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INTRODUCTION
Today the reductionistic view as apparent in neoclassical theorising is
dominating the field of economics. However, criticism developed and is apparent in
all other subfields such as household, gender, ecological and development
economics. Surprisingly, although starting from a different angel, all came to the
same conclusion that social factors or non-economic factors do matter and that the
neoclassical approach is dissatisfying. The contradiction between development
economics and neo-classical economics1 is probably the oldest in this field since the
mechanistic view of human beings developed simultaneously with colonialism. On
the one hand, we had the first economists, namely Smith (1776) Wagner (1876) and
Marshall (1890) who developed the idea of an homo oeconomicus which was
scientifically supported by Darwin’s (1859) famous book, “On the Origin of
Species“ on the other hand, we had the first case studies of African, Asian and Latin
American societies as completed by Waitz (1859) Bastian (1860) Bachofen (1862)
and Ratzel (1882) and it became apparent that those “primitive societies” did not
follow the idea of economic actor as assumed by Smith, Wagner, Marshall, and
many other economists.
As voices from scholars (Kopper 1915, Levy-Bruhl 1910, 1921, Boas 1911,
Thurnwalds 1922) studying “primitive economics” became louder considering social
variables as opposed to pure reductionism, economists declared those scholars as
anthropologists and hence, not belonging to the same science as they do.2 To date
economics has remained a reductionistic, social free and universal applicable
science. Irving Fisher’s words have become common treatment in economics “each
individual acts as he desires all questions of content and limit lay completely within
the realm of psychology, which is beyond the pale of economics“ (1892, quoted by
Coats 1976:51) The reason is that economists became aware very early about
difficulties of combining economic theory with non-economic aspects. The most
sustained expression of this reductionism in relation to ‘primitive economics’ is
                                                
1 Neoclassical economics got its representative name much later, but what was meant by that time,
although generally called classical political economics, is, what was latter called neoclassical
2 in 1929 the Encyclopedia Britannica included in its 1929 edition an article by Firth “Economics,
Primitive”, by 1970 the same article was called “Anthropology, Economic”
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apparent in Goodfellow’s (1939) study and serves as a good example as to why
economists defended economic actor in such a fierce and effective way:
“The aim of this book is to show that the concepts of economic theory must be
taken as having universal validity, and that, were this not so, the result would
be not only scientific confusion, but practical chaos….When it is asked indeed,
whether modern economic theory can be taken as applying to primitive life, we
can only answer that if it does not apply to the whole of humanity then it is
meaningless.“
And in case one dares to suppose otherwise, then as a practical matter
“…the economist has before him no less a task than that of designing a ‘new
economics’, which would apply to the primitive people. The inevitable Further,
task of establishing some correlation between the two ‘systems’ of economics
would then be so vast that we choose not to attempt to consider it”
(Goodfellows, 1939, p. 3-5)
Although today nobody would talk about ‘primitive societies’, we are still
facing the situation of developed countries (DC) functioning next to less developed
countries (LDC)3. Quite often economic theory applicable for DCs appears to be
valueless to LDCs or the other way around, and this is particularly the case in
relation to financial markets. In an age of globalisation, any economic theory can
only be relevant if it is applicable to all countries irrespective from their
developmental state. Therefore, a financial market theory should be developed
allowing for Goodfellow’s “two systems of economics”. My attempt is not to
develop this theory, but to demonstrate that institutionalism is able to provide the
foundation for such a theory.
Goodfellow was quite aware of the difficulties combining ‘primitive
economics’ with the reductionistic view. With the former reflecting the extreme
influence of non-economic variables, it seems to contradict economic theory
focusing on efficiency. The same contradiction becomes apparent if we focus on
financial markets in less developed countries suffering from financial dualism, a
                                                
3 Throughout the dissertation DC and LDC will be used as short form for developed and less
developed countries. Writing about ‘LDC’ does not imply any degrading valuation.
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situation in which a large informal sector coexists alongside a formal one. While the
interest rate in the formal sector reflects the scarcity of money, the interest rate in the
latter reflects the kind and degree of social relations. Contemporary financial market
theories are not able to incorporate an understanding of the informal sector and are,
therefore, only applicable to the formal system which is unsatisfying – or reflects
Goodfellow’s ‘two economic systems’. With over 80 percent of the worlds
population relying on informal financial arrangement (World Bank 2001), financial
informality is not just a small exception. From a macroeconomic perspective a well
functioning financial system is critical for economic development therefore, ignoring
informal financial segment can be critical to understanding the effects of economic
policy.
This dissertation intends to show that sustainable economic growth is only
possible if the two financial market segments are linked, therefore, a financial market
theory is required which including as well non-economic as well as economic
variables. In this context, I suggest that institutionalism could provide the foundation
for such a theory. However, institutionalism is not one unified theory. The conflict of
focus between economic and non-economic variables is reflected in the
contemporary discussion between New Institutional Economics (NIE) and Old
Institutional Economics (OIE)4., but if we assume that we can combine the theories
of NIE and OIE to NIEOIE and we are also able to find empirical evidence
supporting such a theory it can be the beginning of solving Goodfellow’s unbearable
task.
Therefore, the first Part will examine whether it is possible to combine NIE
and OIE towards a theoretical continuum called NIEOIE. Such a theoretical
foundation would allow considering as well informal influences as efficiency aspects
in the process of institution building. However, although both NIE and OIE have
their origin in the dissatisfaction with neo-classical economics (NC), both come to
opposing conclusions in relation to institution building and criticise each other on
those. Therefore, my intention is to investigate whether the criticism, often
                                                
4 Throughout the dissertation NIE is used as synonymous with New Institutional Economics; OIE is
used as synonymous with Old Institutional Economics, and NC as short form for Neo-Classical
Economics
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announced in the dichotomy of formalism versus description, rational choice versus
rule following, evolution versus design, methodological individualism versus holism
and quantity versus quality are consistent. However, the findings suggest that both
schools apply equally the concepts of both sides of the dichotomy, with
methodological individualism versus holism as the only exception. Therefore, a
discussion about an alignment between NIE and OIE can only be conducted if the
view about economic actor can be shared. On first sight, this is not the case. Hence, a
more detailed discussion about the respective view about homo oeconomicus in NIE
and homo sociologicus in OIE will be done. As a closer look shows, OIE does not
mean homo sociologicus in a Marxist manner, rather an institutional individual is
meant allowing for both, informal and efficiency aspects. Further, NIE, by
introducing bounded rationality can not convincingly reject that the economic actor
is an institutional individual. Under these circumstances, the dividing line between
NIE and OIE is blunted and it seems that NIE and OIE can form a theoretical
continuum of NIEOIE.
The intention in the second Part is to investigate whether the theoretical
continuum of NIEOIE can find relevance in reality and, in turn, if today’s reality
requires the theoretical foundation of NIEOIE. In this context, I choose to focus on
financial markets in LDCs since they exhibit a special situation of financial dualism.
Financial dualism refers to a situation in which an extremely large proportion of the
population is excluded from the formal financial sector and engaged in informal
financial arrangements such as borrowing between relatives and therefore, reliant on
non-economic mechanisms. Since over 80 percent of the world’s population (World
Bank 2001) is dependent on informal finance, a financial market theory which is not
able to deal with informality, can never be applicable. Apparently, contemporary
financial market theories are not able to consider informality suggesting that a new
financial market theory is required. Furthermore, the question is whether the
mechanisms behind informal financial arrangements follow similar economic
reasoning as OIE’s theory proposes and whether formal finance is in line with NIE.
The findings suggest that this is the case. Moreover, it seems that a linkage between
informal and formal financial institutions is necessary for economic growth
therefore, suggesting that NIEOIE is relevant. In other words, a financial market
theory able to deal with informal markets can be built on NIEOIE foundations.
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Hence, the necessity to build a financial market continuum of informal/formal
finance reflects the theoretical continuum of NIEOIE.
The intention of Part three is to investigate whether the application of
NIEOIE towards financial markets in LDCs is consistent. The argumentation of Part
II was built on the assumption that the informal financial institution is successful
because it is built on non-economic variables, in contrast, to the formal institution. In
case that the same mechanisms causing the formal institution are also decisive in the
functioning of the informal institution, only NIE and not NIEOIE is relevant. Hence,
it will be examined if NIE is able to explain the advantage and growth potential of
the informal sector. Since NIE is either concerned with information problems
between two actors (either individual or institution – bounded rationality, like limited
knowing about cheating, creates problems) or with information problems caused by
the environment on institutions (shared mental models create inefficient institutions)
the focus is limited to removing information constraints. However, the findings
suggest that the advantage and growth potential of the informal financial sector
cannot be reduced to information properties, therefore, NIE is inappropriate in
application towards financial markets in developing countries and requires an OIE
extension.
The intention of this dissertation is to show that financial market theories can
never be applicable without considering OIE mechanisms. The reasoning is not only
limited to informal/formal institutions in less developed countries, but also to
developed countries as Part IV shows. While politicians often argue that financial
market fragmentation in less developed countries is caused by inefficient formal
institutions, fragmentation in developed countries is caused by too efficient formal
institutions. In this sense, the relevance of a financial market theory solely focusing
on efficiency becomes questionable it itself. Further, the reasoning does not stop at
the micro level of ‘poor people’ banking, but is also important on the macro level
concerning the relationship between the national banking system and the
international banking system. Therefore, NIEOIE is not only a theoretical
experiment, rather it builds the theoretical foundation for future financial market
theories. Such a theory would build a bridge between Goldfellow’s two systems of
economics and would allow for growth enhancing financial innovations.
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PART I – THEORIES OF INSTITUTIONALISM
The contemporary political reality shows, an institutional economic theory is
required. The most interesting aspect of such a theory is how to align informal with
formal institutional forces and how to guide them in a positive manner. This task is
of particular importance to countries with different cultural backgrounds which are in
need of a new institutional environment such as today’s Iraq. The contemporary
existing schools focusing on institutions of NIE and OIE, with the former
concentrating on formal and the latter concentrating on informal rules, are both not
productively able to come to terms with such questions. This might be because one
of their main objectives is still to defend each other according to old prejudices often
pronounced in the dichotomy of formalism/description, design/evolution,
efficiency/reform, liberalism/government intervention and individualism/holism.
(Rutherford 1994, Peukert 2001) Although proponents of both strands are
continuously highlighting the differences among each other, it is common knowledge
among economists that both form rather a continuum than opposite sides.
(Rutherford 1999, Vandenberg 2002, Groenewegen 2000) Since apparently only a
combination of NIE and OIE would be able to overcome their respective
shortcomings, and thereby, producing a valuable institutional theory, it is the purpose
of Part I to enquire whether it is theoreticaly possible to combine NIE and OIE to
NIEOIE.
The task is not to create a new theory, rather an attempt is made to summarise
what is generally accepted and to reflect these insights by suggesting that it is neither
the theory of NIE nor of OIE, but a theoretical complement of both called NIEOIE.
The purpose is to overcome the shortcomings of each approach. NIE neglects
informal mechanisms, OIE rejects the importance of efficiency and information, but
apparently, the contemporary political situation suggests the importance of both.
Although pure NIE or pure OIE form the two ends in the spectrum of institutionalism
in general, neither is nowadays pursued in economics (apart from strict economic
theory). Hence, it seems to be useless and deconstructive to follow old arguments
within antique frameworks while hoping for proven validity. I will start my query of
the possible alignment of NIE and OIE to NIEOIE by defining neo-classical (NC),
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new institutional (NIE) and old institutional economics (OIE) in the first chapter. The
second chapter considers the criticism between NIE and OIE and examines if these
are justified. It appears that NIE and OIE are actually applying each other’s concepts
in relation to formalism, efficiency and reform and thereby, forming a continuum.
The distinct assumption between the two, which is not possible to combine, is the
view of human beings. The essence between their opposing views is the
contradiction of homo oeconomicus in NIE and homo sociologicus in OIE.
Therefore, the question of a theoretical continuum in form of NIEOIE can only be
answered if it is examined as to what kind the actor in such a theory would be and to
what extent he can be aligned to both theories. Hence, Chapter 2 defines homo
oeconomicus of NIE and homo sociologicus of OIE, while asserting their respective
shortcomings. However, the surprising finding is that OIE does not suggest homo
sociologicus in a Marxist manner, rather an institutional individual is meant which is
less reductionistic than the NIE actor. In contrast, to OIE, NIE continues to insist on
its homo oeconomicus actor and explains informal rules with maximising terms
under bounded rationality. Under these circumstances, it seems that NIE cannot be
combined with OIE. Therefore, chapter 3 questions the definition and application of
homo oeconomicus under bounded rationality with the finding that the bounded
rational homo oeconomicus equals the institutional individual of OIE.
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1 Institutionalism
1.1 Why focus on Institutionalism
That institutions matter seems to be almost self-evident, yet, in economic
theory, it is not the case: established growth theory is without institutions. In
contrast, advocates of NIE as well as OIE claim that economic growth and
development would have to be explained primarily by the institutional framework.
(Olson 1996, North 1998) Following the decade of transition in Central and Eastern
Europe, it becomes obvious that implemented macro policies in line with the
Washington consensus, varied considerably in their economic performance.5 (World
Bank 1998) Currently, awareness is emerging that those variations are caused by
different institutional systems. This ‘rethinking’ can be found, for example, in the
World Bank, which is increasingly interested in institutional economics. The World
Banks famous publication, ‘World Development Report’ of 2001/2 focuses solely on
the institutional foundations of a market economy. Some scholars are actually
arguing that the failure of development in the Third World is not so much a failure to
mobilise aid or loans or to make machinery available or anything else of the sort, but
essentially a failure to provide clear ideas on how to set up the appropriate economic
institutions and to shape the appropriate international economic institutions.
(Pasinetti 2001, Williamson 2000, Coase 1998) Similarly one can argue that today’s
Iraqi situation is mainly caused by the mistake to consider institutional forces and
historical context. Being aware of the importance of the institutional environment,
Sachs and Warner (1997) created the ‘institutional quality index’, which often
applied.6 Reported, what differentiates modern societies in terms of economic
development today are differential institutional-cultural patterns. (Zafirovski
2003:804) Since social factors and cultural habits have significant effects on
development (North 1998, Williamson 2000), the question remains on how to align
those insights from ‘reality’ with economic theory. Mainstream economics is not
                                                
5 The term Washington consensus was originally termed by John Williamson (1990) implying the
agreement to follow policies of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. He himself is very
critical about the contemporary meaning, see recent publication. (John Williamson 2000)
6 The approach by Sachs and Warner (1997) is extremely interesting but still limited, as they argue
that the focus of economics should be only on the macro-economic side. In this sense, they miss the
link between institutional forces on the micro-level and the institution on the macro-level.
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only institution free, but seems to contradict the existence of institutions. Therefore,
the question is, whether one can ensure a research programme in which economic
theory and economic institutional analysis are compatible with each other.
1.2 Neo-classical economics
Neo-classical also called mainstream or orthodox economics, continues to be
the textbook-economics students are learning when studying economics. The
question remains therefore, what it is and why it is institutional free, although
institutions seem to be play ‘some’ role. Therefore, section (1.2.1) gives a short
summary about neo-classical economics (NC) to make the distinction to institutional
economic In general, clear. Hence, an overview will be given concerning the major
assumption concerning rationality, actor, equilibrium, and competition. In section
(1.2.2) it will be shown why NC is institutional neutral. Further, section (1.2.3)
summarises general criticism in relation to neutral institutional economics. Section
(1.2.4) shows that neo-classical economics has little relevance for institutional
factors when considering property rights, educational systems, and political regimes.
1.2.1 Summary of NC assumptions and theory
NC is based on the Enlightment notion that humans are rational (it is possible
to calculate potential outcomes to a course of action) and intentional (human have
will and thus, are unlike animals which are guided by instinct).7 Hence, the smallest
unit of account is a rational maximising individual. A maximising actor implies that
the purpose of each individual is to achieve highest utility or profit. Rationality can
be bounded, which denotes a situation in which decisions are rational within the
context of available and processable information. Rational maximising allows NC to
predict and model individual responses to explain economy-wide behaviour. Within
the economy, individuals have various endowments (natural, human, and man-
made), which are useful in producing the goods, and services that satisfy their
preferences. All goods and services are homogenous with all others in their class, but
                                                
7 See Hume (1742), Smith (1776) and Turgots (1769)
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distinct from those in a different class. Equilibrium is ensured through relative prices,
ensuring that goods supplied, and goods demanded are equal and that the market
clears to avoid oversupply or undersupply. The approach is based on efficiency. If
the market mechanism is not obstructed, competition between economic agents will
result in a more efficient use of scarce resources and this will benefit the economy as
a whole. Therefore, the favoured policy regime is market liberalisation with as little
government involvement as possible. The extent to which the individuals can be
satisfied is limited to resources available and the level of technology: to increase per
capita incomes, a society must either accumulate more capital or other resources or
discover new technologies. There are no economies of scale, endowments and
preferences are determined exogenously. A market with zero transaction costs exists
for every economic good and markets are natural entities that emerge spontaneously,
not artificial creatures of governments. When this general competitive model comes
to equilibrium, allocation and distribution are perfectly efficient. This implies that no
reallocation of inputs can increase the output of one good without reducing the
output of another. Hence, it maximises the output of resources and best satisfies
consumer’s preferences and endowments.
1.2.2 NC is institutional neutral
In mainstream theory, characterised by welfare economics and the general
equilibrium models of Arrow-Debreu, institutions play no specific role. (Richter
2000:1) However, neoclassical theory is not as Robert Langlois asserts, (1986) a
“theory without institutions.” A set of institutions is presupposed, but they are the
institutions of a perfectly functioning free-market economy. (Pasinetti 2001:333) In
this sense, NC is only compatible with such a set of institutions. NC treats the
internal workings of its three primary agents – the consumer, the firm, and the
government – as given, nondescript, and beyond analysis. This procedure reflects the
adoption of mechanistic metaphor in economic theory. (Mirowski 1989) In this
rational functioning of individuals and free markets, there is little attention to
habitual, cultural, or historical processes and little recognition of how power and
coercion might affect the operation of markets. The approach is clear, logical and
precise, although narrow. It is a universal applicable theoretical framework in which
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exchange takes place between buyers and sellers without reference to institutional
arrangements, which have developed over time. Hence, it is a-historical and a-
institutional.
1.2.3 General criticism on institutional free economics
At a fundamental level, the core element binding different groups of critiques
on NC together is the conviction that orthodox neoclassical analysis is overly
abstract and incapable of dealing effectively with many problems of interest to
theorists and policymakers. Perhaps it is as Schwartz says “the greatest mystery of
economic thought is that the discipline chose to ignore for so long how firms and
governments come into existence and what determines their true behaviour.” Both
the NIE and OIE rose out of concern with the lack of institutions in conventional
neo-classic economics. “The costs of exchange depend on the institutions of a
country: it’s legal system, its political system, its social system, its educational
system, its culture, and so on” (Coase 1998:73). The NC assumptions of unlimited
knowledge and foresight, unrestricted competitive markets, stable preferences, fully
specified property rights, a neutral state are considered as overly abstracted. In this
context, both schools of new institutional economics and old institutional economics
instead, of focusing on resource allocation emphasise the institutional framework for
distributional matters, where markets have no superiority as control mechanisms. In
the center are not anonymous mechanical market mechanisms, but goal-oriented
personal transactions of individuals and groups. Government intervention is not bad
per se. “It does not imply, when transaction costs are positive, that government
actions…. (regulation or taxation, including subsidies) could not produce a better
result than relying on negotiations between individuals in the market” (Coase
1992:717).
1.2.4 Summary NC economics
Neo-classical economics focuses on a self-interested, utility maximizing
individual which is rational and has complete information. The equilibrium is the
most efficient solution and changes of equilibrium are only caused by relative prices.
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Since prices ensure efficiency, market liberalization is decisive for setting the prices
right. Government intervention is bad per se and institutional entities like states,
governments, firms are considered as black boxes which act like individuals. In this
sense, neo-classical economics are institutional neutral. Critiques of NC point out
that this does not reflect reality and that institutional factors like property rights,
educational system, and political regime have economic decisive influences.
Table 1: Summary NC
Objectives The objective is normative, not positive and designed to predict
optimal end states
Technique A specifically constructed actor, with a specific motive (maximise
utility/profit), placed in a specific environment cannot do anything else
than calculate the one and only optimal position. Principal-agency
theory belongs to the same approach with the only difference that it
includes information asymmetry and opportunistic behaviour, but
because of substantive rationality complete contracting can solve the
problem of “hidden action.”
Limitations Because the assumptions are very abstract the explanatory power of
the theory is questionable. The assumptions are very different from
reality Therefore, correlation does not show causality. It assumes
universal relevancy, but modern micro theory accepts the fact that “all
purpose” theory cannot exist and that the relevancy of the theoretical
building depends on the correspondence with the conditions in hand.
“There is much economic theory that is pursued for no better reason
than its intellectual attraction; it is a good game” (Hicks, 1979, VIII)
Based on Groenewegen, Institutional economics, from black sheep to white knight, Paper prepared
for the Societa Italiana Degli Economisti, XLI Riunione Scientifica Annuale, 27 October, 2000
1.3 Definition Institution
The definition of an institution is an issue not easy to solve and the term has
been used to cover a grab bag of varied things. Given the variety of types of
institutions, it is difficult to provide a definition which is clear and precise (and thus,
possesses analytic value), but which is also encompassing. Various phrasings have
been used to define an institution: a usage that has become axiomatic by habituation;
collective action in control of individual action; widely prevalent, highly
standardized social habits; a way of thought or action embedded in the habits of a
group or the customs of a people; prescribed patterns of correlated behaviour. (Neale
1994, 405) Others broadly define it as a commonplace organisation such as
households, farms, and firms where much of society’s economic activity takes
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place.8 (Cohen 1996:60) Generally, an institution governs interaction between
separate units. It is the behaviour among humans that governs social interaction.
Negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing this relationship is the fundamental aspect of
institutional analysis. (Vandenberg 2002:6) This definition is different from common
understandings of the term such as “financial institutions” or “government” to which
North (1990) refers to as organisations. An institution in form of socially accepted
regularity or behaviour governs the relationship between organisations or among
people themselves and organisations or between people. Different definitions of
institutionalism are surely part of the individual focus of scholars, while Williamson
is concerned with the firm, North deals with institutional change and OIE with the
social whole. Aoki (2000:21) makes a similar point by arguing that the definition of
an institution is not an issue of right or wrong, rather it depends on the focus of
analysis. Hence, it is important to consider what the purpose of each scholar applying
the term ‘institution’ is. The most general definition is done by Vandenberg (2002)
who defines an institution as “a way to govern interaction between separate units.”9
(Vandenberg 2002:6) I will apply Vandenberg’s definition of the term of institution
throughout this paper.
However, my focus is not on what exactly the ‘institution’ is, rather I am
interested in institutional forces behind institution building. One of the more
interesting aspects of institutionalism is the manner in which formal rules interact
with informal rules, in form of cultural norms, and established patterns of behaviour.
It is the interplay between informal and formal rule that might allow for a particular
institution to successfully emerge or to fail. Neither New nor Old institutionalism has
fully come to terms with these questions, although the matter is of enormous
relevance as becomes obvious is cases like contemporary Iraq, Afghanistan or
Serbia.
1.4 New Institutionalism and Old Institutionalism
                                                
8 See for example, Alessandra Casella and Bruno Frey 1992 or Nelson (195:80-81) who use the
institution to refer to particular structures and bodies of law like GATT.
9 See Ruterhford (1994:183) for a similar ‘simple’ definition
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On a fundamental level, the element binding different groups of institutional
researchers together is the conviction that orthodox neoclassical analysis is overly
abstract. The NC assumptions of unlimited knowledge and foresight, unrestricted
competitive markets, stable preferences, fully specified property rights, a neutral
state are considered as over simplified. In this context, two schools of
institutionalism can be defined which are competing for superiority in the fields of
economics. The first one is NIE attempting to work within the logic of mainstream
economics and thus, extends NC theory from one with neutral institutions to one
with active institutions. Section (1.4.1) will deal with NIE theory in general, while
section (1.4.2) defines a NIE definition of institutions. The other strang, competing
with NIE is OIE which was developed at the early twentieth century and focuses on
how social norms influence economic activity through institutions. The theory of
OIE will be outlined in section (1.4.3) and its respective definition will be
summarised in section (1.4.4). Finally, section (1.4.5) will give a short summary
about NIE and OIE.
1.4.1 New Institutionalism
NIE is founded on the contribution of Ronald Coase (1937, 1960) and is
based on the neo-classical principles of rational and maximising behaviour. It
includes work of Alchian, Demsetz, Williamson, and North. Sometimes NIE is
extended to game theoretic approaches and Austrian approaches built on Carl
Menger and Frederick von Hayek. In general, NIE takes the self-interested,
maximising individual (methodological individual) as given with exogenous tastes
and technology. Standard neoclassical economics based on rational actor is extended
with the aim to explain the existence of political, legal, or more generally social,
institutions by reference to a model of individual behaviour and the reliance on the
concept of positive transaction costs, which are considered zero in NC. However, as
Rutherford (1994,2) demonstrates NIE itself is not as coherent as often argued. One
major strang deals with property rights (Demsetz 1967, Alchian and Demsetz 1973)
and common law (Posner 1977, 1981). Another strang is concerned with public
choice, rent seeking and distributive coalitions. (Olson 1982, Mueller 1989) Other
elements deal with organisations (Jensen and Meckling 1976) and agency costs
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(Coase 1937), which is utilised by Williamson (1975, 1985). Further, aspects include
game theory (Shubik 1975, Schotter 1981). NIE is also usually defined as including
Austrian and neo-Schumpeterian economics (Hayek 1967, 1973, 1979; Nelson and
Winter 1982).
However, In general, all agree that development and functioning of
institutions are caused by efficiency terms hence, they are analysed as ways to reduce
transactions costs, uncertainty, internalising externalities and producing collective
benefits from cooperative behaviour. In this framework, institutions are efficient
solution to economics i.e. to select the most efficient organisational form, or set of
routines, or rules. The individual is constrained, but not otherwise influenced by
institutions. Institutions affect individual behaviour, but only in terms of choices,
constraints and information presented to the agents, not by the moulding of the
preferences and indeed the very individuality of those agents themselves (Hodgson,
1994:399). The possibility that individuals are themselves shaped by institutions is
not considered. Hence, Neoclassicism becomes capable to deal with issues relevant
to institutionalism.
1.4.2 NIE definition of institution
For analytical reasons, it is important to differentiate between two major
strands within NIE. The first one which is called NIE1 throughout the dissertation
focuses on intra-firm issues and considers the institutional environment as given,
while the second one which is called NIE2, is more interested in institutional change
itself and less in governance structure. In context of both strands, a definition of
institution will be given below.
i) NIE1 definition of institution
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The first approach focuses on the choice of governance structures of private
actors under a given institutional environment. It is based on Coase’s market system
of resource allocation. Coase (1937) points out those firms arise from the cost of
using the price mechanism. At a very basic level, it asks how production is
organized, either by the price mechanism across markets or within a hierarchically
organized firm. (Coase 1937) Williamson improved the theory of the firm with
focusing on the relationship within a bank or firm. In 1975, he introduced the role of
the firm or hierarchy as an alternative to market resource allocation in a comparative
institutional framework. (Hodgson 1994:240) Williamson typically represents
specific choices between external markets and internal (intra firm) markets. i.e.
internal labor markets, internal capital markets and internal intermediate product
markets. (Kay 1992) By focusing on internal market, the relationships between i.e.
workers and owners (principal agent problem) become significant. Williamson’s
relational contract theory deals with complex long-term relationships between buyers
and sellers and it is the governance structure of a contractual relationship that
matters. (Furubotn and Richter 1997:170)
For Williamson, the relationship between workers and owners/managers
(principal agent problems) or between divisions is of prime importance.
Williamson’s definition of institutions is, therefore, quite specific: they are
mechanisms, governing transactions, and a transaction occurs “when a good or
service is transferred across a technologically separable interface” (Williamson
1985:1). Thus, there are three principle institutions in capitalism: the market, the
firm, and supply (or relational) contracting. The firm is an institution because
transaction between divisions represents interaction across this separable interface.
The institutional choice of firms, of whether to make or buy a component, involves a
choice between whether the interaction takes place between firms or between
departments within a firm. The make-or-buy (or buy on supply contract) decision is
the key and indeed almost the sole problematic of Williamson’s work, and it is
analysed with reference to a number of concepts like bounded rationality,
opportunism and asset specificity.
ii) NIE2 definition of institution
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The second approach does not take the institutional environment as given. It
is interested in ascertaining the effects that various instititutional environments have
on economic performance and development, as well as in explaining the change of
the institutional environment over time. (North 1998, Harris 1998, Bates 1998, Ball
1999) The study of governance – in particular the theory of the firm – is more
developed than the study of the institutional environment (Klein 1999) and plays a
more prominent role in the module of competition and regulations. Among the
representatives of this second line, it remains an open question whether the NIE
basically remains within the neoclassical paradigm and simply deals with a number
of questions previously neglected by mainstream theory or if NIE is indeed an
entirely new paradigm that is incompatible with neoclassical economics.
The NIE2 work is broader, it does not only deal with private sector decision,
but also less precise and less interested in intra-firm issues. The definition of
institutions is consciously broad: “a framework within which human interaction takes
place “(North 1990:4). It can encompass both inter- and intra-organisational issues of
private transacting, as well as the legal and regulatory environment, which requires
an understanding of the political system. Furthermore, it includes the cultural,
ideological, and cognitive processes, providing norm structures and thus guide
human interaction. Partly ,it has borrowed extensively from game theory. Thus,
Douglas North (1990) in line with Thrainne Eggertsson (1990) has also proposed that
institutions are “the rules of the game.” The institution as “rule of a game” has been
further developed by Greif (1998, 1994, 1997, 1998), Milgram, North, and Weingast
(1990), Greif, Milgrom and Weingast (1994) and Calvert (1995) who rely on
sophisticated concepts of equilibrium, such as sub-game perfect equilibrium, in
repeated prisoners dilemma games. Regarding the origin of an institution, the rule-of-
the game theorists tend to subscribe to the design view that rule-making is
susceptible to conscious design either by legislators, political entrepreneurs, or
mechanism design economists. (Aoki 2000:19)
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Table 2: Summary of New Institutional Economics
Objectives The objective of NIE is to explain the institutions that coordinate
transactions.
Techniques Two stream can be distinguished (Rutherford 1994): the formalist
(game theory) and literary (transaction cost economics)
Technique
Game Theory
The players and the rules of the game are given, although this looks
like a single exit construction there is no optimal outcome guaranteed.
More equilibria are possible, but also none. What outcome depends on
conditions assumed
Limitation
Game Theory
Without complementary information about institutional conditions
game theory is silent about economic issues like subcontracting
Technique
Transaction Cost
TCE explain governance structures that match specific types of
transactions. It uses as basic unit the transaction and identifies potential
governance structures, like vertical integration, a classical market
contract or a hybrid like subcontracting. Further, it makes plausible
matches of types of transactions with governance structure using asset
specificity, opportunism, safeguards, farsightedness, and the like.
Transaction A will be matched with governance structure X because of
cost economising reasons.
Limitation
Transaction Cost
Because of the introduction of bounded rationality next to opportunism,
complete contracting is not possible anymore – in contrast, to NC.
However, TC does not explain different governance structures in case
of identical transaction. Apart from this TCE is only appropriate for
comparative static analysis. Economic issues of dynamics, processes,
analysis of adaptation, are not within the reach of TCE.
Based on Groenewegen, Institutional economics, from black sheep to white knight, Paper prepared
for the Societa Italiana Degli Economisti, XLI Riunione Scientifica Annuale, 27 October 2000
1.4.3 Old Institutionalism
Old Institutionalism is built on a tradition associated with Thorstein Veblen,
John R. Commons, Wesley Mitchell and Clarence Ayres and continued in recent
contri, butions by Geoffrey Hodgson, Warren Samuels, Dugger and Malcolm
Rutherford. OIE does not represent a single well-defined or unified body of thought,
methodology, or programme of research.10 The core ideas of institutionalism concern
institutions, habits, rules and their evolution and is built on Veblens main criticisms
(1919) that orthodox economic theory does not address the analysis of long-term
growth. The neoclassical approach, with its rational actor, is abandoned in favour of
one placing economic behaviour in its cultural context. Development and functioning
of institutions is caused by social and political factors as status, group, identity,
                                                
10 Even within the early institutionalists did not represent a unified school which becomes obvious
with the two differing strands of either Veblen or Common. While the first one concentrates on
political and economic power of large corporate interests, the second one focuses on property rights
and organisations, and the impact on legal and economic power.
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ideology, and economic, political power. (Rutherford 1995, Hodgson 1998, Galbraith
1967) Issues of influence, coalitions, and competing values are central in OIE, along
with power and informal structures. (Clark 1960, 1972, Selynick, 1949, 1957,
Greenwood and Hinings 1996) In an OIE view, the concept of habit connects
crucially with the analysis of institutions. This has important implications for both
microeconomic and macroeconomic analysis. (Hodgson 1998:167-68) Every
transaction, Commons smallest unit of analysis, reflects more than efficiency alone.
It also incorporates a stable social order – a kind of higher order efficiency, therefore,
most transactions are habitual and repetitive. (Groenwegen 2000:469) OIE rejects
individualistic welfare criteria and static equilibrium while favouring greater
government involvement to correct institutional failures. (Rutherford, 1994:4) The
structure of social and economic reality is seen as complex, functional, and
interdependent, while the dynamics of this structure are described in evolutionary
terms. In this respect, there is an affinity between institutionalism and biology.
Evolutionary biology has a few laws or general principles by which origin and
development can be explained and it requires both specific and general theories. In
summary, OIE is descriptive, anti-formalistic, holistic, behaviouristic and
collectivistic. (Hodgson 1998) OIE has not a hard-core assumption that defines it,
except that rather than the individual the institutions is considered as unit of analysis.
With tastes and technology as endogenous and economic behaviour as
interdependent the approach is organic and hence, descriptive and non-formalised.
1.4.4 OIE definition of institution
OIE focuses on the cognitive-behavioural aspect, based on the insight of
Veblen, who defined institutions as the “settled habits of thought common to the
generality of men”. (Veblen 1948:239) OIE economists have used the term to refer to
those aspects of culture affecting human and organisational action. With this
perspective, institutions refer to the complex of socially learned and shared values,
norms, beliefs, meanings, symbols, customs, and standards that delineate the range of
expected and accepted behaviour in a particular context. This view of institutions is
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alive and well in modern sociology. (Walter Powell and Paul Di Maggio 1991). It
gives the alternative school a behaviourialist bend and explains its emphasis on
sociology and psychology. Thus, institutions include habits, cultural characteristics,
and routinised behaviour, which may not involve the type of deliberative-rationalised
action, which is the motivation behind neo-classical behaviour. In game theory, the
concept is similar to those relying on evolutionary and repeated games as developed
by Sudgen (1998), Aoki (1995, 2000), Young (1998), Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara
(1998) and Bowles (2000). Concerning the question of origin of an institution in
OIE, there is no clear consensus on this issue.
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Table 3: Summary of Old Institutional Economics
Objective The objective is to understand the complex process of institutional
dynamics.” The institution in which he finds himself is both the cause
and effect of his beliefs…Common beliefs and desire is the vitalizing,
active force within the institution. (Commons 1965, 6-8, quoted from
Hodgson 2000) By endogenising the relation between the individual
and institutional environment the OIE is now capable to grasp
variables like power, learning, perceptions and path dependency.
Technique When analysing a specific issue, one is forced to make general
concepts specific with specific conditions of time and place. In doing
so it s is unavoidable to incorporate different explanatory variables
from different disciplines. The OIE analysis positions the issue in the
broader context of the formal and informal institutional context.
“However, since the new data are constantly coming in and since the
system itself is evolving the model is constantly being revised and can
neither be completed nor rigorously confirmed the techniques of
observation and concept development should be such as to somehow
capture and express the holistic quality. (Rutherford, 1994, 16)
Obvious the purpose is to get hold of the dynamics of the whole.
Limitations The theory is very abstract and rigorous and less relevant for
understanding specific situations
Based on Groenewegen, Institutional economics, from black sheep to white knight, Paper prepared
for the Societa Italiana Degli Economisti, XLI Riunione Scientifica Annuale, 27 October
1.4.5 Summary NIE and OIE
NIE as well as OIE is critical of NC theory in its a-historical and a-
institutional approach. However, while NIE attempts to extend neoclassical thinking
towards institutional theory, OIE rejects the rational-efficiency assumption by
underlying the importance of social norms in relation to the institutional
environment. NIE is split into NIE1 dealing with the institution itself like the firm
previously considered as black box, and into NIE2 dealing with institutional change.
NIE2, is in its nature very closely related to OIE since both focus on the political-
economic sphere and sometimes are difficult to distinguish. However, the main
difference between NIE and OIE is that the first one does not consider the possibility
that individuals are shaped by institutions themselves.
⇒ NIE and OIE both criticise NC for the neglect of institutions
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2 Relationship between NIE and OIE
2.1 Distinction between NIE and OIE
Although both the NIE and OIE deal with institutions and criticise NC for
being too abstract, both represent a varying response to the same problem. These
differences during, the past and present have resulted in theoretical conflicts. This
discrepancy has become overstressed to such an extent that both schools have
became a “paradigm discipline” (Stanfield 1989), rather than an innovative economic
theory. Accordingly, the theoretical approach of NIE and OIE are often dichotomised
into formalism versus description, methodological individualism versus holism,
rational choice versus rule following, invisible hand versus collectivism, and non-
interventionist government versus interventionist government. (Rutherford 1994:6,
Peukert 2001:4)
Table 4: Comparison NIE and OIE
NIE OIE
Formalism:
Mathematics, Models
Anti-formalism:
Descriptive, anti-theoretical
Individualism:
Everything can be explained by
individual action
Holism:
Deals with social influences on individual
action
Rationality:
The individual acts only rational
Rule following:
The individual follows habits and
routines
Evolution:
Institution develop according to an
invisible hand
Design:
Behind the institution exists an intention
and Hence, is the social outcome of an
idea
Efficiency:
Institutional change occurs if a higher
degree of efficiency can be achieved
Reform:
Institutional change is dependent on
power and the preferences of those who
have power
Table by Alexandra Bernstorff 2004
The dispute in relation to the dichotomy is the dividing line, which
classifying scholars as either being NIE or OIE. It implies that if a scholar applies
mathematical models or deductive reasoning, it is assumed that he belongs to NIE.
Similarly, theories and assumptions only expressed by language are categorised as
OIE. While the explanatory movement by NIE scholars is from individual to
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institutions, the movement goes into opposite directions according to OIE writers.
(Hodgson 2003) Thus, NIE scholars conceive social institutions as joint outcomes of
rational individual activities; while in contrast, OIE writers define the former as
societal phenomena modelling pattern in relation to the individual.(Zafirovski
2003:800) According to NIE in the “beginning there were markets” (Williamson
1975:20) which contradicts the OIE view that social institutions and rules are
historically prior to and determinative of market phenomena (Zafirovski 2003,
Hodgson 2002, Myrdal 1953, Pirker and Rauchenschwandtner 1998) Based on those
opposing assumptions, NIE and OIE form contradicting schools having explicit
characteristics. Accordingly scholars are categorised as either NIE or OIE in relation
to assumptions made in relation to the dichotomy.
2.2 Criticism between NIE and OIE
As noted above, the dispute between NIE and OIE centers on the five main
topics in relation to the degree of formalism, rationality, individuality, design and
government intervention. (Rutherford 1994:174) The differing views are the
foundation for criticism between each other. In this context, this chapter will
consider the criticism of NIE on OIE in section (2.2.1) and respectively, the criticism
of OIE on NIE in section (2.2.2). The criticism between both will be summarised in
section (2.2.3).
2.2.1 Critique of NIE on OIE
NIE complains about the OIE lack of theory. The OIE tendency to argue in
holistic terms rather than in individualist terms; the use of ‘behaviouristic’ rather
than rational choice framework; the failure to give sufficient emphasis to
economising as ‘the main case’; and the failure to appreciate the importance of
unintended and evolutionary processes in institutional development as opposed to
processes of collective decision making and instititutional design causes a social, but
not economic theory. (Seckler 1975, North 1978, Schotter 1981, Coase 1984,
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Williamson 1987, Ault and Ekelund 1988) The view is clearly and harshly expressed
in the famous words of Langlois (1986) and Coase (1984).
“The problem with the Historical School and many of the early Institutionalists
is that they are an economics with institutions, but without theory; the problem
with many neo-classicists is that they want economic theory without
institutions; what we should really want is both institutions and theory. “
(Langlois 1986:5)
“American institutionalists were not theoretical, but anti-
theoretical……Without a theory they had nothing to pass on except a mass of
descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire” (Coase 1984:230)
According to NIE, OIE is a descriptive theory which can not be modelled nor
used as advice for any economic questions. OIE draws a picture without any
resolution, due to its descriptive analysis, it is not possible to calculate outcomes and
Hence, it rejects all quantitative methods. With the inclusion of psychology, habits
etc. OIE introduces too many non-calculable variables and blunts the distinction
between economics and other social sciences. (Rutherford 1994)
2.2.2 Critique of OIE on NIE
OIE criticises NIE for being too abstract and formal in which the individual is
reduced to rational maximising actor which is constrained, but not otherwise
influenced by institutions. (Mirowski 1981, Zafirovski 2003, Field 1981, 1984,
Dugger 1983, Dow 1987, Hodgson 1998) Further, OIE criticises that NIE demands a
universal applicable theory. In this form, NIE is inappropriate in relation to and
explanation of certain classes or social phenomena. According to OIE, formal models
of NIE use only those assumptions which are mathematically tractable and not those
reflecting reality. For example, equilibrium analysis based on maximising behaviour
is easier to trace than a process of adaptation. Even worse in OIE eyes, is the fact that
a high degree of abstraction creates generalisation on the one hand, and
indeterminacy on the other. The economic conclusion in formal models depends only
on the specifics of the situation omitted from the model. (Rutherford 1994:8)
Therefore, OIE rejects universal models and focuses instead, on case studies.
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Additionally, OIE criticizes that the central concepts of NIE are indefinable.
Although NIE uses formal models and mathematical equations, the inputs in those
are too imprecise to identify economic laws. Transaction costs, for example, include
search, information, bargaining, decision, and enforcement costs. (Peukert 2001) As
it is nowhere stated how to calculate them, the estimated percentage of transactions
costs of total costs varies considerably. Wallis and North (1986) assume that in
modern western industrial societies, the percentage of transaction costs is
approximately 45%, while Richter assumes that they are near 80%. (Furubotn and
Richter 1997:9) Further, OIE argues that it is not necessarily positive to reduce
transaction costs. The increase of transaction costs at one point of the economy may
reduce transaction costs and uncertainty elsewhere (e.g. the Tobin tax or zoning
laws).11 If positive transaction costs are accepted it follows “that all of the elements
traditionally taken as data in neoclassical theory can no longer be accepted as
objectively given.” (Furubotn 1997:11).
OIE also is critical towards the assumption that all aspects of life can be
interpreted in economic terms. For example, Ensminger (1997) explains religious
conversion to Islam with arguing that the new religion reduces transaction costs.
Apart from the fact that transaction costs are not proper defined, as argued above,
NIE is not clear as to how and why Islam has developed and not for example,
Buddhism. In this sense, NIE always assumes that there is the one best solution and
religion as an institution is reduced to the most efficient institution - which leaves the
question of which religion has more right for existence than the others open. NIE has
difficulties to explain why and how norms develop and is not able to deal with
behavioral aspects other than opportunism. Additionally, NIE is not very convincing
concerning economic development. On the one hand, it is assumed that a democracy
and a free market economy will automatically develop through time. (Alchian 1950)
On the other hand, neither democracy nor liberal market regimes did develop in
many contemporary LDCs. “In comparing economic systems, the question is always
what accelerated or inhibited growth? In pre-modern societies this leads to the
question: what prevented growth? Was economic growth really always the system’s
                                                
11 For Further, arguments see Hensler and Matzner (1994).
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objective (see Sombart 1916) and not political power, salvation, prestige, the
minimization of work effort or something else?” (Peukert 2001:11)
 2.2.3 Summary Criticism between NIE and OIE
As demonstrated above, NIE and OIE are two contrasting oppositions. The
contradiction is not only obvious in the theory and its respective assumptions, as
demonstrated above, but also in political advice. While the former, for example,
advises as little government intervention as possible the latter argues for a strong
state to avoid poverty and inequality. In this sense, it is surprising that both strands,
although they developed concerning the omission of institutions in economics, come
to contradiction conclusions. Although the criticisms between both are
overemphasized for analytical reasons, they can still be found in contemporary
writings. For example, Zafirovski (2003) and Hodgson (1998) in relation to OIE
critique on NIE, and Furubotn and Richter (1997) concerning NIE critique on OIE
side.
⇒ NIE and OIE take two opposing positions in relation to modeling,
rationality, institution, institutional change and the assumptions about
the individual
Table 5: Criticism between NIE and OIE compared
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CRITIQUE OIE ON NIE CRITIQUE NIE ON OIE
Modeling Too formal Too abstract
Individual Too reduced Too holistic
Rationality Too extreme Too little
Institution Do not influence Individual The individual is not able think
independently from its
institutional surrounding
Institutional Change Institution do not only change
for efficiency reasons
It is not possible to design
institutions
Table by Alexandra Bernstorff 2004
2.3 Is the criticism consistent?
The intention of this dissertation is to investigate whether the criticism and
often cited dichotomy between NIE and OIE is consistent. In case the often cited
dichotomy cannot be found in the writings of respective scholars, it could be that a
more adequate solution to the problem of institution building be found if elements of
OIE and NIE are combined. Therefore, it is essential to examine if the criticism
between NIE and OIE are consistent and theoretically defensible. Hence, section
(2.3.1) considers if the criticism from OIE on NIE is more than an objection against
NC. Further, section (2.3.2) will examine if the often stated dichotomy between both
strands in relation to formalism, efficiency, and design can find justification in the
writings of scholars by either school. Section (2.3.3) concludes that the only position
between both approaches which seems to be incompatible is the assumption about
economic actor.
2.3.1 Critique of OIE on NIE only critique of NC?
It can be argued that the main critique of OIE on NIE is not based on NIE
assumptions, but on those of NC. Therefore, the question remains whether NIE is
basically compatible with the neoclassical paradigm and just dealing with questions
previously neglected by mainstream economics or if NIE is indeed an entirely new
school that contradicts with NC. The point is that attempts by OIE to criticize
neoclassical theory from an institutionalist perspective may be quite valid, but
proponents of the NIE can share such a critique. The critical question, then, is
whether the OIE can muster a valid critique of the NIE or in fact whether the new
institutionalism is a useful modification and extension of neoclassical theory.
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(Vandenberg 2002:221) This critical distinction is not always clearly defined and
thus, the otherwise excellent alternative institutional analysis of Hodgson is for the
most part a critique of neoclassical theory and only incidentally a critique of the NIE.
This might be due conviction that it is impossible to produce an institutional theory
that is compatible with neo-classic.
On first glance similarities of NC and NIE are obvious both use the concepts
of scarcity, competition, efficiency, price theory, and actor with exogenous tastes.
However, NIE introduces the concept of transaction cost (TC) and bounded
rationality (BR) to be able to explain institutional phenomena as well as economic
differences.12 TCE was originally introduced by Ronal Coase (1937) who defined
them as the costs of using the market. They were introduced to give a rational for the
existence of firms. If the market would function efficiently and costless, as assumed
by NC, there is no reason for firms to exist at all. Dahlman (1979) later described
transaction costs as “search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, and
policing and enforcement costs”. Bounded rationality was originally introduced by
Simon (1955) and criticizes that conventionally in NC it is assumed that individuals
try to maximize utility in a perfectly rational way. In the words of Kreps (1990:745)
the NC actor is: “A completely rational individual (that) has the ability to foresee
everything that might happen and to evaluate and optimally chooses among available
courses of action, all in the blink of an eye and at not cost”. According to Simon, the
brain capacity does not allow individuals to preview every possible state of the
world, know all the options they can choose from, and be able to evaluate all their
possible consequences instantaneously and costless. Simon criticized the assumption
by arguing that humans are ‘bounded rational’, they are rational under the
processable and knowable information. NIE adapted the concept by introducing
uncertainty as a state of affairs in which actors are not able to calculate expected
values because they are not able to foresee all states the world can possibly take on.
(Jack Knight 1992) Inefficient economic decisions are therefore, not irrational, rather
it was not possible to know or calculate the most efficient solution and hence, a less
efficient solution was chosen. The application of non-calculable transaction costs and
                                                
12 Throughout the dissertation the short forms TC is used for transaction costs, BR for bounded
rationality and IC for information costs.
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non-calculable information insights suggests that the theory of NIE differs greatly
from NC, thus, most criticism of OIE is on NC and not on NIE.
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Table 6: Comparison NIE and NC
NC NIE
Methodological individualism Yes Yes
Choice Theory Yes Yes
Price Theory Yes Yes
Competition Yes Yes
Bounded Rationality No Yes
Transaction Costs No Yes
Institutions No Yes
Government Intervention No Yes
Table by Alexandra Bernstorff 2004
2.3.2 Dichotomy between NIE and OIE
Although often dichotomised, the differences between NIE and OIE are not
as clear as often believed. It will be examined if political advice and economic
statements between NIE and OIE are oppositions or if they are, indeed similar. After
considering all points of the dichotomy in relation to formalism, efficiency, design,
rationality and individualism, it shows that the criticism between NIE and OIE is
reducible to the one assumption about rational man.
a) formalism versus description
The view of the OIE as primarily descriptive and anti-theoretical is quite
misleading. Indeed, OIE rejected the mathematical modeling, but the discussion is
not theory versus description rather concerns the appropriate degree of abstraction.
(Rutherford 1994:9) Even the work of Mitchell and of Commons contains theoretical
underpinnings and theoretical purposes. (Rutherford 1983, 1987) Moreover, new
formal techniques are being developed and attracting interest in both not only in NIE,
but also in OIE. Examples are chaos theory and other models applied to complex
dynamic systems. (Rutherford 1994:184) See, for example, Anderson, Arrow, Pines
(1988) Baumol and Benhabib (1989) in relation to NIE and Radzicki (1988, 1990)
Dopfner (1991) in relation to OIE side. Although NIE is more formal in its theory
than OIE, the degree of formalism within NIE varies widely. For example, it is at its
greatest in the work of Shunick (1975) and Schotter (1983) who deal with agency-
and game theory and little present in the work of North (1990) or Williamson (2000.
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In this context, De Alessi (1999:11) argues that the NIE can be divided into
‘formalists’ and a ‘literary’ branch and claims to find a “growing bifurcation”
between the two. (Rutherford 1994:21) This division within the NIE reflects some of
the same issues that led to the separation of OIE from neoclassical mainstream. De
Alessi (1999) places writers such as Alchian, Coase, Demsetz, North and Williamson
in the literary group and points out that the desire to deal with institutional
complexities leads to less formal approaches. For example, Coase (1984) hardly uses
any mathematical models and argues that the assumption of the individual as
“rational utility maximiser” is both “unnecessary and misleading”. He continues by
stating: “Modern institutional economics should study man as he is, acting within the
constraints imposed by real institutions”. (Coase 1984:231) It is interesting that, as
well, NIE as OIE scholars acknowledged their respective shortcomings and urged for
complementarity of both approaches. For example: Field (1979) as OIE scholar, and
Basu Jones & Schlicht (1987) as NIE scholars.
“The best theoretical work has always been that which combines a detailed
knowledge of the subject under investigation with the ability to abstract and
interrelate its essential features” (Field 1979:67/OIE)…” It is only with the
general acceptance of the value of both types of work that we may be able to
effectively address the challenge of developing an adequate institutional
economics.” (Field 1979:69/OIE)
”NIE tends to be structural, explaining an institution as an optimal institutional
solution without reference to the past. This is the opposite of what historians
tend to do. We urge….that both structural and historical explanations are
needed in economic history, and that these are complementary rather than
exclusive.” (Basu, Jones and Schlicht 1987:2/NIE)
Whatever the strengths of NIE or OIE, neither the highly formal nor the
descriptive methods can, on their own, provide an adequate approach to an
institutional economics approach. Therefore, it is necessary to “develop an
institutional economics that is both theoretically compelling and historically
relevant”. (Rutherford 1994:26)
b) evolution versus design
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The terminology of evolution versus design might be misleading and should
not be confused with the discussion about spontaneous order. According to OIE,
institutional change is an unintended process, while NIE argues that institutional
change is a purposive process. However, to my knowledge, the contradiction cannot
be find in respective writings, as well NIE as OIE consider both as relevant to
institutional evolution.13 The attempt of contradicting the NIE focus on design with
OIE assumption of evolution is often done by overlooking the differences between
Veblens and Commons view. While Veblen assumes that institutional change is an
unintended consequence to new circumstances and not caused by a purpose,
Commons believes that change can be attributed as well to purpose as to externalities
like conflict. (Rutherford 1994:126) Contemporary OIE writers like Hodgson (1998)
or Zafirovski (2003) assume that as well purposive as unintended consequences
result in institutional evolution. However, neither Veblens emphasis on market
power and technology nor Commons emphasis on conflict resolution is on odds with
moral hazards and transaction costs. (Rutherfords 1994:127) Similarily, most of the
NIE discussion of economic history includes both evolutionary and design processes.
(Rutherford 1994:126) Similarities between purpose versus design are quite obvious
in the work of Commons and Williamson. Commons emphasis of political parties
reflects Williamson focus on hierarchy and North’s discussion of judges. (For an
interesting discussion of Williamson and Commons on vertical integration see
Medema 1992) The connection between Veblen and NIE is less pronounced since
NIE in general, deals little with technology. However, Veblen’s assumption that
technological change causes unintended institutional movement has links to North’s
discussion of the “ongoing interaction between organized economic activity, the
stock of knowledge, and the institutional framework”. (1990:78).
c) Efficiency versus Reform
It is often argued that NIE focuses solely on market efficiency, while OIE
rejects the assumption that a free market causes social positive outcomes. According
to NIE, the free market creates automatically the most efficient solution for the
individuals, therefore, the government should intervene as little as possible. In
                                                
13 The view, that according to OIE institutional change is unintended has its roots Veblen who
focused mainly on technology as driving force behind institutional change.
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contrast, OIE criticizes that markets tend to create inefficiencies in relation to income
distribution, wealth, economic opportunity, power, unemployment, macroeconomic
instability, blocking of technological improvements and various forms of “waste”
such as competitive salesmanship (Veblen 1904, 1975, Tugwell, Munro and Stryker
1930, Common 1934, 1961, Mitchell 1935-1950, Ayres 1962) Therefore, OIE tends
to advocate a greater amount of regulation or direct intervention by government.
However, many NIE scholars dealing with institutional change, criticize the use of
pareto optimality (Demsetz 1969, De Alessi 1983, Eggertsson 1990) and favor
institutional guidance. Typical representatives are of Buchanan and Tullock (1965)
and Hayek (1967, 1973). While the former consider the constitution as an outcome of
voluntary exchange, the latter stresses the importance of individual freedom on
evolutionary processes. However, as well OIE as NIE have addressed the question of
judging welfare in relation to institutional change and governmental guidance. The
main difference between the two strands cannot be found in different governmental
policy advice rather in the significance given to individuals in relation to voluntary
exchange. (Rutherford 1994:170)
d) individualism/rationality versus holism/rule-following
NIE and OIE both agree that history matters and efficiency is not always
achieved, both keep a distance from the assumptions of perfect rationality, perfect
foresight and zero transaction cost. (Richter 1996:588) Nevertheless, they do not
agree on assumption about the individual. NIE argues that the individual is rational
and decides as rational and efficient as possible (homo oeconomicus). In contrast,
OIE believes that the individual is rather a rule follower than a rational actor (homo
sociologicus). While NIE assumes that institutions do not influence individual
decisions apart from being constraints (methodological individualism), OIE is
convinced that institutions do influence individual actions and preferences (holism).
NIE and OIE actually apply both sides of the dichotomy noted above,
formalism/description, evolution/design and efficiency/reform, but it is not possible
to apply both assumptions about the individual. In this sense, the question concerning
rationality and individualism versus rule following and holism seems to form the
dividing line between NIE and OIE. The independency or interdependency of
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institutions and individuals forms a contradiction which is difficult to come terms
with. It is not only a theoretical twist between NIE and OIE, rather it forms the
philosophical problem concerning the interrelationship between individuals and
society in general. (Rutherford 1994:6)
2.3.3 Summary of consistent criticism
As demonstrated above, most criticism announced by OIE in relation to NIE
is a critique on NC and is shared by scholars of NIE. Furthermore, it remains an open
question to what extent the NIE assumption concerning bounded rationality and
transaction cost is compatible with NC. Additionally, the often stated dichotomy
between NIE and OIE in relation to formalism, efficiency, and design is nonexistent
in respective writings. Both schools use and apply the contradicting issues of the
dichotomy in their writings. The distinct position between both concerns solely the
assumption about individualism/rationality (homo oeconomicus) versus holism/rule-
following (homo sociologicus).
⇒ The dichotomy between NIE and OIE concerns only the assumption
about the economic actor as either homo oeconomicus or homo
sociologicus
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3 Economic Actor
Chapter 2 has investigated to what extent the criticism between NIE and OIE
are consistent. After examining the different views of the dichotomy, it became clear
that scholars of both schools use equally formalist and descriptive techniques and
appreciate, depending on the case, government intervention and institutional design.
However, the view about the relationship between the individual and the institution
cannot be aligned. Since the assumption about economic actor as either homo
oeconomicus or homo sociologicus forms the basic dividing line between the two
approaches, it then requires a more detailed analysis of the meaning homo
oeconomicus (3.1) and homo sociologicus (3.2) and its actual application by NIE and
OIE. Further, the concept of institutional individualism (3.3) and bounded rationality
(3.4) will be examined. The intention is to explore if NIE or OIE actually keep to
their assumption about the individual, or if indeed both are already using a ‘watered
down’ version. In case both apply similar concepts about the economic actor NIE
and OIE do not form contradicting schools, but rather a theoretical continuum of
NIEOIE. Such a theoretical continuum allows an understanding of efficiency and
pure market forces while simultaneously allowing informal mechanisms to be
relevant and hence, overcomes the shortcomings of as well NIE as OIE. Section (3.5)
summarises the findings of Part I while suggesting that NIEOIE is relevant.
3.1 Homo oeconomicus
This chapter focuses on homo oeconomicus. In section (3.1.1) the historical
foundation of reductionism and the assumption homo oeconomicus is described.
Section (3.1.2) characterises homo oeconomicus. Section (3.1.3) summarises the
economic use and implication of applying homo oeconomicus and reductionism.
Section (3.1.4) describes the advantages of using homo oeconomicus and
reductionism, while section (3.1.5) describes the respective limits.
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3.1.1 Historical context homo oeconomicus
Since the seventeenth century French philosopher Descartes, research has
been reductionistic in nature. An increasing number of scientific researchers since
have started to look at reality in an analytical way. They did so by subdividing the
research object in particles to serve the idea of constructing models similar to
Newtonian mechanics. (Verschuren 2001:389) Such models treat economic agents as
if they were particles obeying mechanical laws whose behaviour could be described
by a solvable system of equations. Application of atomism to the economic realm
means treating human desires as fundamental data, which, like the masses of
physical bodies in classical mechanics, are not affected by the relations being
modelled. (Fullbrook 2002:1) Homo oeconomicus was considered as being the
mental destiny of humans, hence, most economists of that time agreed with Adolph
Wagner’s (1876, 1.i:82) statement that “the principles of economic nature are lodged
fast in human bodily mental organisation, and they change as little as does external
nature, at least during the epochs relevant to human history”. The idea that humans
have emotions and do not act mechanically seemed to be ridiculous as becomes
obvious with Irving Fishers statement in 1892 “ This foisting of Psychology on
Economics seems to me inappropriate and vicious. (quoted in Coats 1976:51). The
universal application of homo oeconomicus in all aspects of life is an expression of
reductionism as it was and is apparent in economic theory.
3.1.2 Characteristic homo oeconomicus
Homo oeconomicus of today is a rational individual, which is generally used
to characterize economic agents. Elster (1989:99) describes homo oeconomicus as
forward looking, intentional, and responsive to incentives. According to Elster homo
oeconomicus is guided by instrumental rationality and pulled by the prospect of
future rewards. (See also Gambetta 1987) Homo oeconomicus adapts to changing
circumstances, always on the lookout for improvements. It is easily caricatured as a
self-contained, asocial atom. Homo oeconomicus has exogenously given and
determinate preferences. These preferences apply to goods and services that are
produced, consumed, and exchanged. Homo oeconomicus is outcome oriented,
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caring about social interactions only insofar as they affect his final consumption and
wealth. (Gintis 2000:21) Homo Oeconomicus has a rate of time preference allowing
him to allocate consumption over time in a consistent manner, reflecting his welfare
and his concern for the welfare of future generations. Homo oeconomicus is self-
interested, caring only about personal bundle of commodities, work, and leisure
acquired (Gintis 2000:312)
3.1.3 Economics and homo oeconomicus
The preference of economists for a rational maximising individual can be
explained by the theoretical interest in explaining price formation. The idea is that
prices are formed in an exchange process taking place after the agent is certain about
which goods he prefers to exchange. Those agents are modelled as choosers and
since they are engaged in an exchange, they must be utility maximiser. (Mazavinos
2001:55) Hence, NIE with focus on transaction costs use a homo oeconomicus or
methodological individualist mode of explanation. (Toboso 1996:768) Although not
all NIE present the same degree of reductionism, 14 all are built on a rational actor,
which implies that the actor is treated as homo oeconomicus. (Mazavinos 2001,
Gintis 2000, Hodgson, 2003) In the atomistic tradition, individuals form intentions
and act, groups do not. Individuals may act as members of groups, but they still form
their intention individually because only individual minds exist. (Davis 2002:13) For
example, Hayek argued that supra-individual entities such as groups, classes, etc.
should be thought of as theoretical concepts rather than real things (Hayek 1955),
and Arrows asserts that “society is just a convenient label for the totality of
individuals” (Arrow 1984:80) Accordingly social events as inflation, unemployment
and organisational change are explained in terms of individual actions, assuming
fixed preferences and incorporating nothing other than material constrains (natural,
technological or monetary) into the analyses. Social factors are reduced or broken
down into individual actions (Toboso 1996) and problems are solved by breaking
them down into parts, and afterwards, by tackling the individual sub-problems.
(Verschuren 2001, Ackerloff 1974, Easterby-Smith et al. 1991) Although traditional
economic theory based on homo oeconomicus has focused on the allocation of goods
                                                
14 On this issue, see Johnson (1999), Eggertsson (1990), Rutherford ( 1999)and Hodgson (2003)
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and services in a market economy, recent developments in economics have expanded
the scope of analysis to virtually all spheres of human behaviour.15 Economists have
literally invaded other disciplines in their analysis of non-market behaviour and
institutions such as crime and punishment, religion, marriage and family planning,
history, and law. The trend to look at reality in an analytical reductionist way is now
part of mainstream social science research, in large part under the heading of
empirical-analytical research. ( Verschuren 2001:390)
3.1.4 Advantages of homo oeconomicus and reductionism
The main advantage of homo oeconomicus is that it allows for reductionism.
Reductionism in turn, gives the possibility of quantification and researcher-
interdependence. (Verschuren 2001:390) The advantages of quantitative
measurements are precision and standardisation, making comparison, as well as
replication and control possible. A quantitative research methodology helps to
achieve researcher-independent results, whereas the personality of the researcher is
independent from the results. Therefore, only the abstract use of homo oeconomicus
makes it possible to determine what kind/ extent a political intervention should be.
3.1.5 Limit homo oeconomicus and reductionism
Homo oeconomicus and reductionism cause a bias of observational results
that Verschurren (2001) calls ‘a tunnel view’. By isolating an object from its
historical context, important influential factors may be omitted. (Guab and Lincol
1989, Denzin and Lincoln 1994, Miles and Huberman 1994, Yim 1989) This may,
for instance, be the case in research with the purpose to measure and evaluate the
impact of an intervention. A difference in the results of measurement before and after
the intervention may be interpreted as a gain or a loss. However, this difference may
be part of a long-term trend, in which case, it does not indicate an effect at all.
(Verschuren 2001:401) Further, reductionism can be inefficient since some processes
                                                
15 For example, Gary S. Becker (1976), The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour, and the recent
writings about the new institutionalism in sociology
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are too complex to divide them analytically. Either it gives an incomplete or reduced
picture of the reality because the number of relevant data is so big that the researcher
has to make a choice, or the research will last too long or will be too expensive. This
type of a problem may arise especially when processes, interactions, and
communications between individuals belong to the research issue. Therefore, most
management studies or business organisation studies are very seldom done
mathematically. However, in general, the idea of homo oeconomicus is not
convincing since everyday observations attest that people fail to conform to the
rational model. People succumb to harmful temptations, behave charitably and/or
vengefully, and have a concern for fairness - although it is argued by NIE scholars
that those actions are pursued in the context of reputation, unusual preferences and
asymmetric information. (Gintis 2000:312):
3.2 Homo sociologicus 16 and holism
The main criticism of OIE on NIE concerns the assumption of homo
oeconomicus and reductionism which they argue should be replaced by homo
sociologicus and a look at the interdependent as a whole, which is called holism. The
following chapters will describe the historical context of homo sociologicus in
section (3.2.1). Section (3.2.2) characterises homo sociologicus. Section (3.2.3)
considers the economic implications when adapting homo sociologicus. Section
(3.2.4) summarises advantages of using homo sociologicus, while section (3.2.5)
demonstrates the limits of its application.
3.2.1 History of homo sociologicus and holism
The idea of homo sociologicus and holism developed at the same time as the
idea of homo oeconomicus and reductionism. The idea can be found in different
schools, for instance, within the so-called diffusionist school of anthropo-
geographers founded in Germany and Austria by Friedrich Ratzel, which propounded
                                                
16 Throughout this passage the extreme version of homo sociologicus, holism, methodological
collectivism, homo psychologicus etc. is used.
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the image of material culture, not the human mind as the protagonist of world
history. According to W.D. Smith (1991, 144, 56), the diffusionists “moved the
individual mentality out of its position as a prime object of study and replaced it with
cultural traits…The real concerns of ethnology were not the understanding of
individual psychology, but rather explaining how people came to act collectively in
the ways they did – which was a function of the cultural patterns they shared with the
other members of their communities”. (cited in Fulbrook 2002:23) Further, in the
west the methodological fashion was holism, as evident in Durkheim’s concern for
‘social facts’ and ‘conscience collective’, in Radcliff-Browns ‘structural
functionalism’ and in Kroebers ‘super organic’ level of analysis. Although ostensibly
far removed from the dry positivism of the diffusionists, this tendency similarly
constrained the supply of useful psychological data to primitive economics. The
implications of this approach are visible already in Maunier’s (1907:105) work of the
original division of labour
“The self-interested calculations of individuals cannot be the source of
economic actions, and of the institutions which crystallise them until the
individual spirit is sufficiently emancipated from the weight of the conscience
collective to be able to deliberate and choose. For in primitive times, the social
conscience absolutely dominates the individual conscience; all individual
originality is annihilated: the greatest sanctions barely suffice to calm the
collective emotion which provokes all innovation.” (cited in Pearson 2000:940)
In general, holism has been more popular in continental and especially
German philosophy, while Anglo-American thought, with some exceptions, has
tended to be hostile to it: the uncompromising individualism of British liberal
thought and classical, as well as neoclassical economics are good examples.
Nevertheless, homo sociologicus and holism have become considerably more
respectable in analytic philosophy in the past two decades. The topic homo
sociologicus and holism is itself much broader than outlined here. Methodological
differences between causal holism, critical realism, methodological intersubjectivity
are apparent in contemporary discussion for details see Boylan and O’Gorman
(1995), Fleetwood (2002), Lawson (1998), Maeki (1997,1993) Fullbrook (2002). For
analytical reasons, the term “holism” as used in this section, is a very simplified one
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that only implies only the tendency to look at an object as a whole with
interdependent parts.
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3.2.2 Characteristics of homo sociologicus
According to Elster (1989:99) the behaviour of homo sociologicus is dictated
by social norms, hence, it is ‘pushed from behind by quasi inertial forces.’ (See also
Gambetta, 1987, Mazavinos 2001) Homo sociologicus is insensitive to
circumstances, sticking to the prescribed behaviour even if new and apparently,
better options become available. (Elster 1989:99) Therefore, the individual is a
mindless plaything of social forces. See for example, Marx (1857, 1989:395-396)
“man is individuated only through the historical process. He appears as a generic
being, a tribal being, an animal of the herd”. (cited in Pearson 2000:935) The
preferences of the sociologists for modelling the agent as a norm follower can be
explained by their special theoretical interests. The Durkheim-Parson tradition in
sociology sought to find a satisfactory solution to the Hobbesian problem of social
order without invoking individualistic-utilitarian considerations. Norm-guided
behaviour seemed to be the proper model to explain the maintenance of a workable
social order. (Mazavinos 2001)
3.2.3 Economics, homo sociologicus and holism
The meaning of holism and methodological collectivism also captures
the term homo sociologicus. (Hodgson 1998, 2003) In this context, holism describes
the view according to which the parts forming a whole cannot be adequately
understood or described individually, but only by considering their relation to the
whole. The whole is more than just the sum of the individuals. (Zahle 2003:77,
Verschuren 2001:400) Economic phenomena like unemployment are not reducible to
individual actions rather institutional influences like political power of parties or
unions can originate the occurrence. According to Wilber and Harrison (1978) and
Rutherford (1994), methodological holism implies the presupposition that individual
actions can only be understood and explained properly if individuals are considered
as elements or components of some other entity. Therefore, in order to analyse
human action and the events generated, special attention must be paid to the entities
(groups, political parties, churches, states etc.) to which individuals mostly belong as
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passive members. It is because of the aforesaid presupposition that these collective or
social entities assume such a central position in most OIE contributions.
In the holist analyses, it is also frequently assumed, explicitly or implicitly,
that these entities as institutions, groups etc. possess a kind of systemic force or logic
which drives events in such a way that it is difficult for the analyst to discover
personal responsibility for what is going on. Events such as continuous changes in
prices, increasing unemployment, technological change etc., all tend to be explained
mainly by way of revealing which systemic and impersonal forces are in place and
how they operate. Of course, not all OIE contributions are systemic to a similar
degree. Whatever the variety of methodological holism adopted, OIE gives primary
importance to the social whole. According to Toboso words”this social whole is seen
as influencing and conditioning individual behaviour.” (1996:767) However, the
strength with which the social is seen as conditioning or determining behaviour of
the individuals varies substantially between holists. In some cases, holists do seem to
imply that macro or social entities have some sort of agential power of their own, but
this is by no means a universal characteristic of the genre.” (See also Hodgson 2002,
Rutherford 1994) Institutions shape human behavior, but are not essentially
transformed by it. Influence on institutions is exerted from extra-institutional sources
at the macro level and not in the organization itself. In this sense, actions are not the
products of calculated decisions; rather, they are embedded in institutional structures
of rules, norm, expectations and traditions that severely constrain the behavior of
social actors. (Mule p-. 147)
3.2.4 Advantages of homo sociologicus and holism
In physical reality, the concept of homo sociologicus and holism for instance,
is important for understanding and maintaining the steady state or equilibrium of a
system. In general, not the sum of the individual parts of a system makes up an
equilibrium, but the integrated whole of these parts. (Verschuren 2001:400) For
instance, in chemistry, parts interact with each other and thus create a whole that is
more than the sum of its parts. Here something with totally new characteristics is
obtained by mixing two or more substances. (Verschuren 2001:401) Another
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example in social reality is the performance of a football team. Even if the latter
consists of capable and highly motivated individuals, the team may be losing one
because of a lack of team spirit, communication, adequate tactics and strategies and
mutual understanding. Therefore, In general, the quality of individual players is only
a weak indicator of the quality of a group. Yet, measuring the qualities of individual
team members is exactly what is done in the reductionist approach. Attributes at the
level of a team or a group, such as team spirit, tactics and strategies are very difficult,
if not impossible, to observe reductionistically in a satisfactory way. (Verschuren
2001:390)
Under holism, the observation itself is far less complicated and time-
consuming than under reductionistic observations. An example is the registration of a
social climate in a group. This phenomenon may be defined as the attitude of the
individual group members in terms of being friendly, helpful and understanding to
each other. Each of these attributes must be made operational by several indicators.
Next, the social climate can be measured by asking the group members about the set
of indicators by calculating an aggregated weighted or un-weighted score for the
group. Instead a holistic researcher might take the role of participant observatory,
and describe at face value the social climate in the group. (Verschuren 2001:403)
Lastly the holistic approach, due to its lack of pre-structuring and its stimulus-free,
open-ended and empiric-driven character gives a better opportunity for obtaining
new and unexpected findings than in the case of theory-driven and highly pre-
structured research strategies.(Verschuren 2001:403)
3.2.5 Limits of homo sociologicus and holism
As noted above, when talking about homo sociologicus, a holist environment
is implied, meaning the tendency to look at an object as a whole. However, in most
cases, looking at something as a whole is a fiction. Human sensory observation is
reductionistic by definition, as it consists of a serial registration of elementary
sensations. The observer necessarily focuses on one or some aspects or particles of
an object at a time. Therefore, in a sense, almost every observation more or less is
reductionistic in nature. For that reason, different from its use in philosophy and
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other contemplating disciplines, in empirical research it is necessary to define holism
as a gradual phenomenon. Hence, holism can only mean ‘less reductionistic’.
(Verschuren 2001:293) Further, the quality approach makes research dependent on
the researcher, his personality and his perception of the object. Hence, it is neither
possible to compare results nor to giver the reader of the research an appropriate
picture.
Some extreme versions of ‘holism’ are also reductionistic in the sense that
they attempt to explain the parts entirely in terms of the whole. For example,
attempts are sometimes made to explain all social phenomena solely in terms of
structures, institutions, culture. Particularly some versions of Marxism and
Durkheimian sociology have been criticised for placing an excessive weight of
explanation on the society, system, or structure, to the neglect of the role of
individual actor. (Hodgson, 2002:159) Nevertheless, individuals are not reducible to
social structures, such as institutions. Such reductionist explanations are invalid.
Individual behaviour cannot be explained entirely in terms of the social structures in
which they are located. According to Hodgson (2002), such ‘upwards reductionism’
would have to deny “reconstitutive upward causation, but could only accept
reconstitutive downward causation. Critics of the assumptions of holism rightly focus
on their failure to accept reconstitutive upward causation.” (Hodgson, 2002:168)
3.3 Institutional individualism
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the often stated dichotomy between
OIE and NIE in relation to formalisation/description, efficiency/reform and
evolution/design is not existent since both schools apparently, use both concepts. It
has been pointed out that this, in turn, is not the case with the consideration about the
individual as it is not possible to use homo oeconomicus and homo sociologicus at
the same time. The principal distinction between NIE and OIE is in the primacy
given to the individual actor, as opposed to the social institution. However, scholars
today using the holistic version of homo sociologicus agree on the fact that first,
nobody is able to consider the whole, but only parts of it; secondly that the individual
is not only determined by social forces, but also by individual calculations; and
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thirdly, some supra-individual acorns do exist like the state. (Mazavinos
2001,Hodgson 1998, Rutherford 1994) Hence, dealing with OIE scholars using the
expression homo sociologicus or holism one can only assume a ‘less reductionistic’
version, as Verschuren puts its. (Verschuren 2001:293) This less reductionistic
version of homo sociologicus is captured in applying the concept of “institutional
individualism”.17 Institutional individualism implies that a behavioural regularity is
shown whenever old problems arise, while rational choice is applied under any ‘new’
situations.
“Strictly speaking, every situation that one encounters is unique in the sense
that there will always be some respect in which it is different from any situation
one has encountered before or will encounter in the future. We can,
nevertheless, meaningfully speak of recurring situations in the sense that any
given situation is, in certain aspects, similar to other situations, past and
future.” (Vanberg 1993:175, cited in Rutherford 1994:48)
By assuming an institutional individual, the quantitative advantage of homo
oeconomicus can be combined with the quality advantage of homo sociologicus. At
the same time, informal mechanisms can be combined with the concept of choice and
efficiency. In this context, the individual is a rule follower in recurring situations, but
as each event has new features a choice is implicit. According to Rutherford (1994)
and Hodgson (1998), in the majority of cases OIE already does so, since OIE does
not appear to imply by holism the idea that social wholes possess and pursue their
own distinct purposes or aims.18 (Rutherford 1994:38) For example, Ayres states
that, all of mans actions involve some combination of tradition and intelligence
(Ayres 1962:102), and Gruchy (1987:3) argues that the conduct of individuals
reflects “the use of some reason” and Boudon (1993:101) remarks by referring to
homo sociologicus:
                                                
17 The term was originally introduced by Agassi (1975), and implies the same meaning of
“methodological structuralism” (Lloyd 1986)
18 Rutherford examines the use of reductionism and economic reasoning in the works of Veblen
(1904, 1914), Galbraith (1971), Ayres (1962), Hill (1989), Gordon (1980), Mitchell (1925), and
Commons (1950)and comes to the conclusion that none uses the extreme version of homo
sociologicus or holism
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“The Moliersque explanations by ‘occult qualities’ bring us back to the dark
side of the Middle Ages. They were considered a none plus ultra at the time
when structuralism and Marxism ruled over sociology. This time is fortunately
over in most places. These explanations are so easy, however, that they remain
a permanent temptation in ordinary as well as academic thinking: “Why did he
Y? Because he has internalised the norm telling him he should do Y.” (Boudon
1993:101)
While OIE leaves space for rational choice and hence, NIE theorising, the
question is to what extent NIE is able to reduce its reductionism and thereby leaving
space for the institutional individual. It is particularly interesting that NIE does
consider ‘social influences’ by referring to: ‘all institutions given’, in this form,
social forces rather through neglect than by design become part of the
theory.19Contrary to OIE, which is less obsessive in the handling of ‘economical
reasoning’, there is a consistent effort in NIE to explain ‘social reasoning’ in
rationalist terms. (Rutherford 1994:78) Stemming, perhaps, from Beckers (1976)
argument that rational choice models can provide an understanding of “all human
behaviour”. Where social influences are incorporated into the NIE, it is usually seen
as the result of bounded rationality. Therefore, it is worth investigating if NIE when
assuming bounded rationality may blunt the borderline between homo oeconomicus
and homo sociologicus and thereby give a chance for the application of an
institutional individual.
⇒ OIE assumes that the economic actor is an institutional individual and
not a homo sociologicus
                                                
19 See for example, the work of Alchian and Demsetz 1973 or others on property rights and game
theory
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Table 7: Reductionist versus holistic empirical research
REDUCTIONISTIC HOLISTIC
Object variables, relations
individuel attri, butes
set of observation units
patterns, types
group attri, butes
research units
Observation stimulus-response
closed, pre-structured
measurement instruments
extensive methods
researcher at a distance
serial
stimulus free/weak
open unstructured
via research questions
intensive procedures
interacting researcher
parallel
Strategy decomposition
counting
linear-serial
one single method
analytical
deductive
composition
comparison
interactive-parallel
triangulation
analogus
inductive
Copied from Verschuren (2001:398), Figure 1
3.4 Bounded rationality
The assumption of homo oeconomicus and homo sociologicus are the main
opposition between OIE and NIE, hence, the previous section (3.3) considered the
respective meaning and application of the terms. After examining OIEs use of homo
sociologicus and holism, it shows that OIE does not use the term in a Marxist
fashion, rather an institutional individual is. In OIE context, the institutional
individual implied an actor, which is rational, but socially influenced. However, it is
only possible to align NIE and OIE to a theoretical continuum if NIE is also able to
accept the institutional individual. As NIE continuously attempts to interpret social
influences in maximising terms this might seem impossible. Therefore, it is
necessary to examine whether the NIE attempt to apply bounded rationality runs into
logical difficulties if NIE persists to neglect the influence of informal mechanisms. In
this context, the theory of bounded rationality is summarised in section (3.4.1).
Section (3.4.2) will investigate the definition of bounded rationality as the concept,
although often applied, appears to be badly defined. Section (3.4.3) considers
explanatory difficulties coming from its weak definition and section (3.4.4)
summarises the concept and implications of bounded rationality, while showing that
bounded rationality does leave space for the institutional individual.
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3.4.1 Theory oft bounded rationality
Firstly, fifty years ago, Herbert Simon noted two key limits to achieving
perfect rationality. First it is usually not possible to obtain all of the information
relevant to a problem by the time a decision has to be made. Secondly, Simon
insisted that, in general, it would not be possible to deal with all that information in a
manner that would permit optimisation. This let Simon to maintain that the best that
one could hope for was “bounded rationality.” (Simon 1955) Simon urged scholars to
substitute bounded rationality for substantive rationality (Simon 1976, 1978, 1979)
and he noted, that ”nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and
informing our research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings
whose behaviour we are studying” (Simon 1985:303), a view that has also been very
strongly stressed by Williamson as a reason to take bounded rationality seriously (
e.g. Williamson 1985)
The concept of bounded rationality is too convincing to be further ignored by
economists. It is as Conlisk argues (1996:691) “Bounded rationality, like elephants in
a living room, are sometimes just too much to ignore. Standard economics is forced
to recognise their presence.” Accordingly, even Becker has opened the door. In his
Nobel lecture (1993), Becker says “ Actions are constrained by income, time,
imperfect memory and calculating capacities, and other limited resources” (p. 386)
and he concludes “ My work may have sometimes assumed too much rationality” (p.
402) And even Williamson (1998) argues that taking more account of the relevant
psychological literature will improve the understanding of organisation “As an
instrument for utilising varying cognitive and behavioural propensities to best
advantage “(Williamson 1998:12). However, he seems mostly intent on
demonstrating that the many findings of biased cognition and judgment are entirely
consistent with “the transaction cost economic triple for describing human actors
–bounded rationality, farsighted contracting, and opportunism” (Foster 2003:259)
He, therefore, refrains from inquiring into how specifically these findings may add to
and complement the transaction cost economics approach.
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3.4.2 “Watered-down” version of bounded rationality
The term ‘bounded rationality’ later gained wide acceptance among
economists and financial analysts, though in terms of a kind of constrained
optimisation. Particularly since Milton Friedman (1953) bounded rationality was
understood in terms of “the question is not whether people are rational, of course,
they are not. The question is whether they act approximately as if rational; they do.”
(Conlisk 1996:693) The reason why economists worked with such a “watered-down”
(Foss 2003:258) version of bounded rationality is because of the well-known
difficulties of aligning bounded rationality with the basic machinery of neoclassical
microeconomics and game theory (Conlisk 1996, Rabin 1998, Camerer 1998). It was
the common belief that bounded rationality simply could not be aligned with
mainstream economics. (Foss 2003:258) Hart (1990, 700-701) sums up the
sentiments of many formal economists when he argues that:
“I do not think that bounded rationality is necessary for a theory of
organisations. This is fortunate because developing a theory of bounded
rationality in a bilateral or multilateral setting seems even more complicated
than developing such a theory at the individual level; and the latter task has
already proved more than enough for economists to handle”
On the contrary, other economists have been less reluctant to work on explicit
models of bounded rationality (Foss 2003:258), which shows in the massive body of
largely psychology based research on the basis to human cognition and judgement.
(See summaries by Conlisk 1996, Camerer 1998, Rabin 1998) Particular scholars in
behavioural finance and behavioural law have achieved considerable success (as well
as controversy). In addition, their success in turn, is due to the use of a more explicit
and detailed views of bounded rationality, drawn from cognitive psychology. (Foss
2003:258) This could be the reason why Conlisk (1996:677) stated that evolutionary
economics might be the mainstream economics of tomorrow. However, Simon
himself never took much of an interest in, for example, the biases literature of
Tversky, Kahneman, Thaler and Rabin although he was aware of it. (Foss 2003:258)
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3.4.3 Explanatory problems with bounded rationality
Although many contributors to economics have agreed on the importance of
bounded rationality, upon closer inspection, it turns out that there is little agreement
on (1) what is the nature of bounded rationality (2) how it should be modeled and (3)
its implications for the behavior and organization of firms. (Foss 2003:261) Hence,
neither in mainstream nor in New Institutional Economics is rational individual
behavior properly defined or modeled, which results in explanatory problems for
these approaches. (Foss 2003:261) In general, the bounded rationality research effort
in common economic theory may be understood as an attempt to elaborate and
examine the insights that (1) the human capacity to process information is quite
limited (2) humans try to economize on cognitive effort by relying on short-cuts, and
(3) because of (1) and (2), as well as other factors, such as the influence of emotions
on cognition, human cognition and judgment is subject to a wide range of biases and
errors. (Foss 2003:261) The problem is that economists of organization have taken an
interest in (1), have been less occupied with (2), and have almost entirely neglected
(3). An attempt to bring bounded rationality more explicitly into economics should
consider (2) and perhaps (3). According to Foss (2003:259) argument, the very
“thin” version (essentially (1) above) which economists deal with has so far resulted
in essentially no explanatory value-added, and it seems to be a reasonable
expectation that being explicit about bounded rationality may yield more such value
added. (Foss 2003:259)20
3.4.4 Summary of bounded rationality
Bounded Rationality as originally introduced by Simon, means the
impossibility to examine and calculate all possible options, therefore, ‘rational
maximising’ is not possible. Although this fact is widely accepted, the theoretical
implication is very limited in the sense that it is assumed that the actor is not rational,
but acts as if he were rational. Therefore, with little exception like in behavioural
economics it is seldom examined what exactly the nature of bounded rationality is,
                                                
20 Foss suggests that the expression ‘procedural rationality’ is a more appropriate expression for
bounded rationality (2003:256)
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nor how to model it or what the exact economic implications of bounded rationality
are. The reason for this ‘watered-down’ version of bounded rationality can be found
in the difficulty of aligning neo-classical economics with cognitive aspects.
However, the attempt to interpret rule following in maximising terms runs into
logical difficulties as soon as bounded rationality is allowed to enter the picture. The
recognition of culture, history and social embeddedness as decisive in being
‘bounded rational’ and moves NIE away from the homo oeconomicus assumption
towards the institutional individual one. It is, therefore, no accident that Rutherford
in relation to NIE and bounded rationality argues that “all of this is very reminiscent
of much of the OIE” (Rutherford 1994:70) The acknowledgement of informal
mechanisms behind observable outcomes moves us, according to DiMaggio,
“beyond the polemical opposition of ‘calculus’ and ‘culture’ to ask not whether
people act strategically, but rather under what conditions and how they do so”.
(DiMaggio 1997:701)
⇒ By assuming bounded rationality NIE is simultaneously unable to
reject the institutional individual
3.5 Conclusion Part I
As well, NIE as OIE criticizes NC assumption of unlimited knowledge and
foresight, unrestricted competitive markets, stable preferences, fully specified
property rights, and a ”neutral” state. Both explicitly deal with institutions and do not
consider them as a black box like NC and both shift the emphasis from physical-
material allocation of scarce resources towards a focus on institutional parameters in
which markets no longer posses a superiority as control mechanism. Both argue that
growth is, to a large extent, institutional path determined with agents being
conditioned by prevailing cultural norms, while simultaneously applying rational
decisions. As a consequence, it may be asked what is left of the hardcore NIE or OIE
propositions. It has been explored in the previous chapters that the only dividing line
between NIE and OIE is in their focus on either homo oeconomicus or homo
sociologicus. However, OIE writings show, that by applying the concept of homo
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sociologicus and holism they do not mean the idea that economic actors are unable to
do rational decisions. Rather OIE assumes a ‘less reductionistic’ version in form of
an actor who chooses rational, but who is dependent on particular social
circumstances and influences. Similarly, NIE applies bounded rationality as a
concept to explain why actors are not able to choose rational. By applying the
concept of bounded rationality, NIE acknowledges informal mechanisms behind the
choice making process although they do not identify them. In this sense, both apply
the concept of an institutional individual, which implies that a behavioural regularity
is shown whenever old problems arise, but simultaneously, every problem has new
features for which rational calculus is applied. In this sense, individuals are both rule
followers and rational maximizer.
However, it is difficult to ascertain whether people choose or not since only
behaviour is observable and not the choice. (Mazavinos 2001:55) As it is not
possible to look into a persons mind, it is not possible to know if people act because
they are following a rule or because they find a rational solution to a new occurring
event. Therefore, it is not possible to differentiate whether a process is of NIE or OIE
nature. However, since both NIE and OIE agree on the importance of rule following
and rational choice they form a theoretical continuum rather than two opposing
institutional thoughts. Such a theoretical continuum called NIEOIE applies an
understanding of efficiency and choice while simultaneously allowing ‘non-
economic’ variables to be decisive. In this sense, NIEOIE connects informal
mechanisms with the formal institutional sphere and hence, overcomes the
shortcomings of each approach.
Conclusion:     NIE and OIE form a theoretical continuum called NIEOIE
PART II – INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 54
PART II – INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS
Part I examined the existing institutional theories of NIE and OIE and
concluded that the use of an institutional individual connects the two approaches to a
theoretical continuum of NIEOIE. The intention of Part II is to investigate whether
reality reflects theoretical arguments of NIEOIE and in turn, if today’s economic
situation requires the theory of NIEOIE. I chose financial markets in developing
countries as the medium of investigation as they inhibit a special characteristic called
financial dualism. Financial dualism refers to a situation in which informal forces
create informal institutions while simultaneously formal institutions are created by
the government. With over 80 percent of the worlds population being reliant on
informal credit the interesting question is if contemporary financial market theories
are able to incorporate an understanding of informality. In this context, chapter 1
explores whether an ‘institutional’ financial market theory is required, and whether
existing theories are suitable. As the result suggests that a new financial market
theory is needed, the interesting question is if NIEOIE could provide the theoretical
foundation for such a theory.
However, question remains why NIEOIE should be able to do so since the
approach in itself has little to do with ‘finance’. Therefore chapter 2 investigates the
characteristics and functioning of informal and formal financial institutions. In this
context it is asked whether OIE theorising, with focus on non-economic variables is
applicable to informal finance and whether NIE, focusing on efficiency is suitable for
formal finance. Apparently, the findings suggest that this is the case. Nevertheless,
the pure existence of two institutional segments, one ‘belonging’ to NIE, the other
‘belonging’ to OIE, says little about the relevance of NIEOIE. Part I has shown that
creating a theoretical continuum of NIEOIE is reasonable because it overcomes the
respective theoretical shortcomings of both. Hence, the relevant question of Part II is,
if connecting the two financial market segments to a financial market continuum
overcomes the limitations of each sector. In this context, chapter 3 investigates if
linking informal and formal financial arrangements is beneficial for both. In case that
both institutional arrangements benefit from linkages, it suggests that the same
reasons behind the theoretical continuum of NIEOIE are actually relevant for
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building a financial market continuum between informal and formal financial
institutions. Under these circumstances, NIEOIE has relevance to an actual market
phenomenon, while simultaneously being able to serve as a theoretical foundation for
future financial market theories.
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1 Financial Markets and Economic Development in LDCs
1.1 Why focus on financial markets?
The intention of this paper is to ask whether the theory of NIEOIE has
potential applicability to economic policymaking and in turn whether reality requires
the theory of NIEOIE. I chose to focus on financial markets for different reasons.
Firstly, the factor trust in financial markets is more decisive and obvious than in
goods market. In good markets transaction prices summarise all information relevant
to the transacting agents. The issue of trust arises only in a peripheral manner such as
vegetables might or might not be contaminated with chemical residues. The credit
transaction, in contrast, involves a promise to repay in the future which may or may
not be totally credible. This calls for the evidence of interpersonal trust which can
only be partly established by a loan contract and collaterals. (Floro and Yotopoulos
1991:14) Since NIEOIE forms a theoretical continuum with the special feature to
consider as well informal as formal institutional forces a market in which informal
factors like trust play a great role from the beginning are interesting. The second
reason for focusing on financial markets in developing countries concerns their
condition of financial dualism. Financial dualism refers to a situation in which a
large informal sector exists outside the regulations of the formal sector. In many
countries, despite the knowledge of the existence of a large informal financial sector,
policy makers have tended to direct economic policy without consideration of the
likely impact informal financial activity will have on the efficacy of their policies. In
view of the large size of informal finance and its weak linkages to formal finance,
macro-economic policy-making becomes difficult and usually ineffective. Because
informal finance is significant and has been growing there is increasing pressure on
policy makers. (Aryeetey 1995:5, USAID 1998) Accordingly, there is an increasing
need to design an economic theory that is able to deal with both informal and formal
financial markets, and I believe that NIEOIE is able to provide this theory.
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1.2 The importance of finance
Postulating a link between the financial system and economic development
implies a rejection of neoclassical economics, since in orthodox models only
exogenous factors have an impact on economic growth. Therefore, this section
examines whether a relationship between finance and economic development can be
found. The intention is to explore if an institutional economic theory for financial
markets is required. In this context, section 1.2.1 deals with past discussions
concerning the relationship of finance and economic growth; section 1.2.2 focuses on
traditional growth theory in a neoclassical sense; section 1.2.3 deals with endogenous
growth theory; and section 1.2.4 focuses on empirical evidence. Section 1.2.4 shows
that financial deepening is decisive for economic development, although no causality
can be established. Section 1.2.5 summarises the findings, suggesting that it is only
possible to deal with financial markets by applying institutional theories.
1.2.1 Past discussion
There has been a considerable debate on the issue if and how the financial
system or the level of financial development affects long-run growth. This discussion
dates back to Walter Bagehot (1873) and Joseph A. Shumpeter (1912) stressing the
importance of the banking system on the growth rate of national income. In 1911,
Joseph Schumpeter argued that the services provided by financial intermediaries –
mobilizing savings, evaluating projects, managing risk, monitoring managers, and
facilitating transactions – are essential for technological innovation and economic
development.21 On the contrary, Joan Robinson (1952) asserted that economic
growth creates a demand for financial services. “Where enterprise leads finance
follows” (1952:86) this view implies that financial deepening is just a “side-show” of
economic development. Other economists just assumed that the financial-growth
nexus is not of any importance. For example, Robert Lucas stated that “economists
badly over-stress” the role of finance for economic growth. (1988:6) Particular
                                                
21 Other authors like Galbis continued in Schumpeter’s line and suggest “it may well be that financial
development is a prerequisite, if not a major determinant, of the take-off into self-sustained
economic growth.” (Galbis1977:59) Similarly, Gertler and Rose (1994) argue that economic
growth and financial sector development are mutually dependent.
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development economists seem to ignore the topic at all as neither Anand
Chandavarkar 1992, Gerald Meier (1984), Dudley Seers (1984) nor Nicholas Stern
(1989) mention it.
However, already in 1969 that Goldsmith demonstrated an empirical
association between economic growth and the increasing size and complexity of the
financial system (financial deepening) and broke with traditional growth theory. The
contemporary body of empirical research (Levine 1997, Demirguec-Kunt 2001)
concludes that financial markets and institutions are critical for the development
process and concludes that the level of financial development affects the speed and
pattern of economic growth. (Levine 1997:689) Nevertheless, a direction of causality
has yet not been established although common agreement exist that economic growth
without financial stability and a proper working financial system is hardly possible.
1.2.2 Traditional growth theory
In traditional growth theory, financial intermediation could be related to the
level of the capital stock per worker or to the level of productivity, but not to their
respective growth rates. Postulating a link between financial development and
economic growth entails relaxing some neo-classical assumptions. Firstly, in an
Arrow-Debreu model with no information or transaction costs, there is no need for a
financial system. Hence, it is the costs of getting information and making
transactions that create incentives for the emergence of financial markets and
institutions. Secondly, in a neo-classical growth model, only the exogenous
technology factor affects the steady-state per capita growth rate. Thus, in this
theoretical framework, the level or type of financial development could affect the
long-term growth rate only via a very limited route if it directly affected the rate of
technological progress. (Kotaro Tsui 2000:1)
1.2.3 Endogenous growth
A recent surge of interest in the link between financial development and
economic growth has resulted mainly from the transformation of microeconomic
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theory and the emergence of endogenous growth theory, driven by analysis of market
failure due to asymmetric information and transactions costs Different types and
combinations of information and transaction costs motivate distinct financial
contracts, markets, and institutions. (Levine 1997) This raises the possibility of an
influence of institutional arrangements on growth rates by incorporating concepts
previously thought of as non-economic: trust, customs, networks, commitment and
so on. (Fine and Lapavitsas 2000:28) These models could thus offer important
insights to the impact of financial development on economic growth. In an
endogenous growth framework, financial development can promote economic
growth either via its positive impact on capital productivity or via its impact on the
efficiency of financial systems in converting financial resources into real investment.
(Kotaro Tsui 2000) Although in a pure neoclassical framework the financial system
is irrelevant to economic growth, in practice an efficient financial system can
simultaneously lower the cost of external borrowing, raise the returns to savers, and
ensure that savings are allocated in priority to projects that promise the highest
returns, all of which have the potential for affecting economic growth rates.
1.2.4 Empirical evidence
The dynamic link between financial innovation and economic development is
empirically investigated by King and Levine (1993). They prove by using the
standard cross-country growth regression framework of Robert J. Barro (1991) that
stock market liquidity and banking development both predict long-run growth,
capital accumulation and productivity improvements.22 Recent microeconomic
evidence complements Levine’s assumption. Asli Dermirguec-Kunt and Vojislav
Maksimovic (1996) show that firms in countries with better-functioning banks and
equity markets are growing faster than predicted by individual firm characteristics,
and Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998) show that industries that rely
more on external finance prosper more in countries with better developed financial
markets. In those models, financial systems serve one primary function: they
                                                
22 However, their research had some fundamental weaknesses. Their empirical research could not
establish that the direction of causality went from financial development to growth. The
relationship could be coincidental, because other contemporaneous shocks affect both variables.
Or, the causality could be reversed since high growth may lead to the emergence of more
developed financial intermediaries and markets.
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facilitate the allocation of resources, across space and time, in an uncertain
environment. (Merton and Bodie 1995:12) In this context, it is assumed that financial
institutions channel funds from surplus to deficit units by mobilising investible
resources and ensuring efficient transformation of these funds into real productive
capital. Nevertheless, it is important to note that growth in financial assets is not a
sufficient condition for economic growth, and improved financial intermediation per
se may not necessarily lead to economic growth (Bhatia and Khatkate 1975).
1.2.5 Summary finance and economic growth
The discussion whether finance pushes economic growth or whether
economic development pulls financial deepening has still not been solved. However,
one thing is certain, that finance, contrasting traditional growth assumption, does
have an impact on economic development. In a pure neoclassical framework the
financial system is irrelevant to economic growth, in practice an efficient financial
system can simultaneously lower the cost of external borrowing, raise the returns to
savers, and ensure that savings are allocated in priority to projects promising the
highest returns, all of which have the potential for affecting economic growth rates.
Therefore, traditional growth models have to be replaced by endogenous models
where finance and growth are interrelated. Nevertheless, it is important to note that
growth in financial assets is not a sufficient condition for economic growth, and
improved financial intermediation per se may not necessarily lead to economic
growth. On the contrary, economic growth without financial deepening is hardly
possible. Since traditional growth theory built on NC theorising is not able to link
finance and economic growth, NC models have to be replaced with institutional
economic theory allowing for the relationship.
⇒ An institutional financial market theory is required because finance
and economic growth are interrelated
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1.3 Two opposing schools concerning financial markets
It has been shown in section (1.2) that financial deepening is related to
economic growth and hence, institutional theory concerning the kind of a financial
institution is required. In this context, two opposing schools emerged in relation to
capital supply. Proponents of the bank-based financial system oppose those who
argue that the market based capital supply system has the most positive effect on
economic growth.23 The next section discusses these two prototypes of financial
systems, the “bank-based” system and the “market-based” system with the intention
to investigate which one is more appropriate. Section (1.3.1) considers the market
based approach, while section (1.3.2) focuses on the bank based approach, section
(1.3.3) outlines each concluding policy advice, section (1.3.4) searches for
similarities between the bank-based approach and the market-based approach and
section (1.3.5) shows that while both approaches differ, they are static due to their
focus on information properties. Both build their approach around fixed institutional
features and assets, while both do not consider that during development different
assets and institutions are required. Therefore, neither can provide a sufficient policy
analysis for financial markets in developing countries with changing financial
demands and in particular not to countries suffering from financial dualism.
1.3.1 The market-based model
In the early 1970s, theoretical treatment of the relationship of the financial
system to economic development came to be dominated by the literature on financial
liberalisation originating in the work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). The
financial liberalisation model, developed by them, and exerted considerable influence
on macroeconomic policy in developing countries in the 1970/80s, particularly
through the recommendation of the IMF and the World Bank.24 This literature
largely ignored the institutional structure of the financial system and concerned itself,
                                                
23 The question can be dated back to Gerschenkrons (1962) taxonomy, which divides financial
systems into two categories: the ‘bank based’ and the ‘capital-market based’ financial system.
Since those days continuously discussion about the kind of capital supply takes place. (See: Mayer
1987, and Frenkel and Montegomery 1992, Arestis and Demetriades 1996)
24 See for instance the World Bank 1989 report on development and financial structure.
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above all, with determination of interest rates. The analysis is based on the idea that
many developing economies suffer from financial repression, a misguided
development strategy of low interest rate ceilings and selective credit policies. Their
main claim is that, if interest rates are kept artificially low by the state, savings will
be low and inefficient investment will be encouraged thus fostering
underdevelopment. It is argued that even though investment opportunities exist,
growth is kept below its potential. (Fry 1989, McKinnon 1973: 59-61, Shaw:
1973:8).
1.3.2 The bank-based model
Post Keynesian models have focused on the assumptions about the
availability and distribution of information between borrowers, lenders and financial
institutions and the main work is usually undertaken within a principal-agent
framework in which asymmetry of information allows participants in economic
transactions to pursue divergent objectives. The relaxation of the perfect information
hypothesis permitted these models to explain the role for financial intermediaries in a
competitive economy: the lack of costless information gives financial intermediaries
the role of assessing the credit-worthiness of borrower. A common theme in this new
line of thought in financial economics is that informational asymmetries may
introduce inefficiencies in financial markets which may have quantitatively
significant real effects. Furthermore, the growing literature on information and
incentives information also points out two problems in financial intermediation
which can jeopardise the allocative role played by intermediation: adverse selection,
where trading parties have asymmetric information prior to contracting, and moral
hazard, where the asymmetries arise after contracting. Asymmetric information
occurs when lenders have trouble determining whether a borrower is a good risk or a
bad risk. Because of this lack of information, lenders will desire to pay for a security
that reflects the average quality of firms issuing the securities – a price which is
higher than the market value for high quality firms and too high for the low quality
ones – a classical case of ‘the lemons problem’ proposed by Akerlof (1970). Hence,
only low quality firms will be willing to sell their securities.
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) also demonstrated, using a loanable funds
framework, that adverse selection would generate credit rationing because low
quality firms with riskier projects will be the one willing to pay the highest interest
rates.25 If lenders cannot identify the riskiest projects, then the supply of loanable
funds will shrink when interest rates increase, exactly the opposite result from that
theoretically expected. The danger of moral hazard may prevent lenders from
extending credit, if the interest rate makes it very attractive to do so. In other words,
lending would be at sub-optimal levels. The two cases just point to the possibility
that, due to asymmetric information, the financial system may not play its role as
broker in the saving-investment process efficiently. In other words, in these cases
loanable funds to investment will be lower than potential and allocation of resources
will be distorted. This literature presents a challenge to the view that financial
markets are efficient allocators of capital.
1.3.3 Policy implications
The market based models argue that financial repression reduces both the
quantity and the quality of investment in the economy as a whole. Hence, McKinnon
and Shaw (1973) conclude that financial liberalisation can increase economic growth
by increasing investment and its productivity. What matters for development is free
determination of interest rates, while the design of the financial system is not an
important concern. This idea provides the basis for financial liberalisation which in
turn, is often conditionally recommended by the World Bank and IMF. The first
generation financial repression models are represented by, among others, Yoon Je
Cho (1984), Vicente Galbis (1977), Basant Kapur (1976a), Yan-Pal Lee (1980),
Donald Mathieson (1980), and Maxwell Fry (1978, 1980a/b).
                                                
25 It is important to differentiate between Stiglitz older and newer work since it reflects his personal
development. While he in his early years supported the bank based approach he now states (1998,
Prebisch Lecture, p. 9) “The ideological debate should be over; there should be agreement that
while markets are ate center of the economy, governments must play an important role. The issue is
one of balance, and where that balance is may depend on the country, the capacity of its
government, the institutional development of its markets. In other words, development advice
should be adapted to the circumstances of the country.”
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Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that the theoretical approach of financial
liberalisation is unsatisfactory since it treats price and quantity controls imposed by
the state as the only reason for the absence of non-rationed equilibriums in credit
markets. In contrast, they demonstrate that in the presence of asymmetric
information, the unregulated operation of banks can lead to inefficiently high interest
rates thereby discouraging productive investment and reducing the return to lenders
by attracting increasingly risky borrowers. (Fine and Lapavitsas 2001:30) Further, it
is pointed out that under asymmetric information the certainty and efficiency of
contracting among financial institutions and productive enterprises might be
unproductive. (Mayer 1987, 1988). Commitment by banks to enterprises is the key
concept in this regard. A practical resolution of these problems is perceived through
closer collaboration among contracting parties, encouraging long-term financial
arrangements based on reputation and reducing reliance on anonymous market
forces. (Fine and Lapavitsas 2001:30) Consequently, how banks relate institutionally
to industry is of crucial importance for economic growth and performance.
Commitment reflects a systemic reputational effect, or implicit contract, on both
sides. (Aoki and Patrick 1994, see also Horuchi and Yoshino1992)
1.3.4 Similarities of market versus bank based approach
Despite their apparent differences, the two currents of market- versus bank-
based policy share common conceptual foundations. Financial systems are compared
with each other according to their basic functions concerning the ability of trading
risk, allocating capital, monitoring managers, mobilising savings, and easing the
trading of goods, services and financial services.26 (Levine 1997:689) However, both
ignore, that although those basic functions remain constant through time and across
countries, there are large differences across countries, in the quality of financial
services and in the types of financial instruments, markets and institutions. (Boyd
and B. Smith 1996). Reliance on the concept of asymmetric information prevents
analysis of the financial system as a system in which various parts are organically
                                                
26 For different ways of categorising financial functions, see Cole and Betty Slade (1991) and Robert
C. Merton and Zvi Bodie (1995)
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related to each other and the ‘real economy’. Instead, the financial system is treated
as an agglomeration of institutions, markets and assets that might or might not
exhibit certain informational properties. Hence, both currents treat information as an
absolute fact in possession of market agents, rather than as a state of knowledge and
trust among market participants that is conditional upon social, political and
historical factors. (Lapavitsas 2001:29) Instead, the major aim of the two schools is
to identify a design for the financial system that has optimal informational properties
as shown in relation to (a) assets and (b) development advice.
Assets
Generally, the two opposing approaches proceed by constructing finance as a
set of assets (for example, short- and long- term loans, or bonds as opposed to equity)
and a set of institutions and markets (for example, money and bond markets, or
commercial and investment banks). Usually a recommendation concerning state
regulation (prudential or other) and of the degree of intervention in the allocation of
credit is added. Correspondingly, market-based as opposed to bank-based systems
are readily associated with the predominance of different types of assets, institutions,
markets and regulations. (Fine and Lapavitsas 2001:35). However, in reality the
distinction is not that obvious since developed countries usually possess the same
types of institutions, markets and assets. The relative weight of particular types of
assets in such systems often contradicts their conventional characterisation as bank-
or market- based. (Corbett and Jenkinson1996) In Japan, for instance, market-based
finance for investment purposes has been surprisingly high throughout the post-war
period. Analogously, both German and US Corporation rely heavily on internally
generated funds for investment (Corbett and Jenkinson 1997). Interestingly Corbett
and Jenkinson conclude “that there is no market based Anglo-U.S. pattern of
finance” (Corbett and Jenkinson 1996:71) and that “there is little evidence to support
the view that Germany is a bank-financed system nor that the UK or the US are
market financed” (Corbett and Jenkinson 1997:69) Thus, categorisation of financial
systems on the basis of formal differences in institutions, assets, and so on will often
result in misleading conclusions.
Development context
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An additional misconception concerns the theoretical analysis of screening,
monitoring and enforcing which are important for the relationship between finance
and industry, but which are not continuous properties. The requirements of the real
economy differ over time and at different stages of economic development. The
specific social, historical and political context within which particular financial
systems relate to industry is of importance and it can be misleading to follow a policy
because it is consistent with either the market- or bank-based financial system.27 As
Lapavitsas demonstrates (2001:35) it is probably, that the virtues of bank-based
systems are less significant once large-scale corporations and conglomerates have
been established that have the capacity to command sufficient long-term finance
form a variety of diverse sources. Changes in telecommunications, computers, non-
financial sector policies, institutions, and economic growth itself influence the
quality of financial services and the structure of the financial system. (Levine 1997:
721)
1.3.5 Summary bank-based versus market-based approach
Section 1.2 concludes that although no causality between finance and
economic growth exists, economic development without financial deepening is
impossible. Therefore, an ‘institutional financial market theory’ is required. In this
context, a discussion arose concerning the ‘best-practice’ concerning financial
market policy and financial institution building. According to McKinnon-Shaw, free
markets provide the most efficient development device for financial markets.
(market-based approach) Stiglitz and Weiss in contrast, demonstrate the due to
asymmetric information government intervention is often more efficiency enhancing
than the free market. (bank-based approach) However, for both advocates the focus
of analysis is mostly on the process of determining the prices and the quantities of
credit under different informational properties. Reality proves this approach wrong
since in less developed countries it is often not possible to determine either of them.
Another problem embodied in as well the bank- as in the market-based is the static
                                                
27 For example, differences in legal tradition (Rafael LaPorta et al. 1996) and differences in national
resource endowments can produce different political institutional structures (Stanley Engerman and
Sokoloff 1996)
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nature of both models. Requirements of developing countries concerning capital
supply are continuously changing, not only in space, but also in time. In this context,
the discussion of market- versus bank-based approach seems to be rather useless.
Accordingly Levine (1997:689) argues:
“…[My] approach discourages a narrow focus on one financial instrument, like
money, or a particular institution, like banks. Instead, the approach prompts a
more comprehensive – and more difficult- question: what is the relationship
between financial structure and the functioning of the financial system. Indeed,
the approach highlights the importance of examining an under researched topic:
the relationship between financial structure – the mix of financial instruments,
markets, and institutions – and the provision o financial services…”
Levine continues:
“…I do believe that we will not have a sufficient understanding of long-rung
economic growth until we understand the evolution and functioning of financial
systems. This conclusion about financial development and long-rung growth
has an important corollary: Although financial panics and recessions are critical
issues, the finance growth link goes beyond the relationship between finance
and shorter-term fluctuations. Undoubtedly, the financial system is shaped by
non-financial developments.” (1997:721)
The knowledge of factors decisive for financial development in individual
cases and at particular times is important. Neither the bank- nor the market- based
approach is a appropriate theory in dealing with changing financial demands.
Therefore, neither is able to provide financial market policies necessary for economic
development, in particular, not to countries suffering from financial dualism.
⇒ Existing financial market theories are not appropriate for LDCs
because they are not able to deal with changing financial demands
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2 The Financial Reality in LDCs
It has been shown than financial market policies require an institutional
theory. Further, the findings suggest that contemporary existing financial market
theories are too static to deal with changing economic demands and therefore,
insufficient in their applicability to developing countries. It appears that a suitable
financial market theory requires some non-economic variables as shown by Levine
(1997:721) who states that “undoubtedly, the financial system is shaped by non-
financial developments”. NIEOIE is able to combine informal with formal economic
influences hence it appears reasonable to search for possible NIEOIE application
towards financial markets.
Financial markets in LDCs are subject to financial dualism, a situation in
which informal forces create informal institutions while simultaneously formal
institutions are created by the government. The similarity of informality versus
formality in reality and institutional theory is quite striking. Thus the aim of this
chapter is to find out if the similarity concerning ‘informality’ exists just by using the
term ‘informal’, despite different meanings or whether actually the same term is used
in the same sense. In this context the intention is to examine the forces behind
financial dualism (2.1) and to explore what informal finance implies and whether it
can be justified to apply OIE (2.2). Further, it will be questioned whether the extent
of informal financial arrangements is large enough to consider it as worth noticing or
whether it is a small exception (2.3). Finally, it will be investigated in what respect
informal finance differs from formal finance (2.4) and whether OIE is a suitable
theory to capture the mechanisms behind (2.5).
 2.1 Financial dualism
The main characteristic of financial markets in developing countries is
financial dualism. Most LDCs are characterised by financial dualism a situation in
which the formal financial sector co-exists next to an informal financial sector. The
formal sector refers to an organised, institutional system catering to the financial
needs of the monetarised sector, while the informal sector, itself unorganised and
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‘non-institutional’, would deal with the non-monetarised spheres of the economy.
Existing financial market theories do not consider financial fragmentation, although
more than 90 percent of the population in developing countries is excluded from the
formal sector. (Robinson 2001) Therefore, applicability and theoretical consistency
of common financial market theories is extremely limited. In this context, Stiglitz
(1998:3) argued that one of the biggest failures of development economics was to
ignore the fact that most developing countries are dual economies.
⇒ Financial markets in LDCs are fragmented into a formal and an
informal segment
2.2 Informal finance
Decisive for financial dualism is the existence of a large informal financial
sector. Therefore, the following section defines informal finance by explaining
(2.2.1) the terminology used (2.2.2) the main characteristics of informal finance;
(2.2.3) the products of informal finance; (2.2.4) the fact of heterogeneity; (2.2.5) why
informal finance is not an informal financial market; and (2.2.6) summarises
informal finance as an unregulated, heterogeneous, dynamic sector which acquires its
viability mainly through reciprocity.
2.2.1 Terminology
In this paper, the expression informal finance is applied to all financial
transactions, loans and deposits, occurring outside the regulation of central monetary
or financial market authority. An exact institutional definition is not possible because
informal finance in itself is very heterogeneous. The terms informal, parallel, black,
underground, fragmented, unorganised, and segmented and curb markets have all
been used interchangeably in the literature to describe various forms of economic
activity lying outside the officially regulated or monitored realm. (Montiel 1993:7)
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2.2.2 People engaged in informal finance
Informal finance is of particular importance to those segments of the
population who are excluded from the formal sector. Those people are usually poor
and are not able not provide loan collaterals. Illiteracy rates make it impossible for
them to sign and understand formal loan applications. Often distances from rural
villages to the next bank are too far to travel and banks are seldom able to meet loan
requirements as i.e. small overnight loans, consumption loans, seasonal loans.
Alongside those who have no access at all to formal funds, informal finance also
includes people who have access to formal sources, but who seek to supplement bank
loans with informal funds or to take advantage of the speed of delivery of informal
credit or to better integrate themselves into their community by participating in
neighbourhood associations. (Germidis 1991:14) Informal finance reaches borrowers
beyond the profitable reach of the formal sector. (Ghate 1992:6)
2.2.3 Characteristics
Informality is characterised by highly personalised loan transactions,
entailing face-to-face dealings with borrowers and flexibility in respect of loan
purpose, interest rates, collateral requirements, maturity periods and debt
rescheduling. (Ghate 1992:6) Adams (1992) suggests that there are three types of
informal sector activity:
1. non-commercial transactions among friends and relatives;
2 .  group arrangements for savings such as savings clubs, or
arrangements combining savings and credit such as ROSCAs28
3 .  Informal finance organised on a commercial basis, conducted by
moneylenders, pawnbrokers, landlords, traders and other collector.
(Nissanke & Aryeetey 1998:25)
Commercial informal transactions can be money-based, land-based or
                                                
28 ROSCAS are rotating credit and savings associations, for descriptions of the working mechanisms
of a number of ROSCAS see Ardener 1964, Besley et al. 1993, Bouman 1995, Germidis et al.
1991, Ghate 1988, Thomas 1993, von Pischke 1991
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commodity-based, such as those used by trader-moneylenders for interlinked market
transaction. (Germidis 1991) Such tied credits may be ubiquitous, accounting for a
large proportion of total informal credit in many countries. (Nissanke and Aryeetey
1998:26) For example, Montiel (1993), reports a survey result from Malaysia, which
suggest that the traders purchasing agricultural product provided almost two-thirds of
all rural credit. Many group-based organisations operate on an agreed discipline and
the principle of solidarity. They are often based on funds generated from member’s
savings and this indicates the importance of reciprocity. Linking credit with savings
encourages the poorest to save and generally ensures high repayment rates.
(Nissanke & Aryeetey 1998:26)
Informal financial activity is present in both rural and urban areas; though, in
terms of financial activity, the informal sector is generally more important in rural
areas. (Germidis 1991:17) The informal sector in some countries may be rather more
complex and evolved, not only from the point of view of structural and operational
characteristics, but also in terms of the weight it carries in overall financial activity.
Examples of partnership firms which are often found in Indonesia while indigenous
bankers and pawnbrokers are found primarily in India. (Germidis 1991:16) By its
very nature, informal activity is not specific to any one sector. If anything, it can be
expected to pervade all sectors of the economy.
2.2.4 Heterogeneous informal finance
In general, informality is characterised by a strong flexibility and
individuality in respect of loan purpose, interest rates, collateral requirements,
maturity periods and debt rescheduling. (Ghate 1992:6) The economic components
of informal finance are particularistic, and may even be unique to a particular
borrower and his relationship with the lender. Informal finance as a term
encompasses the mobilisation of savings as well as the extension of credit. Informal
lenders provide financial services as well as credit, including the transfer of funds
within countries, remittances between countries, guarantees, safe-keeping, and
insurance. (Adams and Pitchett 1992:2)
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2.2.5 Informal finance and not informal financial market
Economic transactions in the informal sector are embedded in social relations
implying non-market institutions as borrowing and lending between friends and
relatives, which is mainly based on reciprocity. Therefore, Ghate (1992:5) argues
that the term informal finance is rather appropriate than informal market since
market is misleading when applied to some types of credit such as interest free loans
between friends and relatives, the terms of which are set not by impersonal market
forces, but by social relations between parties. Accordingly the interest rate does not
only reflect the scarcity of  money and risk as in the formal sector but also to a large
extent the individual relationship between lender and borrower. Even predominantly
commercial informal transactions often have a residual non-economic component.
(Nissanke 1998, Ghate 1992, Adams 1992)
2.2.6 Summary informal finance.
Informal finance is an important loan provider for underprivileged people
excluded from the formal financial sector. Exclusion occurs because either the
formal sector is not able to fulfil the requirements of the poor or because the poor do
not fulfil the requirements of the formal procedure. Informal finance is unregulated
and heterogeneous in its loan provision and agreements are often market-interlinked.
Credit arrangements are mainly built on reciprocity and are often as individual as the
lender-borrower relationship itself. Therefore, informal financial arrangements have
few similarities with formal financial market mechanisms. Rather the efficiency
focus of mainstream financial theories is replaced with an emphasis on the
relationship between individuals. As shown above, the relevance of social
connections on the interest rates composition is more prominent than the aspect of
profit.29 Therefore, interest free loans between family and friends are quite common.
However, exaggerated interest rates are also occurring when moneylenders have
extraordinary power. In this context, the social embeddedness is decisive for market
relations. Reciprocity, culture, class, gender, power and social status are the variables
                                                
29 A more detailed analysis about the interest rate composition in the informal sector will be given in
Part III, section  2.1
PART II – INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 73
that mainly influence the interest rate of the informal sector. Those variables are
neither captured in mainstream economics nor in common NIE theorising. Instead,
these variables are, as shown in Part I, subject to OIE. Thus it is reasonable to argue
that OIE is a suitable theory to capture the mechanisms behind informal
arrangements.
⇒ The factors relevant for the working mechanisms behind informal
financial arrangements are also the relevant factors to OIE theory.
Therefore, OIE is a suitable theory in relation to informal finance.
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Table 8: Informal Savings and Credit Arrangements
TYPES OF LINKS
Non-commercial arrangements
Commercial credit arrangements
i )money-based
Individual
ii )land-based
Moneylending
ii )commodity based
Savings arrangement
Associations
Combined savings
Credit Arrangements
Partnership Firms
Financial 
intermediation
Indigenous bankers
LENDERS
Friends
Neighbours
Households
Professional moneylender
Mobile bankers
Private individuals
From upper income groups
Landlords
Farmer moneylender
Trader-moneylender
Agricultural input dealers
Equipment suppliers
Processors (rice miller)
Produce traders
Itinerant traders
Market vendors
Storeowners
Fixed-fund associations
Mutual aid associations
Savings clubs
Informal credit unions
Informal savings and loan
Co-operatives (ROSCAS)
Pawnbrokers, Finance,
Investment, Leasing and Hire-
purchase companies
BORROWERS
Small farmers
Small business
and relatives
Small farmers
Small business
and households
Tenants
Small farmers
Small farmers
Small business
Household
Small farmers
Small farmers
and households
Small farmers
Small business
and households
Small business
and households
Source: Adapted from Holst Juergen, U. “The Role of Informal Financial Institutions in the
Mobilisation of Savings” in Germidis, Kessler and Ullmo, (1991) eds., op. cit. p. 123
2.3 Size of informal finance
To underline the importance of the informal sector and its decisiveness
concerning financial market policies, the following section will give a few estimates
concerning the size. By its very nature, it is difficult to arrive at a reliable estimate of
the relative size of informal finance. In general, two different kinds of estimates
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dominate the literature (1) estimates size of the non-monetarised sphere in relation to
GDP for example, the figure for Africa, Asia and Latin’s America range from a low
2% to a high 50% of GDP (2) Another way of assessing the extent of informal
financial activity would be to consider the number of persons who are members of
informal savings and credit associations. (Germidis 1991:41) In my opinion, the
latter is the more appropriate approach since economic development not only implies
GDP growth, but also decreasing income inequality. Just to mention a few figures in
this context,
Approximately 70% of the population of Cameroon participates in the
informal financial sector and informal sector saving is estimated to be more than 50
% of the total. (Nissanke 1998:47)
• It is estimated that over 80% of Zimbabwean smallholders have
access to informal credit, while in Zambia over 80% of the urban
population are estimated to participate in the informal financial sector
(African Development Bank 1994)
• According to Zeller (2000),30 less than 5 percent of the amount
borrowed by poor rural households Pakistan and Cameroon was
obtained from formal lenders.
• Aryeetey (1995:12) concludes that 77% of market women saved with
the informal Susu31 collector.
• Montiel et al. 1993, reckon that the share of informal credit in total
credit varies from about a third to about three quarters in Asian
developing countries.
• An OECD study estimates that the share of informal credit may range
from 30% to more than 80% of total rural credit (Germidis et al.
1991).
• In sub-Saharan Africa, the share of the informal sector is larger than
that of the formal sector in both credit provision and savings
mobilisation (Aryeetey 1997)
                                                
30 Zeller 2000 (IFPRI Policy Brief NO. 1, March 2000)
31 Susu collector are informal moneylender in Ghana
PART II – INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 76
• In general, it is estimated by Marguerite s. Robinson (2001:9) that
“about 90% of the people in developing countries lack access to
financial services from institutions.
• And According to the World Bank ,World Development Report 2000,
2001 Some 80 percent of the worlds 4.5 billion people living in low
and lower middle income economies do not have access to formal
sector financial services which are 3.6 mil. People
If it is assume that the latest estimate of the quite conservative World
Development Report in 2001 is close to reality, the question arises how financial
market theories can have any validity without considering those markets. In the view
of the large size of informal finance and its weak linkages to formal finance, macro-
economic policy making becomes difficult and usually ineffective. (Aryeetey
1995:4) This suggests that informal activity in the financial market may be critical to
understanding the effects and the efficacy of economic policy. (Montiel 1993:10)
⇒ The understanding of informal financial markets is due to their size
and the number of people engaged decisive for financial market
practices
2.4 Formal financial sector
The interest rate of the formal financial sector is dominated by the scarcity of
money and risk. In contrast the interest rate composition of the informal sector is
mainly based on relational factors. In the formal financial sector information
properties and their influence on efficiency are the decisive factor. The following
section discusses the formal financial sector by demonstrating the characteristics
(2.4.1); defining the three levels of formal financial sector activity (2.4.2);
differentiating the degree of regulations concerning formal finance(2.4.3); and
contrasting informal with formal finance while simultaneously showing that formal
finance is subject to NIE theorising (2.4.4). .
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2.4.1 Characteristics formal financial sector
According to Germidis (1991:13), the formal sector refers to an organised
urban-oriented, institutional system catering to the financial needs of the monetised
modern sector. The formal sector institutions are regulated and licensed as financial
intermediaries, usually comprising the central bank, commercial and merchant banks,
development or other specialised banks and non-bank financial institutions.
(Nissanke & Aryeetey 1998:25) Informal financial activities are usually localised
and confide to small and short-term transactions or seasonal requirements e.g. cash
flow and liquidity management. In contrast, formal institutions are largely located in
urban areas, and their operations are characteristically urban-biased, involving larger
transactions. Germidis (1991) depict formal institutions by their bias in the
mobilisation and allocation of resources:
1. A preference for the public over the private sector
2. A preference for large-scale enterprises and upper income households
over small-scale enterprises and low income households
3. A preference for non-agricultural over agricultural loans.
2.4.2 Three levels of formal finance
The formal financial sector can be represented on three levels. The first level
is that of the central bank which, in developing countries, often oversteps the
prudential functions it is assigned to and assumes an increasingly interventionist role
in local financial activity. Another characteristic of formal finance is the predominant
role of the treasury. The second level is composed of a myriad of banking and non-
bank financial intermediaries, including commercial banks, merchant banks,
development banks, savings banks, building societies, postal savings networks,
specialised financial institutions, social security schemes, provident funds, and
insurance companies. As for the third level, i.e. capital markets, developing country
experiences are multifarious, ranging from the relative atrophy of money, bond, or
stock markets, in Africa to what the IFC has labelled “emerging capital markets” in
certain Asian and Latin American countries. (Germidis 1991:15)
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2.4.3 Regulation in formal finance
As regards the formal financial sector, two main cases may be distinguished:
the first is that of a closely “regulated” financial sector where government control
over and intervention in the activities of financial institutions is extensive, often at
the expense of the development of financial markets; the second is that of a more
liberalised financial sector, where financial institutions have great leeway in carrying
out their intermediation activities, and where market mechanisms are promoted.32
Centered between these two theoretical archetypes, there is a whole range of ways
and degrees too which control is exercised. For example, controlled financial systems
such as that of Ethiopia can be contrasted with the more liberalised systems of
Zimbabwe(mid 1990), the Philippines and India; in between, the financial systems of
Mexico, Indonesia, Burundi and Zambia could be described as “mixed and evolving”
towards more liberalised policies. Regulation by the public authorities may be
carried out through the market (Zimbabwe and Philippines) or through direct control
of financial institutions (India, Indonesia). (Germidis 1991:13)
2.4.4 Summary formal finance
Formal finance focuses on information properties and is more readily able to
accommodate large and long-term loans because of its greater reliance of the pooling
of deposits and maturity transformation. It thus, enjoys greater economies of scale
and scope, although not necessarily of specialisation. Modern telecommunications
and data processing technology enable it to transmit claims over long distances
almost instantaneously. Formal finance is better suited to the needs of large and
medium-scale industry, organised trade and commerce and well to do urban
household, but it is less successful in serving the needs of the large unorganised
sector in developing countries, small and micro-entrepreneurs, small traders, and
small and poor borrowers generally. (Ghate 1992:16) NIE is able to deal with large
and medium-scale finance since both share the focus on efficiency under information
                                                
32 See the previous discussion concerning bank versus market based financial growth perspective
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constraints. Further, focusing on urban households makes it easier to hold the
assumption of ‘rational individual maximising’ since personal relations are less
relevant. In general, formal finance has an information advantage in exploiting
economies off scale in portfolio management and in diversification to allow risk
pooling and maturity transformation. However, NIE has a disadvantage in dealing
with relational financing as apparent from the informal sector, which does not follow
NC efficiency aspects.
⇒ NIE captures the efficiency enhancing assumptions behind the formal
financial market mechanism
2.5 Financial dualism and OIE
Financial markets in developing countries are subject to financial dualism, a
situation in which the financial market is divided into an informal and a formal
segment. With more than 80% (World Bank 2001) of the world’s population being
dependent on informal finance a financial market theory, not considering informal
financial institutions, can never be applicable. In this context, the informal sector was
examined while suggesting that efficiency aspects seem to be rather unimportant.
The efficiency aspect in informal finance is replaced with a focus on the specific
relationship between the individual borrower and lender. Informal financial
agreements are based on culture, reciprocity, networking, family, kindness, and
power. These factors are most important to OIE, hence, the informal sector reflects
OIE theorising. In contrast, the formal sector focuses on efficiency, information, and
economies of scale. The mechanisms behind the formal financial sector with its
particular focus on information properties seem to reflect NIE theorising. The large
number of people dependent on informal finance raises the question whether any
contemporary financial market theory can be applicable without recognising the
informal financial sector. Since the informal financial sector reflects the mechanisms
relevant for OIE, is suggests that any applicable financial market theory must inhibit
a degree of OIE reasoning.
PART II – INFORMAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 80
⇒ Financial market theories in relation to LDCs must consider non-
economic variables
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Table 9: Financial Circuits in Developing Countries
FORMAL FINANCIAL SECTOR INFORMAL FINANCIAL SECTOR
BANKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL
INTERMEDIARIES
Commercial Banks Professional moneylenders Loan companies
Indigenous banker Finance companies
Pawnbroker, etc. Investment companies
Merchant Banks Trader-lenders
Landlord-lenders
Farmer-lenders
Storeowners
Development Banks
Savings Banks Fixed-fund associations Housing finance 
companies
Building Societies Savings Clubs
Postal Savings Networks Self-help organisations
Co-operative Banks ROSCAS
Mutual Banks Chit funds
Social Security Institutions Mutual Aid Associations
Provident/ Pensions Funds
Insurance companies
CAPITAL MARKETS
Stock Friends Investment companies
Bond Neighbours
Money Relatives
Foreign exchange Private individuals from upper income
Groups, Rural financial markets,
Informal foreign exchange markets
Source: Based on Table 2.1 Germidis, Informal Markets, 1992, p. 28
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3 Relationship between Informal and Formal Finance
Associating NIE and OIE to a theoretical continuum called NIEOIE makes
only sense if each is able to provide theoretical advantages in relation to the
shortcomings of the other. While this is the case with the theory as shown in Part I
the question remains if this is also the case in reality with informal and formal
financial arrangements in LDCs. It has been shown that OIE is the appropriate theory
to deal with informal financial markets, while NIE is equally suitable for formal
financial markets. Further, it has been argued that the enormous size of people reliant
on informal finance suggest that only a theory that includes informal markets can be
appropriate. Despite this finding, it has been proposed by the financial repression
school, that informal finance can be neglected because it is ‘only’ a negative side
effect of financial repression and transition. If this is the case, informal financial
arrangements can be ignored and hence, OIE is useless. Thus, only if informality
inhibits an advantage in its own structure it makes sense to capture those advantages.
Additionally, it can only be justified to apply NIEOIE theory towards financial
markets if the linkage between informal and formal financial institutions is beneficial
for both. Thus the first chapter will examine the origin of informality according to
the financial repression school (3.1), following it will be investigated if the if the
argument reflects reality (3.2). As the findings contradict the assumption announced
by the financial repression school it will be questioned if the existence of informal
institutions can be explained by having comparative advantages in their individual
structure (3.3). In case advantages do exist, it will be further, explored if a linkage
between informal and formal financial institutions is beneficial for both (3.4). In
case, linkages are beneficial for the growth potential of both sectors, it suggests that
the same reasons justifying a theoretical continuum of NIEOIE are relevant for
creating a financial market continuum. Under these circumstances NIEOIE has
relevance to an actual market phenomenon.
3.1 The financial liberalisation school
The informal sector, despite its size, was neglected in financial market
theories due to the practical and theoretical domination of the financial liberalisation
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school.33 (FLS) Although the financial liberalisation school perceived credit markets
as fragmented and imperfect, they argued that this is a result of government policies,
which have repressed the growth of credit markets rather than an inherent
characteristic of the market itself. (Floro 1991:9, McKinnon 1973, Shaw 1973) The
following section summarises the financial liberalisation school by showing how
repressive policies cause fragmentation (3.1.1); asking what the growth implication
of financial repression are (3.1.2); explaining the interest rate/savings nexus
according to McKinnon and Shaw (3.1.3); and the assumption that that financial
liberalisation would eliminate financial dualism. (3.1.4) Finally the findings will be
summarised in section (3.1.5).
3.1.1 How repressive policies cause fragmentation
Repressive policies are seen as the prime cause of fragmentation (Roe 1991,
Montiel 1993, Frey 1988). It is argued that ‘informal financial markets develop and
thrive in circumstances where formal financial institutions are severely hindered by
distorted polices and generally repressed’ (Roe 1991:2) Ceilings on deposit and loan
rates tend to raise the demand for funds and depress the supply. Dissatisfied demand
for investible funds then forces financial intermediaries to ration credit by means
other than the interest rate, and this encourages the development of an informal
market at uncontrolled rates. A segmented credit market emerges with informal
financial markets to fill the credit gap and serve as an alternative vehicle for saving.
(Montiel 1993:45) On the formal market, favoured borrowers obtain funds at
subsidised, often highly negative, real interest rates, while other must seek credit in
expensive and unreliable informal markets. As McKinnon argues “Fragmentation in
developing countries .in the sense that firms and households face ….different
effective prices for land, labour, capital and produced commodities…has been
largely the result of government policy.” (1973:5) Indiscriminate distortions of
financial prices control over credit allocation, interest rate ceilings and rigidly fixed
exchange rates are seen as retarding economic growth by reducing the relative size of
the financial system and remitting distorted signals. (Nissanke 1998:19)
                                                
33 The financial liberalisation school has heavily influenced World Bank thinking, throughout the
1980s and 1990s. This is evident throughout the World Banks own publications. For example,
World Bank 1983, pp. 58-59, World Bank 1989, p. 171, and World Bank 1994, pp. 114-115
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3.1.2 Growth implication of financial repression
It is important to note here that financial repression not only causes
fragmentation, but also is the major obstacle for economic development. The main
propositions of the McKinnon and Shaw school on the consequences of repressive
policies are (Nissanke 1998:19):
Economic growth in a financial repressed economy is constrained principally
by the low level of saving, not by the absence of good investment opportunities.
Ceilings on deposit rates penalise financial saving and result in a lower rate of
investment, which diminishes the potential for economic growth
Real interest rates should reflect capital scarcity, and thus, interest rate
ceilings reduce the efficiency of capital allocation and with it the quality of
investment. By reducing the scope for risk premier, loan rate ceilings discourage
risk-taking by financial institutions. A large proportion of potentially high-yielding
investments are thereby rationed out of the market.
In short, financial repression is perceived to have a number of adverse
macroeconomic consequences, including the creation of informal financial
institutions.
3.1.3 Interest rate-savings nexus
According to McKinnon-Shaw, in developing countries money is held as a
store of value, rather than simply for transactions purposes. Consequently, the real
return on money represents the marginal return to savings while a low real interest
rate on money, consisting of a low nominal interest rate on deposits, often combined
with a high rate of inflation, tend to depress private savings. Because the
accumulation of money balances and physical investment are complementary, as in
McKinnon (1973), the reduction of savings reduces investment in physical capital.
Moreover, low administratively-determined interest rates on bank loans ensure that
credit will be rationed by non-price means, implying that many low-return projects
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will be financed, artificially depressing the aggregate rate of return on investment.
Financial repression, thus reduces both the quantity and quality of new investment,
and thereby also the economy’s rate of growth. Economists in the McKinnon-Shaw
tradition emphasise and additional feedback from low growth to lower saving
through a standard life-cycle mechanism, which in turn, magnifies the adverse effects
described above.34 (Montiel 1993:46)
3.1.4 Policy conclusion
The policy conclusions that follow from the financial repression thesis are
financial liberalisation, deregulation, and the removal of government intervention
form all aspects of financial markets which should enable the formal sector to expand
its frontier and thereby, eliminate the need for informal finance. It is argued that
financial liberalisation leads to financial deepening; improved efficiency, resulting in
lower spreads between borrowing and lending rates; and increased flow of funds
between segments, including better access to formal finance of previously
marginalised savers and borrowers. (Steel et al. 1997:6; Nissanke 1998) Accordingly,
what is needed is plentiful credit at high real interest rates. Such policies would
increase total savings, improve the efficiency of investment and either because of the
complementarities of money and capital or because of the increased availability of
credit increase investment. (Montiel 1993:47) The financial liberalisation hypothesis
(McKinnon 1973, Shaw 1973, and Frey 1982, 1988), which coined the term
“financial repression” represents the currently dominant strains of thinking about
developing country financial markets. Further, the forceful criticism of financial
repression by economists in the McKinnon-Shaw tradition has provided the
intellectual underpinning for the movement towards financial liberalisation in many
parts of the Third World. (Montiel 1993:45)
3.1.5 Summary financial repression school
                                                
34 For a more detailed treatment and mathematical models see McKinnon 1973, Shaw 1973, Frey
1988, Montiel 1993
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Financial market policies neglect the informal financial sector, despite its
acknowledged existence because it is considered as a negative side effect caused by
‘financial repressive’ policies. Underlying is the assumption that interest rate ceilings
tend to raise the demand for funds and depress the supply. Dissatisfied demand for
investible funds then forces financial intermediaries to ration credit by means other
than the interest rate, and this encourages the development of an informal market at
uncontrolled rates. The policy conclusions that follow from the financial repression
thesis are financial liberalisation, deregulation, and the removal of government
intervention form all aspects of financial markets which should enable the formal
sector to expand its frontier and thereby eliminate the need for informal finance.
⇒ According to the financial repression school, informal markets are
caused by government intervention
3.2 Reality contradicts financial repression school
As can be seen in reality informal markets are not - or at least ‘not only’ –
caused by financial repression or a transition phenomenon. Informal financial
markets continue to exist and its proportion of GDP and population is continuously
rising despite increasing financial liberalisation. (Aryeetey 1995, USAID 1999,
World Bank 1998) Those findings contradict the McKinnon-Shaw reasoning. Under
financial liberalisation policy, the informal sector was supposed to be a transitional
phenomena becoming irrelevant during the course of financial liberalisation. Based
on neoclassical reasoning it was assumed that the emergence of informal finance is a
natural product of market mechanisms. The laws of supply and demand expect
alternative sources of finance to appear as long as the official supply of credit falls
short of actual market demand for credit. (Tsai 2002:7). However, reality proves that
the explanation is not sufficient. For example, in Argentina, one of the most liberal
financial systems, only 5 percent of the population has access to formal finance.
(Schreiner 2001) Bagachwa and Naho (1994) estimate that the ‘second’ economy in
the United Republic of Tanzania has grown from 20% of the official GDP in the late
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1960s to a sizeable 40 percent of GDP after the mid-1980s.35 If commonly applied
theories are not able to justify the existence and growth of the informal financial
sector, despite many years of financial liberalisation, another explanation is required.
⇒ Financial market fragmentation exists despite financial liberalisation
requiring another theoretical explanation, therefore another
explanation is required.
3.3 Advantages informal sector
Section 3.2 demonstrated that despite increasing financial liberalisation,
informal finance continues to be vital and growing. It seems that informal finance is
not just a negative side show of economic development as argued by the financial
repression school. Rather informal finance seems to be an inherent characteristic of
the financial market itself. As such it should inhibit advantages in relation to formal
finance. Identifying this advantage can give insights about financial market dynamics
in developing countries and might be utilised for economic development. Further,
identifying advantages gives the informal sector its theoretical ‘right’ for existence.
Hence, the following section intends to search after informal finance advantages. The
text will proceed by enquiring reasons for the preferences of informal arrangements
over formal ones (3.3.1); the distribution of informal finance and its savings potential
(3.3.2); the productivity of informal credit and the importance of consumption loans
(3.3.3); the limitation of formal arrangements (3.3.4); the wrong assumption about
monopoly rents (3.3.5). The findings will be summarised in section (3.3.6).
3.3.1 Preference of informal over formal
Poor people often prefer informal finance to formal finance, although it
charges higher interest rates, because access to informal finance is relatively easy - in
comparison to the formal sector transactions are easily understood. Formal finance
                                                
35 See also the section 2.3 concerning the size of the informal sector.
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requires literacy rates and collaterals - both are not common between the poor.
(Germidis 1991:17) Due to the rapid processing of requests and delivery of credit, it
meets the demand of the lower income households concerning seasonal financing of
consumption and production. (Germidis 1991:17) Transactions are based on the
confidence engendered by face-to-face relationships between creditor and debtor;
there is usually no collateral involved and security on loans is contingent upon the
borrowers past savings and credit record and on social pressure to abide by certain
rules of behaviour. Informal finance relies instead, on collaterals or interlinked credit
contracts with land, labour or product markets36.
3.3.2 Distribution and saving
Informal finance is also much better distributed than formal finance. Informal
finance - because it functions outside the purview of regulations imposed on the
formal sector - has a flexibility that develops dynamism of its own, adapting to the
needs of the communities in which they operate. (Nissanke 1997, Ghate 1992:6) The
dissatisfied demand for credit of those excluded by the formal sector is met by
heterogeneous informal lenders. (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998) Although informal
institutions are very heterogeneous all of them have the features of informality,
adaptability and flexibility based on reciprocity. Therefore, informal finance is
concentrated wherever there are substantial amounts of commercial transactions
regardless of the state of development of formal financial markets. The proportion of
poor people in informal finance is large and informal loans and deposits are common
among all economic classes (Adams and Pitchett 1992:3)
Many group-based organisations are operating on an agreed discipline and the
principle of solidarity. They are often based on funds generated from member’s
savings and this indicates the importance of reciprocity. Linking credit with savings
encourages the poorest to save and generally ensures high repayment rates.
(Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998:26) Therefore, informal finance also provides deposit
opportunities. Someone must save to provide each unit of money circulating in
                                                
36 Product-related loans can be output-tied loans, input-tied loan or loans from market agents
(Germidis et al. 1991)
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informal finance. Large amounts of informal loans mirror an equally large amount of
informal financial savings. (Adams and Pitchett 1992:3) Indeed, the link between
prior savings and credit is stressed much more in the informal sector than in the
formal one. (Germidis 1991:18) Informal finance allows millions of individuals,
firms, and households in low income countries who have surplus funds to redeploy
them as loans to individuals and firms who have better economic opportunities. This
results in an increase in output and in capital formation over what would occur if
informal financial markets did not or could not operate. (Adams and Pitchett 1992:4)
While informal loans and savings may be small in absolute terms, they are often as
large in relation to a borrower’s income and assets as are formal loans.
3.3.3 Productivity and consumption loans
In contrast, to common thinking, small borrowers often use credit more
productively than borrowers in the formal sector. Hence, informal finance serves as
well equity as efficiency. (Ghate 1992:6) Knowledge of borrowers, often based on
close relationships, gives informal lenders a competitive edge in transaction costs,
though at the same time it limits them to their local network. Informal associations
and agents also have a competitive edge in small and short-term deposit mobilisation,
which is untapped by formal institutions. (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998) It has been
argued that informal finance serves only unproductive consumption loans. However,
according to Ghate (1988) consumption loans cannot be regarded as unproductive
per se because (1) they serve as essential loans for emergencies and subsistence, (2)
productive loans for housing, education, migration, (3) loans for the purchase of
consumer durables which may be used for productive purposes, such as sewing
machines and typewriters; and (4) loans for conspicuous consumption. It is also
questionable as to what extend food at subsistence level can be considered as
consumption in the common sense. Particular since on average 60-70 percent of
expenditures is incurred for food.37 (Zeller 2000) Hence, in poor households, levels
of consumption and investment are inseparable in the sense that consumption and
                                                
37 Zeller (2000) in one of the IFPRI studies uses data from Bangladesh, Cameroon, China, Egypt,
Ghana, Madagascar, Malawi, Nepal and Pakistan.
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nutrition are important to households ability to earn income since family labour is by
far the most important production factor. (Zeller 2000)38
3.3.4 Restriction of formal finance
Formal finance is more readily able to accommodate large and long-term
loans because of its greater reliance on the pooling of deposits and maturity
transformation. It thus enjoys greater economies of scale and scope, although not
necessarily of specialisation. (Ghate 1992:16) Formal financial institutions tend to
neglect the mobilisation of household savings, and devote their efforts instead, to
allocating credit and creating money. (Zeller 2000) Formal financial institution
display, as Germidis (1991:17) calls it, a ‘triple bias’ with regard to both the
mobilisation and allocation preference for the public over the private sector, for
large-scale enterprises and upper-income households over small-scale enterprises and
lower-income households, and for non-agricultural over agricultural loans. (Germidis
1991:17) Formal institutions are limited in their scope of action because they
excluded the large proportion of would-be clients for whom consumption credit may
sometimes be a necessity before productive investment can follow.
3.3.5 Monopoly rents
Informal markets are usually characterised by free entry and exit. However,
this does not guarantee active competitions because of the restricted information
flows among participants. One of the central issues on the subject of formal and
informal finance is that of interest rates and its determination. The ability of some
commercial informal lenders to extract a monopoly rent is widely documented, and
the share of monopoly rent in the interest rates is largely determined by the degree of
competition prevailing in a particular market. (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998:25)
However, it is important to recognise that interest rates charged by such commercial
                                                
38 Particular banks frequently argue against consumption loans on the grounds that loans should
finance activities that generate income for repaying the loan. The reality, however, is that
consumption loans have to be considered as working capital loans for maintaining and enhancing
the production factor labour. (Zeller 2000)
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informal lenders must also allow compensation for transaction costs, risk premiums
and the opportunity costs of funds, as well as monopoly rents on profits (Bottomley
1975, Germidis 1991) Monopoly rents or profits included are also related to the sunk
costs of their operations and the contestability of markets. (Nissanke and Aryeetey
1998:25) 39 Various empirical studies on the subject have led to differing results,
particularly as regards the presence or absence of monopoly profits. What is certain,
however, is that no market rate of interest can be observed in the informal sector;
instead, there is a multitude of debt arrangements covering a wide range of interest
rates which are often a function of the relationship between lender and borrower.
(Germidis 1991, Nissanke 1998, Aryeetey and Udry 1995)
3.3.6 Summary advantages informal financial sector
Section 3.2 explored that despite increasing financial liberalisation informal
finance continues to be vital and growing. Therefore, section 3.3 enquired if informal
finance exists because it has an advantage in its individual structure. The findings
support this view. The informal sector advantage is built on the dynamic of
reciprocity and network building and has a positive effect on savings deposits, credit
provision, poverty, and credit distribution. Heterogeneity and flexibility give
informal finance a comparative edge. Policies dealing with economic development
should find a way to utilize this positive effect. Although informal arrangements are
limited in size, member, scale and place. By demonstrating advantages of the real life
informal sector, OIE is not limited to theoretical advantages in relation to NIE, but
extended with a field of advantages in reality. Reality shows that in contrast to
common economic theories OIE is able to capture the mechanisms behind the
informal financial market. The finding that more than 80 percent of the world’s
population rely on informal finance because informality provides advantages,
suggests, that a financial market theory is required that is able to acknowledge
informality. Since OIE is able to capture the mechanisms behind informal finance,
such a financial market theory requires elements of OIE.
                                                
39 For example, Thomas (1993) presents empirical studies to show that the share of monopoly rents in
interest is relatively small if alternative returns and risk premiums are taken into account.
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⇒ Informal financial institutions exist because they have an advantage in
their individual structure which is mainly based on social relations.
Therefore a financial market theory is required which incorporates an
understanding of these functionalities.
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Table 10: Comparison Formal and Informal Sector
INFORMAL FINANCIAL SECTOR FORMAL FINANCIAL SECTOR
1. The informal financial sector provides savings
and credit facilities for small farmers in rural
areas, and for lower- income households and
small-scale enterprises in urban areas.
1. Formal financial institutions ignore small
 farmers, lower-income households, and
small-scale enterprises in favour of a larger-
scale, well-off, and literate clientele which can
 satisfy their stringent loan conditions.
2. The procedures of informal schemes are
usually simple and straightforward; as they
emanate from local cultures and customs; the
population easily understands them.
2. Complex administrative procedures are
beyond the understanding of the rural masses
and small savers.
3. The informal sector mobilises rural savings
and small savings from low- urban households.
3. Formal financial institutions do not
mobilize income rural savings or small-scale
deposits. Commercial banks could contri, bute
to rural and small savings mobilization if they
had adequate branch networks and if they
adopted the relevant procedures.
4. Informal groups operate at times and on days,
which are convenient for their members.
4. The working days and opening hours of
formal financial institutions do not take rural
work schedules into account; banks are open
at times when farmers are at work in their
fields
5. Informal sector associations accept any
amount of regular savings, even the most modest
sums which a saver can afford to set aside. The
financial techniques on which such informal
groups are based lend themselves to the
management of a large number of small
accounts.
5. Formal sector institutions are selective
regarding clientele, so as to avoid having
clients who make only small deposits. Their
financial technology is not suited to the
management of modest sums from a large
number of savers.
6. Access to credit is simple, non- bureaucratic,
and little based on written documents. Literacy is
not a requisite.
6. Loan application procedures are complex
and require reading and writing skills so that a
file on the borrower may be established.
7. The simple and direct processing of loan
requests allows for their prompt approval and a
minimum delay in disbursement. Rejections are
rare;, but the level of risk is reflected in the
interest rate charged.
7. Processing of loan requests is complex,
resulting in long delays before final approval
or rejection. Even when approval is obtained,
loan delivery is slow.
8. Collateral requirements on loans are to local
conditions and borrowers capacity. The
conditions may be based either on regular contri,
butions to ROSCAs or on precise knowledge of
farm size and/or crops harvested so as to
determine the borrower's capacity to repay a
8. Collateral requirements correspond to the
situation of relatively well-off urban-dwellers:
deposits or savings accounts in a commercial
bank, property that can be mortgaged.
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conditions may be based either on regular contri,
butions to ROSCAs or on precise knowledge of
farm size and/or crops harvested so as to
determine the borrower's capacity to repay a
loan.
deposits or savings accounts in a commercial
bank, property that can be mortgaged.
9. Transaction costs are low 9. Transaction costs are high
10. Repayment rates are high 10. Repayment rates are low.
11. Because they emanate from local
environment, informal groups are aware of the
problems that members may be confronted with,
and Therefore, they can deal with repayment
difficulties in a pragmatic manner. Debt
rescheduling is possible.
11. Formal sector institutions do not have
close contact with the environment in which
they operate. Sometimes they prosecute
defaulters, which can have negative social
repercussions, while at other times they do not
sue for reimbursement, leading borrowers to
believe that formal loans are free.
12. The informal sector has a dense and effective
information network at the
 grassroots level for close supervision and
monitoring of borrower activity - particularly
their cash flow - whether they are members of an
informal association or not. This contri, butes to
the efficient mobilization of savings and ensures
high loan repayment rates.
12. Unfamiliar with the grass-roots
environment, formal institutions are ill-served
by a mediocre supervisory and monitoring
network, and are unable to gain insight into
the activities of their clientele.
13. Within the informal sector, information is
network widely diffused. The regular meetings
of informal savings and credit associations serve
as a forum for dissemination of information.
13. Formal sector institutions do not have a
good for dissemination of information. In
addition, they are out of touch with the rural
masses and make little to seek ways of
reaching them.
14. The interest paid on deposits in the informal
sector compares favourably with that paid in the
formal sector, thus providing an incentive for
rural and small urban households to save.
14. Some institutions of the formal sector do
not even offer savings facilities. Others apply
low - or sometimes even negative - real
interest rates, thus putting off many a potential
saver.
15. The informal sector charges competitive
lending rates; though they are sometimes high,
this reflects the scarcity of loanable funds. There
is little connection between deposit and lending
rates.
15. Public institutions charge very low -
sometimes negative - real interest rates on
loans. Commercial banks apply moderate
lending rates, which are nonetheless
considerably higher than the interest paid on
savings. The link between deposit and lending
rates is weak.
16. There are no investment opportunities for
savings which have been mobilized, but which
have not been lent.
16. There are investment opportunities for
savings which have been mobilized, but which
have not been lent.
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savings which have been mobilized, but which
have not been lent.
savings which have been mobilized, but which
have not been lent.
17. The informal sector usually does not keep a
written record on the borrowing and/or saving
activities of its clientele. When it does, the
procedures are relatively simple.
17. The formal sector keeps written records on
the activities of clients, although the
information recorded is sometimes irrelevant.
18. The volume and availability of loanable
funds are subject to seasonal fluctuations.
18. The formal sector regularly has loanable
funds available.
19. The informal sector is not subsidized by the
government, nor does it receive grants or other
forms of support from donor agencies.
19. Formal sector institutions are subsidized
by the government and may also receive
grants and other support from donor agencies.
20. Savings and credit mechanisms in the
informal sector are not geared towards
accumulating funds before the peak season
deprived when loan requests are highest.
20. A regular supply of funds allows the
formal sector to lend at any time of the year.
This is not the case with government lending
institutions, which are of sufficient funds
because of high default rates on their loans.
21. Despite the widespread dissemination of
information within the informal sector, informal
groups are often unaware of new farming
methods, and so members do not learn of new
techniques, which would allow them to increase
production levels and raise their standard of
living.
21. Formal sector institutions could reach a
widely dispersed rural clientele by
collaborating with government extension
units. In practice, though, they do not resort to
such intermediaries and do not provide
financial services in rural areas.
Germidis et al. (1991) Financial Systems and Development: What Role for the Formal and Informal
Financial Sectors? Paris: OECD Development Centre
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3.4 Linkages
Fragmentation of financial markets has persisted even years after financial
policy reforms were initiated because they did not adequately address underlying
institutional and structural constraints. Reforms have focused on the formal financial
sector, but as research shows, simply removing financially repressive policies is not
sufficient to increase financial depth or to induce banks to reach a wider clientele.
(Steel 1997:41) As the section (3.3) suggests, the informal financial sector provides
comparative advantages in relation to the formal financial sector. Therefore, it is
analytically wrong to explain its existence only with financial repression as
McKinnon and Shaw tend to do or to ‘regulate it away’ as often done in the past. If
the informal sector exists because it owns a comparative advantage the question is if
it makes sense to capture those advantages for economic development.
Consequently, the issue of linkages between the formal and informal financial
sectors has recently gained much attention in the literature on development finance.
Policymakers in developing countries in context of the micro-finance revolution have
considered theses linkages seriously, and in some cases have implemented schemes
for promoting such linkages. (Floro and Ray 1997:1) Thus the following section
investigates the economic rational for linkages (3.4.1) and explores why and how
linkages provide advantages. (3.4.3.) In case linkages between informal and formal
institutions create economic advantages by forming a financial market continuum,
the application of the theoretical continuum of NIEOIE has a field of relevance. In
this context, the interesting query is, if linkages are only a subject of relevance, or if
linkages are a necessity (3.4.4.). In case linkages are a necessity for economic
development, it’s a necessity to apply NIEOIE.
3.4.1 The Economic rational for linkages
Expanding the role of informal institutions appears to be an efficient way to
gain its comparative advantage and reduce financial dualism. Consequently, different
policies to enhance the role of informal markets were developed and implemented by
different governments. A general feature of those policies was to include incentives
for closer linkages between formal and informal institutions and a supportive legal
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and regulatory framework. (Steel 1997:41) The theoretical rational for the approach
is essentially three-fold: Firstly, it takes advantage of the lower transaction costs and
risk premia of the informal sector to reach smaller and poorer borrowers beyond the
profitable reach of the formal sector. This not only enhances the equity impact of the
informal sector, but also saves society costly resources spent on intermediation.
Because the formal sector pushes some of its transactions costs on to the borrower,
the borrower benefits too in the form of lower borrower transaction costs. Secondly,
to the extent that the shortage of funds for lending can sometimes confer market
power on existing lenders, access to formal sector funds could promote competitions
within the informal sector and reduce monopoly profits in those areas of the informal
sector where they are being made. Thirdly, by enabling the two-way flow of funds,
better linkages promote allocative efficiency by offering a broader choice for the
productive use of savings, irrespective of which sector they are mobilised by. The
first two rationals imply a flow of funds from the formal to informal sector, whereas
the third assumes the possibility of flows in both directions. To the extent, however,
that the formal sector has proved more successful in mobilising small savings than in
making small loans, the basic advantage of the promoting linkages approach is that it
combines the strength of both sectors to supplement the resources of the informal
sector. 40 (Ghate 1992:177)
Ghate also observes that the two sectors are substitutes over a range of credit
needs that occupy the middle range of a spectrum of credit markets and purposes.
Within this range they impinge on each others share of the market, depending on
lending and borrowing rates in each sector. “At both ends of the spectrum however,
each occupies a number of markets which cannot be served by the other and which
are, therefore, complementary” (Ghate 1988:75) In his study the financial system as
a whole becomes more competitive as a range of demand, non-exclusive to one
sector, has expanded. In the presence of overlapping demand, there is also spill over
effects from the formal to the informal segments. An example of such effects is
analysed by Bell (1990). When informal lenders act as intermediaries for formal
                                                
40 See Bouman and Houtman 1988 and Sanderatne 1989 for support from Sri Lanka for the view that
the formal sector is relatively more successful in mobilising small deposits that in making small
loans. Excess liquidity is reported to have led the rural banks in Sri Lanka to refuse accepting
deposits in the late seventies. Increasing the credit/deposit ration in the rural areas in India has been
a long-standing concern of the formal sector.
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institutions, Bell shows that the resulting lower costs of funds to informal lenders
will be passed on to borrowers. Thus, where demand is non-exclusive, i.e.
overlapping, direct credit links can have a positive effect on the efficiency of
financial systems. (Nissanke 1998:47)
⇒ It is rational to link informal and formal financial institutions because
linkages reduce financial dualism through spill over effects
3.4.2 Advantages of linkages
The advantage of linkages between informal and formal finance affects nearly
every part of finance and therefore, growth. To clarify the context the following
section gives a few distinct examples by (i) considering the effect of linkages on
insurance markets; (ii) focusing on transaction and information advantages; (iii)
dealing with the effect on low transaction costs on finance and demonstrating
efficiency gains through the fact that informal and formal finance are
complementary.
Insurance Markets
In the case that insurance markets are at loss and insurance possibilities are
limited, an act of inter-temporal trade to affect resource transfers over time such as
saving and credit becomes vitally important for consumption smoothing of the poor
(Besley, 1995). There is potentially immense demand for financial intermediation as
an effective device of risk-pooling and risk-sharing in developing countries.
However, the risk management capacity of financial institutions in the formal sector
is very restricted. (Nissanke and Aryeetey 1997, 1998, Nissanke 1998:4). In this case
informal markets, seem to perform a useful economic function in the evolution of the
financial sector in developing countries. (Montiel 1993)
Information and Transaction Costs
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Informal financial market segments have long developed devices and
mechanisms to cope with the agency problems within geographically and socially
confined community settings. These mechanisms used by heterogeneous informal
associations and agents are firmly rooted in indigenous social codes and norms.
(Nissanke 1998:10)While financial reforms undertaken so far have focused on the
formal sector, the comparably low transaction costs of informal agents and groups in
dealing with particular market segments indicate that facilitating their capacity
growth could provide a relatively efficient solution to the information and
enforcement problems that characterise developing economies. (Nissanke 1998:48)
Thus even in a country like Egypt, with a relatively dense coverage of formal
financial institutions, the role of informal lenders remains important. (Zeller 2000)
Formal and Informal Finance as Complementary
Formal and informal finance has each its advantages and shortcomings. Both
formal and informal segments of the financial system serve a distinct clientele and a
narrow market niche. (Ghate 1992) However, financial systems as a whole continue
to fail in capitalising effectively on potential comparative advantages of different
market segments. In particular, there has been an absence of functional linkages.
(Nissanke 1998) Instead each segment appears to struggle with its respective
operational constraints. On the one hand, despite flexibilities and adaptabilities
shown by some informal financial arrangements, the characteristics of informal
financial agents and institutions are such that the growth of operations within the
informal sector in is severely limited. On the other hand, despite their potential
advantage in exploring economies of scale in portfolio management and
diversification to allow risk pooling and maturity transformation, formal institutions
suffer from a legacy of either conservatism of financial distress characterised by high
transaction costs and severe loan recovery problems. (Nissanke 1998:14-15)
However, there exists a potential in exploiting comparative advantages of each sector
– formal and informal. In transitional periods, the capacity of financial systems could
be enhanced if integrative mechanisms are developed that can reduce operational
constraints facing each sector, and at the same time capitalise on the comparative
advantages conferred by each sector.
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⇒ Linkages between informal and formal financial institutions are
beneficial because the two are complements over a range of financial
services.
3.4.3 Necessity of linkages
The section above (3.4.2) summarised reasons why and fields where there are
advantages of linking the informal and formal sector in general. However, I would
like to go one step further and investigate whether it is a necessity to link financial
informal and formal markets. The requirement is based on two arguments. The first
argument deals with the impossibility to create macroeconomic policy and stability
with more than 90 percent of the population in LDCs is excluded from the formal
financial sector. (Robinson 2001) The second argument, by using case studies from
Africa, Asia, and Europe, shows that economic development, independent from time
and region, depends to a large degree on linkages between formal and informal
segments. Therefore, the goal of economic development cannot be achieved without
considering and utilizing informal finance.
Argument I
The first argument is developed by Montiel (1993) and based on
macroeconomic implication. Given the size of informal credit and foreign exchange
markets in many developing countries, their presence has enormous macroeconomic
effects. Such markets play important roles in determining the manner in which
exogenous and policy shocks are disseminated through out the economy, both on
impact and over time. Failing to ingrate them into the short-run macroeconomics of
developing countries may therefore, result in inadequate analysis and misleading
policy advice. “By its very nature, informal activity is not specific to any one sector.
However, from a macroeconomic perspective, the acknowledged role of well-
functioning financial markets in industrial country macroeconomics suggests that
informal activity in the financial market may be critical to understanding the effects
and the efficiency of economic policy.” (Montiel 1993:10) Montiel further,
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concludes that little has been achieved in the integration of informal credit markets in
macroeconomic models. Although informal markets are the subject of a large
microeconomic literature, their macroeconomic role has largely been ignored outside
the context of the dialogue between analysts in the tradition of McKinnon and Shaw
and Neo-Structuralists. (Montiel 1993:3)
At the macroeconomic level, Montiel additionally expresses concerns that
monetary and fiscal policy is ineffective where informal finance is dominant. The
large currency holdings that are accumulated outside government restriction
therefore, have the potential of reducing the authority’s control of the money supply.
Attempts at monetary creation, for example, may be frustrated by a flight of currency
from the banking sector into the informal sector, hence, limiting the banks ability to
create deposits. (Montiel 1993:26) On the fiscal side huge tax erosion takes place,
because informal transactions are mostly officially unrecorded.
Argument II
The other argument is, to my knowledge, not generally expressed. It
summarises different statements of scholars who evaluate evidence of individual case
studies. Surprisingly, independent from the region and development stage, scholars
express the assumption that economic development is not dependent on different
policies as for example, small scale versus large scale industrialisation or bank based
versus market based finance, but most decisive is the degree of linkages between the
informal and formal sector. In this sense, linkages are the precondition for
dynamism, the driving energy behind growth. Following examples will be provided
from (a) Africa; (b) Europe and Japan; (c) China.
(a) Africa
M. Nissanke links, in one of her United Nations studies (1998) dealing with
Sub-Saharan Africa, economic development to formal and informal institutional
linkages. Nissanke (1998) concludes that financial market fragmentation becomes a
problem when links between the different segments are weak because under such
circumstances the transmission of price and policy signals across systems severely
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limited. In such an environment, the weakness of each sector cannot be overcome,
while their comparative advantages are not exploited in full for efficient
specialisation. Consequently, the systems potential capacity for enterprise
development is circumvented. (Nissanke 1998:48) Nissanke concludes that the
question what hinders economic development cannot be found in the contemporary
discussions between market vs. state led growth, but within the question of
institutional linkages. This finding is also fostered by authors of different case
studies, i.e. Floro and Ray (1997) in relation to the Philippines, Soyibo (1996) in
relation to Nigeria, Aryeetey and Udry (1995) in relation to Kenya, Mohne (1996) in
relation to South Africa.
(b) Japan and Europe
Teranishi (1997) shows how important the informal sector in past Japan was
for contemporary successful institution building. During the Japan Meiji era (1868-
1912), informal segments had been systematically nurtured by government policies
so that they could be transformed and graduated into formal institutions. (Nissanke
1998:48) In this context, Teranishi (1997) demonstrates that many informal
arrangements could be formalised without coercion for their own expansion and
growth. He additionally emphasises that institutional innovations – not just
technological ones - and related changes in the legal and regulatory policy
framework could extend the feasibility frontier of sustainable finance to reaching the
poor. The primary role of policy should therefore, be to foster institutional
innovations. (Zeller 2000) Equally Marco Da Rin (1997) argues that the degree of
economic integration in relation to formal and informal institutional arrangements
was decisive for the development of technology and finance of early industrialised
Germany and Britain. Lauren Morris Mac Lean (2002) explains that, despite nearly
identical cultural and economic landscapes and homogenising pressures of
globalisation, social security differs in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, two neighbouring
countries in West Africa, due to different attitude towards the informal sector. While
Ghana attempts to strengthen the informal social welfare system successfully, Cote
d’Ivoire has tried to replace these informal social networks (unsuccessfully).
(c) China
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However, the informal sector is not only relevant for very low developed
countries, but also for transition countries like China. As PriceWaterhousCooper
states “Chinas private sector is booming. Today, it is one of the fastest growing
economic engines in the world economy.” (April 2003) The private sector has clearly
been the most vibrant part of Chinas economy since the initiation of economic
reform in 1978. Just to give a few numbers41:
• More than thirty million private businesses were established since
1978
• Eight out of ten new employment opportunities are created by the
private sector
• In 2002 the private sector generated 60% of Chinas industrial output
• In Zhejiang alone, over 90% of the local GDP flows from the private
sector
Although those numbers are impressive, it is unbelievable that banks only
extended credit to state and collective enterprises (SOEs), not to private ones. At the
end of 2000, less than 1% of loans from the entire national banking system had gone
to the private sector.42 If banks are not lending to private entrepreneurs, then how has
Chinas “economic miracle” been financed? The short answer: informal and often
illegal finance. (Tsai 2002:2) With an impressive study, Tsai documents the sheer
variety of informal financing options used by entrepreneurs in China. Most
interesting is his conclusion that “the scope and scale of informal finance” relies on
the different orientation of local governments towards the informal sector, which in
turn, “translates into varying degree of implicit support for informal financial activity
in any given locality”. (Tsai 2002:14) Therefore the power of Chinas rapid
development lies within the informal financial sector and the governmental attitude
towards it.
                                                
41 According to a survey recently conducted by the Asian Development Bank
42 Calculated from Table 19.3 of the Zhongguo tongji nianjin 2000 Chinas Statistical Yearbook by
Tsai
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3.4.4 Summary necessity to link the formal and informal financial sector
Section (3.3) explored that the informal financial sector exists due to its
comparative advantage in relation to formal finance. Furthermore, it has been
investigated in section (3.4) that building linkages between a formal and informal
financial institution do not only provide advantages, rather it seems to be a necessity
for economic development. Section (3.4) derived that argument by highlighting the
economic rational as well as the advantage of linkages between two complement
segments. Furthermore, it appears that stable macroeconomic policies are impossible
in a country confronted with a huge informal financial market. In this context case
studies suggest that growth is dependent on the linkages between informal and
formal institutional arrangements. The importance of linkages for economic
development is independent from time, region and development stage of a country.
Therefore, it seems to be appropriate to argue that linkages between formal and
informal institutions are essential for economic development. As the informal sector
reflects the relevance of OIE theorising and the formal sector reflects the relevance
of NIE theorising, the necessity to link informal and formal financial institutions
reflects the necessity of NIEOIE.
⇒ Linking informal and formal institutions to a financial market
continuum is a necessity in the course of economic development,
independent from time region and developmental state.
3.5 Conclusion Part II
Part I examined the existing institutional theories of NIE and OIE and
concluded that the use of an institutional individual combines the two approaches to
a theoretical continuum of NIEOIE. The intention of Part II is to investigate whether
reality reflects theoretical arguments of NIEOIE and in turn, if today’s economic
situation requires the theory of NIEOIE. Therefore, the first chapter asked if an
‘institutional’ financial market theory is relevant and if existing theories are
sufficient. The findings suggest that existing theories are insufficient and that a new
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theory is needed. In chapter II it has been asked if NIEOIE could provide the
theoretical underpinning for such a theory by examining the relationship between
informal and formal financial institutions. As the former reflects OIE theorising,
while the latter mirrors NIE theorising the finding that linking the two financial
institutional environments is necessary for economic growth reflects the necessity to
combine NIE and OIE to a theoretical continuum. In this sense, the theory NIEOIE is
not only a theoretical experiment, but becomes its justification through the
requirements of financial reality. The theoretical continuum of NIEOIE reflects the
actual financial market continuum of informal/formal finance. Further, with over
80% of the world’s population relying on informal finance because of its advantages,
a financial market theory is required which captures as well the mechanisms behind
informality as well as the forces behind formal finance. Therefore, NIEOIE is
suitable to provide the foundations for such a theory.
Conclusion: The necessity to link formal and informal institutions to a
financial market continuum while creating the need for a new financial
market theory reflects the demand and applicability for NIEOIE
PART III – CRITICISM ON NIEOIE 106
PART III – CRITICISM ON NIEOIE
It has been explored in Part I that as well, NIE as OIE apply an institutional
individual as economic actor and that on this foundation NIE and OIE form rather a
theoretical continuum, called NIEOIE, than contradicting schools. Part II
investigated if reality reflects theoretical arguments of NIEOIE and, in turn, if
today’s economic situation requires the theoretical foundation of NIEOIE. It was
suggested that because the informal sector inhibits an advantage through its
individual structure, it is necessary for economic growth to link informal and formal
institutions to a financial market continuum. As the informal sector reflects those
institutional mechanisms which are central to OIE, while the formal one mirrors NIE,
it suggests that NIEOIE finds applicability and justification. This argumentation was
built on the assumption that the informal sector has an ‘advantage’ built on its
individual institutional mechanisms, which differ from those in formal institutions.
However, critiques could argue that the advantage of informal financial institutions is
built on the same fundamentals as the advantage in formal institutions. If the
mechanisms causing the emergence of a formal institution are similar to those forces
which create the dynamic of the informal financial institution, only NIE theorising
and not NIEOIE is relevant. Therefore, the intention of Part III is to investigate if
NIE theorising is able to explain and capture the functionality of informal financial
institutions in less developing countries (LDC). Since NIE scholars do not explicitly
deal with informal financial markets, the question is if development economists who
do, are applying NIE reasoning (chapter 1). Further, it remains to be investigated if,
in case they do apply NIE theorising, NIE theory is sufficient in explaining the
advantage of informal financial markets (chapter 2). In case NIE is insufficient, it
needs an enquiry if the ‘insufficiency’ is built on the same arguments OIE uses
theoretically to criticise NIE. Only if the weakness, as demonstrated by reality,
appears to be identical to the shortcomings of the NIE theory as criticised by OIE,
NIEOIE finds justification in relation to informal financial markets.
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1 NIE and Informal Financial Markets
1.1 Institutional and structural approach
NIE scholars do not deal with informal financial institutions, but development
economists (DE). DE scholars applying NIE microeconomics with focus on
information properties towards informal financial institutions are summarised as the
“institutional and structural” approach (ISA). However, despite the fact that all ISA
scholars focus on informal financial institutions, they are independent from each
other, using different arguments and do not form a school. Some focus on the
information advantage of the informal institution itself, others focus on structural
reasons that cause information problems, however, all of them focus on information
structures. Therefore, the following section will explore different approaches.
Section (1.2.1) considers Hoff und Stiglitz argument that informal financial
institutions overcome the shortage of credit when banks are having difficulties of
monitoring. Section (1.2.2) deals with Aryeetey and Udry who demonstrate that
informal institution have an advantage due to insider knowledge. Section (1.2.3)
focuses on Teranishi and Caprio who argue that missing information infrastructure
makes it necessary to rely on informal finance; and section (1.2.4) explores Gertler
and Roses explanation that informal arrangements are caused by path dependency. In
section (1.2.5), the hard core positions of all approaches are summarised.
1.1.1 Hoff and Stiglitz
For example, Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) who also developed the bank-based
approach to financial development (see Part II) advance an explanation for persistent
fragmentation based on imperfect information. The costs of screening, monitoring
and contract enforcement between lenders in developing countries are too high for
banking in relation to poor borrowers. (Steel et al. 1997:6) They argue, in
contradiction to the financial repression school, that even when no ceiling on interest
rates and excess demand for loans exists, it may be unviable to lend to certain
categories of borrowers, such as small and medium-size enterprise (SME), if the
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costs and risks exceed those of known, lower-risk clients. (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990) In
addition, in developing economies, information about future prospects may be highly
uncertain, especially if the economic structure is vulnerable to external shocks. In the
absence of credible predictions, reliable information and appropriate financial
instruments, perceived risk may be abnormally high for term lending, especially to
small borrowers. (Nissanke 1997:23,) Market auctions, moreover, are often
ineffective due to difficulties in specifying and monitoring the other agent’s actions.
Contracting parties, as a result, are compelled to make use of non-price strategies
such as quantity rationing and market interlinkages. (Floro 1991:12)
In developing countries characterised by these conditions, the growth of
formal financial institutions is severely constrained. Formal institutions must retain
their commercial viability and, in this environment of high risks and high transaction
costs, banks are likely to be conservative and risk-adverse in their portfolio
management.(Hoff and Stiglitz 1990) They may prefer to hold government paper,
with its lower risk to extending loans to non-established borrowers. This explains
both the failure to reach target groups of subsidised credit programmes administered
through formal institutions and the high concentration of bank loans among the
relatively well-off groups who have collateral or reputation at their disposal. Many
credit guarantee schemes designed specifically to deal with the problems of high risk
have not managed to alter this general tendency. Under such conditions, the
dominance of informal finance based on limited social relations can be expected.
(Nissanke 1997:24) Accordingly, the existence of inter-linked transactions between
credit and other goods or service markets (inputs, outputs or labour) is explained by
the need to overcome information problems about the future behaviour of clients in
time based transactions (Hoff, Braverman et al. 1993)
⇒ The formal bank causes the advantage of informal credit arrangements
because due to information asymmetries the bank may not be willing
to lend to SMEs. Hence, the risk adverse characteristic of the bank
causes the advantage of informality.
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1.1.2 Aryeetey and Udry
Other institutional explanations of segmentation emphasise differences in the
costs and characteristics of different types of transactions that can lead to
specialisation within financial markets. In the context of imperfect information and
transaction costs, the informal sector provides a comparative advantage which
explains its continuous existence. Aryeetey and Udry argue “The segmentation that
is observed arises because in the attempt to reduce the moral hazard involved in
lending, informal units have to create distinct groups or associations that they can
control or use to capture information about potential clients, one way or another.”
(Aryeetey and Udry 1995:35) Informal financial arrangements are able to make use
of local sources of knowledge and specific social mechanisms to overcome
screening, monitoring and enforcement costs. For example, rotating savings and
credit associations (ROSCAs) are able to operate due to degree of ‘insider’
knowledge they have about each member and their ability to enforce compliance
through the use of local social sanctions, such as non-co-operation in other aspects of
daily life. (Susan Johnson 2001:4)
⇒ The informal credit institution exists independent from the willingness
of banks to lend because they provide an information advantage
through their individual structure.
1.1.3 Teranishi and Caprio
Teranishi (1997), for example, attributes segmentation of financial markets in
developing countries to a host of problems arising form imperfect information, where
information disclosure is severely limited. He argues that “the efficiency of financial
markets in such an economy hinges crucially on the degree of accumulation of
information and establishment of information channels between lenders and
customers as a device to cope with problems related to imperfect information”.
(1994:315) In this context, Caprio et al. (1994) draw a particular attention to the fact
that years of financial repression in developing countries have led banks to
underinvestment in information capital. They emphasise, therefore, the importance of
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developing equity markets, accounting and auditing systems in order to build the
economy’s information capital base. (Nissanke 1997:23)
⇒ The informational infrastructure of a country causes the information
asymmetries of banks and hence, their unwillingness to lend to SMEs.
1.1.4 Gertler and Rose
Institutional theories also deal with structural bottlenecks as cause of
fragmentation. Historical weaknesses of the banking system in developing countries
may have also exacerbated structural tendencies towards segmentation. In many
former colonies, banks were established primarily to serve import-export trade with
the colonial central. Many commercial banks of such an origin retain this particular
feature. Their lack of interest and expertise in lending to indigenous, locally oriented
firms has not been easily overcome. (Steel 1997:8) Segmentation may also result
from weaknesses inherent in the infrastructure that supports the financial system. For
example, the adequacy of the legal infrastructure affects the costs and risks of
contract enforcement, which in turn, influence both the willingness of lenders to
enter into financial agreements and the type of security they are willing to accept. In
addition, the formal financial sector ability to offset the risk of default may be limited
by the absence of a well-functioning insurance market and of markets for the sale of
confiscated collateral (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986) Furthermore, inadequate
bank regulation and supervision over the years has propagated financial
mismanagement and poor portfolio performance, which, in turn, have raised the
perceived risk of term lending to small enterprises. In this situation, financial sector
reforms may prompt banks to address management weakness and to diversify
portfolios, but the response may be slow, as many parameters and exogenous
conditions essentially remain the same. (Nissanke 1997:23)
Within the general framework of transaction and information costs, other
authors have concentrated on a range of structural and institutional features of
developing countries financial markets to explain segmentations. In a New
Keynesian tradition, they demonstrate that the structure of financial markets,
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including market segmentation, closely mirrors the development and performance of
the real sector. (Nissanke 1997:21) For example, Gertler and Rose (1994) analyse the
symbiotic relationship between finance and growth based on two key concepts: a
premium for external finance and a borrowers net worth.43 Based on these
perceptions they develop an evolutionary model of the banking system with the
purpose to determine the relative efficiency of a financial system and its dynamic
evolution. Accordingly development of the real sector raises borrowers net worth and
“tends to reduce the premium, attached to external finance which in turn, serves to
stimulate further, development” (Gertler and Rose 1994:32). The premium for
external finance then is inversely related to borrower’s net worth, and they jointly
determine the level of investment. In this context, Gertler and Rose 1994 developed a
model which links the evolution of an economics financial structure with firms
changing financial needs over its life cycle. Thus, as self-finance develops into
external finance, intermediation by banking institutions increases and a securities
market develops. (Nissanke 1997:21, Steel 1997:7)
⇒ Weaknesses resulting from path dependency cause the resentment of
banks not to lend to SMEs and Hence, the growing importance of
informal finance.
1.1.5 Summary ISA
The financial regression school assumes that informal arrangements exist
because the government intervenes in the financial market and destroys thereby, free
market forces, which would never support informality. Contrary, scholars of the
institutional and structural approach argue that the informal sector owns an
advantage independent from the government’s attitude. Scholars demonstrate that
problems arising from imperfect information are likely to be most pronounced in
                                                
43 The former concept refers to an additional premium borrowers pay for uncollaterised loans and
insurance due to frictions introduced by informational and enforcement problems. The latter is
defined as the sum of a borrowers net liquid assets and the collateral value of his illiquid assets.
This consists not only of frangible physical assets but also any perspective future earnings that the
borrower can credibly offer as collateral. Thus, the borrowers accumulated net worth depends both
on past earnings and anticipated future prospects.
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low-income countries. Economy-wide information flows may be extremely limited,
and gathering information is often costly. Poor information systems encourage
segmentation by raising the costs to formal institutions of acquiring reliable
information on both systemic and idiosyncratic risks for all, but the largest clients. In
contrast, informal agents rely exclusively on localised, personal information, giving
them local power, but constraints their ability to scale up. (Steel 1997:7).
Accordingly, the informal sector is still a transitionary phenomenon caused by
market failure, but the market failure is not ‘only’ caused by government
intervention, but also due to the transition stage of country in which information
asymmetries are decisive. Thus, the informal sector exists because it provides a
comparative advantage in relation to imperfect information and transaction costs.
Based on those “new microeconomics” ISA is able to explain the existence and
advantages of the informal sector irrespective of financial repression. The policy
advice to link formal and informal financial institutions in this perspective is based
on the assumption that in the process of linking, the formal sector becomes able to
utilise the information advantage of the informal sector.
⇒ According to the ISA, the informal sector exists because it has an
information advantage
Table 11: Comparison Financial Repression School and Institutional and Structural Approach
FINANCIAL RREPRESSION SCHOOL INSTITUTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL
APPROACH
The informal financial institution is caused
by financial repression
The informal financial institution emerges due
to its information advantage in relation to the
formal institution
The informal institution is a transitionary
phenomenon
The informal institution is a transitionary
phenomenon
The informal institution is bad The informal institution has information
advantages, but only in comparison to the
shortcomings of formal institution
Linking informal and formal is unnecessary Linking informal and formal institutions is
positive so that the formal sector is able to
utilise the advantages of the informal sector
Table by Alexandra Bernstorff 2004
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1.2 Is ISA an extension of NIE?
Apparently, ISA scholars focusing on informal financial institutions are able
to explain the existence of informal institutions independent from financial
repression and are able to identify the advantages possessed by the informal sector.
The interesting question is to what extend those ‘explanations’ equal NIE theory.
Therefore, the intention is to find out if ISA is an extension of NIE in relation to
financial markets in developing countries. However, it is important to differentiate
between the early and the more sophisticated version of NIE. Both can have
similarities with ISA, but the later version is far more difficult to differentiate from
OIE. Section (1.3.1) deals with the terminology between NIE and ISA; Section
(1.3.2) considers similarities between the early version of NIE (NIE1) and ISA;
while section (1.3.3) focuses on the similarities between the more sophisticated
version of NIE (NIE2) and ISA; section (1.3.4) summarises similarities and discusses
if ISA is an extension of NIE in relation to financial market theories in developing
countries.
1.2.1 Terminology between NIE and ISA
It is important to note that although many NIE scholars have explicitly built
their theory on explanations concerning economic growth variances between
developed and less developed countries, they are not development economists
(DE)44. (North 1990, Harris 1996) Why is that of any importance? NIE scholars are
building ex post explanations for an institutional phenomenon like the Asian crises
often within a game theoretic approach, while development economists are
concerned with case studies and ex ante recommendations.45 (Aoki 2000, Qian 2001)
NIE as a theory intends to follow theoretical consistency and is concerned with the
                                                
44 DE will be used as short form for development economists
45 It is important to note that the class of Development Economists entitles all economists focusing on
developing countries independent from their ideological and theoretical background. In contrast,
ISA only refers to the sub-group of development economists, dealing with institutional and
structural features of development while focusing on information properties.
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effect of institution on individual and collective welfare.(Azfar 2002:2) In contrast,
DEs are less concerned with theoretical consistency than with practical applicability
and the focus on microstructures is replaced with a focus on growth. However,
during the period of the transition process from socialism towards capitalism within
the GUS states DEs became automatically concerned with institution building. It
seemed to be natural that DEs dealing with institution building turned their attention
towards the theory of “Institutionalism” as device. At exactly this intersection
between DE and NIE, the confusion starts. Quite often DEs call themselves or their
strategies NIE, while they are not. On the other hand, NIE experiences
recommendation and practical application through the use of the word NIE which in
turn, supports their theory while they are not meant.46 It is the intention to untangle
those words, meanings, theories etc. and to find out if DEs who refer to NIE mean
NIE or may be OIE.
For the comparison of the ISA and NIE approach, it is important to define the
terminology between them. Despite the recognition by some NIE scholars that
informal institutions play a crucial role in defining societal rules (Denzau & North
1994, Ensminger 1997, Greif 1997) the application of NIE to the study of micro-
level issues relevant to financial matters in developing countries has largely focused
on formal institutions. (Zenger 2001:2) At this point, it becomes obvious how little
communication between scholars of NIE and scholars who work within the ISA
exists. While NIE talks about informal institutions as the social and cultural
embeddedness or as “shared mental models” of a society, ISA applies the term
informal institutions to unregulated institutions.47 In contrast, for NIE the
unregulated institution is still treated like a formal institution, a collective action
solution towards an efficiency problem under imperfect information and bounded
rationality. On the other hand, the informal institution of NIE, or in other words the
shared mental model, is assumed by ISA to be the “cultural endowment”. Due to
these “language problems”, many misspecification within the literature can be found.
                                                
46 The list of scholars is long see Sindzigre, Stein, Nissanke, UNRISD, Arestis, Demetriades etc.
However, it is not the purpose of the dissertation to demonstrate each particular misuse of NIE but
rather to explain why the misuse is happening.
47 See North 1990 on shared mental models and informal institutions in contrast, to Stiglitz 1990 on
informal institution and the necessity of government action. For NIE use of informal institution see
also Williamson, Eggertson, and other NIE scholars. For ISA sue of informal institution see also
Aryeetey, Robinson, Nissanke, and other scholars working with microfinance.
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Often development economists describe themselves as new institutionalists, while
they are not. On the other hand, NIE economists regularly describe a solution
towards a development problem without solving it, since the problem they are
writing about is not the problem supposed to find an answer.48
Table 12: Terminology NIE and ISA
TERM NIE INTERPRETATION DE INTERPRETATION
The Informal Institution Shared mental models, like
religion, tradition, culture etc.
The unregulated institution or non-
official institution, like ROSCAs or
any private agreement outside public
law.
The Unregulated Institution Equal to Formal Institution,
collective action solution
towards an efficiency problem
under imperfect information
The Informal Institution
Shared Mental Models
(norms, similar
worldviews,)
Informal Institution Cultural Endowment
Institutional Path
Dependency
(Geography, History, Law)
Informal Institution Institutional Endowment
Table by Alexandra Bernstorff 2004
However, throughout the following part of the dissertation the unregulated
and regulated institution will be contrasted while mirroring the formal and informal
institution of Part II. The term informal institution will be used in an NIE manner as
shared mental models. In case of relevance, the informal institution will be
differentiated between institutional and cultural endowment, while the former
reflects path dependency and the later shared mental models influenced by religion,
history and other cultural factors.
1.2.2 The early NIE approach
It is important to note, that within the NIE approach development took place.
The comparison done in this dissertation between the “institutional and structural”
approach and NIE relates not only to the “early” (NIE1), but also to the more
                                                
48 Examples are Sindzingre 2003, Stein 2002, Nissanke 1998, UNRISD, Arestis 1997, Demetriades
2001
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“sophisticated” (NIE2) form of NIE.49 NIE1 is a pure efficiency-driven view of
institutional change. Institutions are seen as emerging when the market mechanism
fails to allow all the potential efficiency-enhancing transactions to be realised. (North
1990, Coase 1984) In this version, the rational wealth-maximising agents will not fail
to seize upon the opportunities for efficiency enhancement, by setting up a new
institution – formal or informal (Evans and Chang 2000:11) NIE1 treats efficiency,
especially in the form of transaction costs (Coase 1998:73), as the only explanation
of institutions in all societies at all times. In this version, therefore, all institutions
that exist are efficient (examples will include authors like early Douglass North,
Harold Demsetz, Armen Alchian and the “property rights school” of Furubotn,
Richter, Pejovich and Yoram Barzel).
NIE1 is particularly obvious in the kind of “structural and institutional”
approach which deals with comparative advantages of unregulated institutions as
done by Aryeetey and Udry (1995). (see section 1.1.2). The unregulated institution
improves the market situation for credit due to its comparative advantage in relation
to information and transaction costs. NIE1 is also apparent in ISA approaches done
by Stiglitz et al. (1990) demonstrating that due to information disadvantage regulated
institutions do not provide sufficient credit, thus unregulated credit institutions
emerge. See as example Hoff and Braverman (1993) who demonstrate how credit
institutions, due to the inter-temporal basis of transactions, are subject to
information, monitoring and enforcement problems. These features give rise to moral
hazards and adverse selection in credit transactions and the possibility of market
failure. It is important to note, that in the former approach the unregulated institution
itself provides a comparative advantage, while in the latter approach the unregulated
institution arises in response to a market failure which is caused by information
asymmetries. Nevertheless, both are in line with NIE1 theorising which explains
institutions as an efficient solution towards an information and transaction problem.
Phrases, such as ‘market failure’ and ‘market imperfections’, due to information
asymmetry dominate the study of ISA’s in relation to developing countries . They are
also fundamental to NIE1, given the focus on production externalities, public goods,
                                                
49 The use of the words ‘early’ and ‘late’ relates to differences in the early work of North, Williamson
and the later work of North, Williamson. During the dissertation NIE1 and NIE2 will be used as
differentiation.
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imperfect information and the free-rider problem. Underlying is the assumption that
institutions are the way in which economies cope efficient with ‘market failure’.
(Harris 1995:2)
1.2.3 The sophisticated NIE approach
In the more sophisticated version of NIE (NIE2), it is admitted that due to
path dependency, not all institutional changes are efficiency-enhancing, not even in
the long run. Scholars like Brian Arthur, Paul David and Joel Mokyr, who work
mainly on technological issues argue that certain institutions may be chosen not
because of their inherent efficiency, but because of certain “irreversible events” in
history. (institutional endowment) The best example is that of “network externality”,
which gives the first movers a selection advantage through the frequency-dependent
definition of “evolutionary fitness”. (i.e. the competition between different computer
operating systems.) Similarities can be found in path-dependency approaches like
those from Teranishi (1994) and Gertler and Rose (1994) in which history and past-
structural decisions influence the present outcome. This approach is additionally
extended in NIE2 to the “cultural dimension” in the sense that the worldview
possessed by human agents matters. The proponents of this view start from the
assumption that human agents suffer from bounded rationality, hence, they are not
able to choose the most efficient institution. Bounded rationality, according to this
vision, makes it inevitable that humans operate with a mental model of the world that
may not necessarily be a good model of the real world. Given the devotion to a
certain worldview by the actors, they may prefer a certain institution because it
happens to fit their worldview ( or “cultural endowment” ), even when it is not
necessarily efficiency-enhancing from an “objective” point of view. In this way, the
optimality conclusion is negated. (Evans and Chang 2000:14)
The sophisticated version of NIE has grown together out of economic history
and the advances in game theory and information theory. (Nabli and Nugent 1989,
North 1990, Lin and Nugent 1995, Claque 1997, Olson 2000, Claque and Grossbard-
Shechtman) This advancement lies in the possibility to link formal rules to social,
economic, political and cultural factors, which allows “a systematic analysis of the
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embeddedness of financial institutions”.(Johnson 2001:2) Scholars who deal with the
institutional environment within a “bounded rationality” approach are very difficult
to differentiate from OIE. Within the ISA, the strang dealing with history,
infrastructure and geography as decisive for the existence of informal markets equals
NIE2. In contrast, to the ISA equivalent to NIE1 which considers the fact of
information problems between two actors and the influence on actors behaviour, the
sophisticated version of NIE and ISA deals with the causes of information problems.
According to the examples noted above the, Teranishi and Caprio explanation of
unregulated institutions is an equivalent to the NIE2 version because it does not
explain the action of informational constrained behaviour, but instead, explains the
existence of the information problem with informational infrastructure problems.
Similar Gertler and Rose demonstrate how history influences informational capital of
banks.
For analytical clarity, I have chosen a few distinct examples of differing ISA
approaches falling in the category of NIE2 although in general, each work of modern
development economists which deals with the “transplant effect” belongs to it. The
‘transplant effect’ implies that an institution can only be built on the fundament of
already existing institutional and existing cultural endowment. (A more detailed
analysis will follow in section 3.1.5) There is a growing literature by development
economists on the transplant effect. For example, Berkowitz and Li (2000); Roland
and Verdier (1999); Zhuravaskaya (2000) who deal with the question why strong
institutions emerge or fail to emerge in formerly socialist economies that are making
a transition to a market economy. There is also a growing interest in tracing the
determinants of differences among legal families. (Glaeser Shleifer 2000) Other
studies like Rodrik (2000) provide empirical support for the theory that a well-
designed strategy for institution building should take into account local knowledge,
and should not over-emphasise best practice blueprints used in developed countries
at the expense of local participation and experimentation. (See also Acemoglu 2001,
Johnson 1997, and Robinson 2000, Sachs 2001)
1.3.4 Summary comparison NIE and ISA
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In relation to financial markets, both NIE and ISA economists equally apply
neoclassical analytical tools while incorporating an understanding of the influence of
imperfect information and transactions costs under bounded rationality. Both suggest
the need to focus on an analysis of the rules, monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms of financial institutions and the financial services to which they give
rise. Both visualise institutions as the outcome of games of social interaction, in
which individuals rationally choose their actions, according to their mental models of
the world, their information sets, and the behaviour of other players in the game.
(Claque and Grossbard-Shechtman 1996:2) Both define institutions as socially
devised constraints on individual action (North 1994) and both consider institutions
as sets of rules that are recognised and frequently followed by members of the
community which impose constraints on the actions of individual members. (Claque
1997:17) Although NIE theory has not been applied towards financial markets in
developing countries before, and the ISA approach has been nothing else than a
collection of different works by development economists focusing on information
properties in relation to informal markets, both use the same methodology and
causality. As the findings suggest that similarities between the “institutional and
structural” approach and NIE are decisive, it makes sense to call the ISA an
extension of NIE concerning financial markets in developing countries.
⇒ ISA is an extension of NIE towards financial market theories
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2 Is NIE sufficient?
The obvious question following the Hypothesis that ISA is an extension of
NIE towards financial market theories is, whether the NIE approach in explaining the
advantage of the informal sector with its informational properties is sufficient. In
case NIE is relevant, NIE is able to explain the advantage of the informal financial
sector and hence, the relevance of NIEOIE for financial markets does not exist.
Nevertheless, the application of NIE towards financial markets in developing
countries has many different faces and often deals with unrelated areas; hence, the
question of sufficiency is not easily to answer. I choose to focus on three levels of
sufficiency. The first concerns reality, and enquires to what extent the theory of NIE
mirrors the reality of developing countries (2.1). The second focuses on the theory
itself and asks whether NIE is theoretical consistent to explain informality with
information (2.2). The third level concentrates on the practical side by investigating
the applicability of NIE for political advice (2.3). In section (2.4) the findings will be
summarised.
2.1 The theory of NIE and reality in LDCs
It will be investigated if some of the basic assumption underlying NIE theory
mirrors the reality of LDCs. In (2.1.1) the assumption of NIE concerning informal
markets as single markets will be enquired; in (2.1.2) the explanatory power of
information and transaction costs in relation to informal finance will be examined
and in (2.1.3) the principle of homogeneity in informal financial markets will be
explored. Section (2.1.4) summarises the findings which suggest that NIE theory is
not able to capture the reality of financial markets in LDCs.
2.1.1. NIE assumption: single/multiple markets
One of the basic assumptions of NIE is that financial markets in LDCs are
single markets. Traditionally, this means that a market-clearing price exists. NIE
explains differences in the cost of credit, which relates to the market-clearing price of
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credit, with differences in transaction and information cost. (Aryeetey 1995:16)
Thus, differences in the interest rate are explained by the influence of imperfect
information and transaction costs. (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Hoff, Braverman et al.
1993) According to NIE credit markets are subject to information, monitoring and
enforcement problems due to the inter-temporal basis of transactions. These features
give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection in credit transactions. In this
approach, the interest rate comprises four components i) transaction costs, ii) risk
premium, iii) cost of funds, iv) monopoly rent. If these would be included into
calculations a market clearing price exists.
As an alternative method of defining a single market, NIE suggests looking at
the products offered by the suppliers of financial services in terms of their end-use by
borrowers. By this approach, if one sees a single or similar product i.e. a loan, then
the conclusion was that a single market for loans existed, irrespective of its structure.
In contributions to a workshop discussion of “markets in developing countries”
various contributors took the view that financial markets were single with a common
product, but acutely segmented/fragmented with significant price differences arising
from a number of sources. (Aryeetey 1995:16) According to Roemer and Jones
(1991:xvi), markets are single because in developing countries they are divided into
segments in which different prices prevail for the same goods, services or factors.
Criticism I
The important question is: “Are the services and products of the financial
agents all similar? Are they homogenous products?” Obviously, a small overnight
loan from a savings collector based on a handshake must be very different from a
large long-term one that is secured by 200% collateral. (Aryeetey 1995:17) Usually,
the decision whether a product is a subsidy or a complementary is done by
comparing the financial products offered by formal and informal financial units on
the asset side from the end-use, but in developing countries it is not easy to decide if
a product is consumption or a production good. A bicycle, usually considered as a
consumption good, might be the only means in LDCs to transport goods to the
market. Therefore, Adams (1992) suggested that looking out for financial markets
purely on the notion of a uniform loan or other credit as the product was likely to
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lead to a inadequate comprehension of the way financial systems operated. His
argument was essentially based on the analogy of clothing that “informal finance was
able to tailor contracts to fit the individual dimension, requirements, and tastes of a
wide spectrum of lenders and borrowers”. Hence, only a few contracts, and therefore,
products, in informal finance were similar. In other words, most of the financial
products that borrowers receive differ considerably from another. (Aryeetey
1995:17)50 The point is of particular importance if it is considered that the dynamic
of the informal sector is created by the diversity of credit products.
Criticism II
Critical is also the NIE assumption that differences in the interest rate are
explained by the influence of imperfect information and transaction costs. (Stiglitz
and Weiss 1981, Hoff, Braverman et al. 1993) In contrast, case studies relating
informal markets to interest rates as Floro and Yotopoulos (1991) in relation to the
Philippines, or Udry (1993) in relation to northern Nigeria suggest that the NIE
approach is insufficient to explain the whole composition of interest rates. Variation
remains within the result, which is not accounted for by transaction, information and
default costs, but can only be explained by the presence of personal relations.
(Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998) The point is that the operators in informal markets are
mostly individuals, and transactions are based on the confidence engendered by face-
to-face relationships between creditor and debtor. There is usually no collateral
requirement since personal good faith and social pressure are sufficient to sustain
payments. Many loans are non-commercial and/or linked to other markets as labour
or product markets. The interest rate is flexible, reflecting the same components as in
the formal market – transaction costs, risk premium, cost of funds and monopoly rent
-, but additionally, including a “social” variable. 51 Hence, Shipton (1994: 284)
concludes that the concept of transaction and information costs in informal markets
is a far too simple concept to capture reasoning behind rural individual or collective
                                                
50 Incidentally, Hoff and Stiglitz (1993) made a similar point when they suggested that credit markets
in developing countries operated a matching system by which different prospective borrowers were
sorted across different lenders according to the ability of the lender to screen particular borrowers
and enforce particular kinds of contracts. Thus, ‘only an individual who markets his surplus
through a trader can be matched with that trader-lender’ (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1993:6)
51 The discussion of NIE versus OIE is obvious in the very early debate between Stiglitz and Amyrta
Sen concerning the debate of share cropping. Stilglitz explains share cropping with IF and TC,
while contrasting Amyrta Sen considers existing power relationships as the foundation
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decisions. Shipton further, concludes “ if these (rural) financial systems are to be
understood as markets, they are certainly no unified or discrete ones” (1994:311)
2.1.2 NIE assumption: transaction and information costs
NIE explains the existence of informal institutions as an efficient way to
reduce transaction and information costs. The most cited example for the use of IC
and TC concerning informal institutions are ROSCAs (Rotating Savings and Credit
Associations) since ROSCAs are informal institutions which developed as well in
Europe’s early transition period as in contemporary Africa and Asia. ROSCAs
demonstrate that informal arrangements are timeless solutions due to the advantage
of local information on transaction costs.
Criticism I
Case Studies demonstrate that women, in contrast to men, prefer to use
ROSCAs over other informal arrangements. This fact would make sense according to
TC and IC if the percentage of women participating in the informal sector is greater
than that of men. Contrary, to what one expect that is not the case. The participation
between men and women in the informal sector is 50% to 50%.52 (Tsai 2002) As
different scholars point out women and men prefer different informal arrangements.
Such differences are often only explainable by different attitudes i.e. towards
drinking tea, which are caused by cultural influence on the matter of being male or
female n general. (Johnson 2001) For an institution to be effective, norms must be
internalised with an emphasis on trust and an extension of time horizons on lending.
Both are important to reducing transaction costs and enhancing development (Stein
and Nissanke 2003: 306)
                                                
52 Although in some countries, particular Islamic ones, the participation of women in the informal
sector is higher due to female discrimination.
PART III – CRITICISM ON NIEOIE 124
Criticism II
While focusing on transaction and information costs, NIE ignores other
stipulations of contracts between lenders and borrowers or barriers to credit access.
In this context, not the monopoly is meant by barriers of entry, but social power
relationships in form of being a women or coming from a low cast. What is lacking is
that credit relations which are embedded in wider social-economic relations are
studied in isolation. As Mohan and Stokke (2000) point out, the romanticised notion
of ‘the local’ represents the key point where it became possible for NIE to align
institutional success or failure with social forces. In this version, the local is a
homogenous passive actor searching for efficiency, but unfortunately constrained by
shared mental models.53 (Mohan and Stokke 2000:264)
2.1.3 NIE assumption: the homogenous unregulated institution
NIE evaluates credit transaction and financial services in the unregulated
sphere of LDCs in form of information and transaction costs. Therefore, NIE comes
to the conclusion that the informal sector if linked to the formal sphere has a positive
impact on market efficiency. Accordingly, direct links between regulated and
unregulated institutions are recommended with the purpose to improve financial
market efficiency. The unregulated financial institution has to be formalised to
improve financial deepening, in the sense, that the unregulated institution becomes
the semi-regulated institution, and finally, the regulated institution. NIE presupposes
that each community creates its own homogenous efficient unregulated institution
which politicians can easily ‘formalise’ to increase market efficiency.
Criticism I
This approach is useful in recognising that unregulated institutions are
important is an advancement to orthodox theory it is not well thought through. As
Bebbington (2001) shows, informal arrangements demonstrate a remarkable diversity
                                                
53 See also Hart 2001:655 who differentiates between the D/d dimension
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of organisations even in a small area like the Andes. These organisations have
differing interests, priorities and ideas about development suggesting that there are
several development alternatives being pursued at any one time at local levels. Even
if the different alternatives are not necessarily mutually exclusive they certainly pull
in different directions and imply different ways of allocating local and external
resources. (Bebbington 2001:15) Hence, the assumption that all those ‘unregulated’
organisations can be recognised and formalised with an upgrading intention is not
realistic. What is missing within the NIE approach is the recognition of multiple
forces at work. It is very interesting that Grameen Bank as the most innovative
financial institution using informal forces is at the same time the greatest obstacle to
future experimentation as Hulme and Mosley argue, since “most designers and
sponsors of new initiatives have abandoned innovation, and replication is leading to a
growing uniformity in financial interventions.” (1996:135) It is important to note in
this context, that just because one microfinance institution using unregulated
institutional forces is successful it does not mean that exactly the same microfinance
institution is successful everywhere since at different places, different informal
forces are at work. See also Murdoch (1997) and (Dunford and Woodworth 2003) for
similar arguments.
2.1.4 Summary of NIE sufficiency in relation to LDC reality
NIE is not able to explain the existence of various informal institutions, nor is
NIE able to explain the interest rate composition in informal financial markets.
Further, NIE assumes homogenous institutional structures in relation to informal
finance which does not mirror reality. NIE neglects power structures and
forward/backward linkages. Therefore, NIE is not sufficient to explain the reality of
LDCs
⇒ NIE is not sufficient as a theory in relation to the reality of financial
markets in developing countries
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2.2  Theoretical consistency of NIE in relation to unregulated markets
This chapter intends to enquire if NIE, while theoretically able to explain the
existence of the comparative advantage of informal institutions in relation to formal
ones, is also able to explain the advantage itself. NIE is able to explain growth with
focus on formal institutions, but it is overlooked that growth is to a large extent
driven by informal forces. For example, Chinas contemporary growth is to the most
part driven by informality. Therefore, NIE is only an applicable theory if its
reasoning based on information advantage can be used to explain formal growth
potential as well as informal growth potential. Section (2.2.1) explores if this is the
case. Further, it will be investigated in section (2.2.2) if the NIE assumption of an
institutional hierarchy, with the formal institution being better than the informal one
is justified. In section (2.2.3) the findings will be summarised.
2.2.1 Uncertainty
This chapter intends to highlight that although NIE is able to explain the
positive effect of linkages by using the concept of uncertainty, NIE is not able to
explain the enormous growth potential of the informal sector with uncertainty.
Therefore, section (i) examines the concept of uncertainty; section (ii) demonstrates
why North argument is sufficient to explain the existence, but not the growth
potential of informal arrangements; and section (iii) demonstrates how Williamsons
is able to justify linkages while being also unable to explain the dynamics. Section
(iv) concludes that the concept of uncertainty is insufficient in relation to informal
finance.
Concept of Uncertainty
According to the NIE approach, the advantage of the unregulated credit
market is based on trust. Although ‘trust’ is a social phenomenon, in economics it is
translated as a way to decrease uncertainty. Hence, the advantage of the unregulated
sector is built on the ability to decrease uncertainty. However, the concept of
uncertainty is not that simple. Although in the sophisticated version of NIE a more
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complex understanding of uncertainty exists the approach is still limited54. In
general, it is differentiated between procedural rationality which means the mental
limitation to calculate possible outcomes and substantive rationality which implies
the lack of information which, in turn, has different subcategories in relation to
probabilities. (Dequeche 2003)
Graph 1: Different levels of uncertainty55
Graph 1 illustrates different aspects of uncertainty
A detailed definition of substantive rationality, weak substantive rationality,
strong substantive rationality, ambiguity and fundamental uncertainty is given below.
                                                
54 The more sophisticated NIE version of uncertainty, risk etc. has yet not been applied to developing
countries financial markets – but it could be.
55 Graph by Alexandra Bernstorff 2004
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Table 13: Differences in uncertainty
Procedural Rationality The limitations of mental ability to consider all possible outcomes
Substantive Rationality The lack of information In general,
Weak Substantive Rationality The lack of information is caused by risk, but probabilities exist.
Strong Substantive
Rationality
The lack of information is caused by the absence of probabilities.
Ambiguity of Strong
Substantive Rationality
Although the lack of probabilities makes a risk calculation
impossible, the probable events are known. For example, in relation
to harvesting in developing countries, good weather, bad weather,
insect plaques, war effects influence the crop size. These factors are
ex ante known, but the probability of all factors together can not be
calculated.
Fundamental Uncertainty The lack of information is caused by the absence of the probabilities
and the absence of possibility in turn, is caused by the fact that
possible events can not be known.
Table by…….?????
The explanation by NIE scholars concerning institutional change implies that
every institution decreases one of those uncertainty aspects. For example, North
focuses on procedural rationality by focusing on the influence of shared mental
models on institution building. Williamson, in contrast, focuses on fundamental
uncertainty by emphasizing the importance of contracts. The assumption that
decreasing uncertainty increases efficiency implies that the growth potential of
informal institution is limited to the task of decreasing uncertainty for the formal
institution. Thereby, it is lacking out that informal financial institutions show growth
potential independently from formal institutions. To gain theoretical consistency, the
same mechanisms of decreasing uncertainty for efficiency gains, in relation to the
regulated institution, should be valid in relation to the unregulated institution. Hence,
the following section will consider North and Williamsons argumentation applied to
the unregulated institution.
North
The differences in relation to uncertainty are quite decisive. For example,
North focuses on procedural uncertainty in the sense that limited cognitive ability is
decisive for uncertainty. In relation to informal credit markets, implying that the
‘social factor’ is missing in the interest rate composition steams from advancement in
procedural rationality. Or in other words, due to social bonds, the mental ability to
calculate uncertainty increases. It is obvious that North focus on procedural
uncertainty cannot be convincingly applied towards the unregulated credit markets.
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The problem is that North’s limited mental ability approach towards uncertainty is
developed in the context of inefficient institutions. He explains the existence of
inefficient institutions with cognitive limitations. The application of procedural
rationality towards an efficient institution is confused and inconsistent. It would only
make sense, if it is assumed that the mental ability to process information increases
in a small network, but in North work mental ability is fixed56. In his work, the
mental ability always causes uncertainty, but has no opportunity to reduce
uncertainty. The critical inconsistence of North is that mental models are always
considered as constraints to efficiency, while in contrast, increases in efficiency are
always based on information advantages
Williamson
Another example for theoretical inconsistency of NIE is Williamson (1998)
who focuses on fundamental uncertainty caused by the incompleteness of complex
contracts. (Dequeche 2003) In relation to informal credit markets that would imply
that social bonds decrease the complexity of contracts and hence, have a positive
influence on the interest rate. Although the theory is advancement towards
neoclassical theory the question is to what extent it is relevant for informal credit
markets. As demonstrated in part II, the dynamic and flexible features of the informal
sector are decisive for its viability and this implies a continuously changing interest
rate. If the interest rate composition is mainly explained by complex contracts
(Williamson 1998) which are static in a small network, variation of the interest rate
should not be apparent. In this case i) transaction costs, ii) risk premium, iii) cost of
funds, iv) monopoly rent and v) complex contracts (social factor) are constant. The
failure is to explain fundamental uncertainty with complex contracts instead, of a
characteristic of reality – in other words, market failure is caused by the need for
complex contracts. The reverse conclusion would be, to argue that the dynamic of the
informal credit sector exists only due to defined contracts. Critically, in this
approach, is the assumption that fundamental uncertainty is bad, it makes the perfect
contract impossible and each contracting party has to expect cheating. What is
                                                
56 In his later work North admits changes in the mental ability but the approach is still inconsistent
because (1) he only assumes an improvement of the mental ability – a unidirectional development
is always critical; and (2) changes in the mental ability are always caused exogenous. A more
detailed analysis follows in the following section.
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lacking is the fact that fundamental uncertainty causes innovation and the need for
trust. Fundamental uncertainty causes flexibility and adaptability and is hence,
substantial for the advantage of the informal sector.
Summary Uncertainty
This section demonstrated that, while NIE is able to explain the positive
effect of linkages by using the concept of uncertainty, NIE is not able to explain the
enormous growth potential of the unregulated sector with uncertainty. NIE assumes
that the unregulated sector does have an advantage in relation to the formal sector,
but not an advantage in its particular structure. The focus is on the formal sector. In
this sense, informal arrangements are only a means to overcome constraints on the
formal sector. The informal institution overcomes the information constraint of
formal institutions. Therefore, their potential is limited to increase the functionality
of formal institutions. This approach is insufficient to explain the dynamic potential
of informal institutions. In other words, NIE assumes that formal institutions are the
driving force behind growth, but reality proves that to an equal extent the informal
institution is decisive for development. The theory of NIE is only applicable if the
same reasoning that explains the advantage of informal institutions in relation to
formal ones can be reversed, but this is not the case, therefore, the chain of NIE
argumentation is inconsistent.
2.2.2 Formalisation
NIE argues that informal arrangements should be formalised with the
intention to capture its comparative advantage. Critically with the aim of
formalisation is that the purpose is not to design formal rules which are consistent
with the unregulated institutional dimension, but to transform the existing
institutional endowment for a specific purpose. (Sindzingre and Stein 2002:11) This
is complicated because it presupposes that development is an hundred percent
intentional process. It is as Cowen and Shenton (1996, 1998) argue: “one of the
confusion, common through development literature is between development as
immanent and unintentional process as in for example, the “development of
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capitalism” and development as an intentional activity” (Cowen and Shenton 1998:
50)57 The attempt to formalise informal institutions overlooks the fact that as well
endogenous as exogenous institution develop specific meaning and function in its
relation with other institutions. According to Sindzingre and Stein, it is the
environment of other institutions that gives it scope, content and meaning. (Sindzigre
and Stein 2003:13) The problem with NIE is that institutional forces are not
distinguished from institutional purposes and institutional outcomes.58
The unregulated institution is missing in NIE because the distinction between
the regulated/unregulated is only used in the sense of maximising an objective
function subject to constraints. In this sense, the unregulated institution is never
enabling. This approach limits the importance of the unregulated institution to the
‘least efficient’ institution on the way to reach the ‘most efficient’ institution. It
implies a hierarchy of efficient institutions. For each unregulated institution, a higher
order efficient institution is ex ante known. It seems that NIE (1994) does not deal
with the unregulated institution because it would lead to theoretical inconsistence.
On the one hand, North (1994) considers shared mental models as enabling in the
sense that they simplify the complicated world which can never be fully accessible to
humans on the other, he presupposes to know the right formal institution (the most
efficient). Since all humans act with shared mental models then one wonders why
humans know the perfect formal institution. The unregulated institution lies in a
theoretical sense at exactly the point between knowing and not knowing. Therefore,
it is only possible to use the NIE concept of institutional formalisation when
institutions are analysed in a functionalist perspective and if historical change is
explained by the reduction of transaction costs.
Additionally, the differentiation in institutional dimensions has to be
considered carefully. It is assumed that an ‘institutional hierarchy’ exists where the
formal institution has more value and strength than the informal institution, but as it
is unknown which institutional force is the strongest, it can be a shared mental model
like religion which transforms into a new formal institution like the Islamic bank, it
                                                
57 A similar point is made by Bebbington 2000, 2002 and Hart 2001
58 See also ( Adelman 2001:118) “There are no unique sets of causalities , nor a linear path leading to
development”
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can be an institutional arrangement like ‘The Hanse’ which supports trade, it can also
be an external factor like the implementation of the “Marshall Plan” in Germany
after WWII. Sometimes shared mental models have to be aligned with formal
institutions sometimes they do not need to. All institutional dimensions constitute a
continuum of activities with changing relations. The informal rule is what makes
formal rules compulsory, but the informal rule can as well ex ante as well as ex post
emerge. For example, under the influence of the German Party “Die Grünen” the
concept of Mülltrennung was established as compulsory for each citizen. Although
the majority did not ex ante accepted it, it became with the years an ex post informal
rule. It is as Sindzingre and Stein (2003:9) argue erroneous to oppose formal rules
and institutions and informal ones, as if the “informal” level had weaker rules.
However, it is also erroneous to assume that formal rules have weaker rules than
informal ones. It depends on the exact rule, institutional arrangement, timing and
other non-economic variables.
2.2.3 Summary theoretical consistency of NIE
This chapter shows that NIE is able to explain the positive effect of linkages
by using the concept of uncertainty. However, NIE is not able to explain the
enormous growth potential of the informal sector with uncertainty and information
advantage. For NIE, informal arrangements are only a means to overcome constraints
on the formal sector. In this sense, they assume an institutional hierarchy in the
process of decreasing constraints. Underlying is the assumption that ‘formality’ is
growth enhancing, what is missing is that to an equal extent ‘informality’ is growth
enhancing. The theory of NIE is only applicable if the same reasoning that explains
the advantage of informal institutions for formal ones can be reversed, but this is as
section 2.2.1 shows not the case. Therefore, the chain of NIE argumentation is
inconsistent.
⇒ NIE as a theory is inconsistent in explaining the growth enhancing
advantage possessed by unregulated institutions
2.3 Applicability of NIE?
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It will be examined if NIE is able to provide policy advice to countries facing
financial market fragmentation. The economic field dealing with informality is
microfinance, the institution which is extremely energetic in this area and built on
NIE theorising is the World Bank. Thus, it seems naturally to observe if the World
Bank is able to give policy recommendations for microfinance. Section (2.3.1)
examines the World Development Report 2002, which summarises the
recommendations as announced by the World Bank in relation to institution building.
Further, it will be examined in section (2.3.2) if those recommendations can serve as
a political advice and whether the approach is applicable in relation to women
lending (2.3.3), interest rate setting (2.3.4) and social context (2.3.5) Finally, section
(2.3.6) summarises the findings.
2.3.1 World Development Report 2002
The World Bank raises its voices in the famous World Development Report.
In the context of microfinance, the World Development Report 2002 with the
promising title “Building Institutions for Markets” is extremely interesting. The
report is an extension of NIE theorising because it considers the importance of
formal and informal institutions and is in agreement with the Post-Washington
Consensus. The introduction of Part IV (written in big capital letters) states:
“Societal forces shape the effectiveness, growth, and legitimacy of market
institutions, which in turn, affect the rules and values of societal actors. The
chapters in this part of the Report explore the range of interactions between
society and market institutions. Chapter 9 on Norms and Networks discusses
how the informal institutions used by societal groups influence transactions in
the market. “ (World Development Report 2002:170)
What follows is the recognition of the importance of the informal sector. It is
recognised that “informal institutions tend to complement formal ones” (p.172). It is
recognised that “When inadequate attention has been paid to norms and culture,
formal institutions have not delivered desired outcomes.”(p.172) And it recognises
that “Building bridges between existing formal and informal institutions is an
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effective means of enhancing the success of formal institutions”. (p.178) The entire
report deals with the question of “How do informal institutions aid market
transactions? Why do informal institutions facilitate transactions for some and not for
others? And how can the interaction of informal and formal institutions are used to
ensure a dynamically supportive market environment?” However, if the reader
attempts to answer those questions he is left alone by the report. The conclusion of
the chapter “Conclusion” of the World Development Report is:
“Market activities are supported by a complex blend of informal and formal
institutions. In many poor regions of the world, and particularly for many poor
people, informal institutions such as community networks are the only ones that
are relevant, because access to formal institutions is relatively
scarce……Informal institutions can be superior to formal alternatives, either
because they are more efficient at achieving the objective or because they
embody features that formal institutions are unable to provide, but in other
cases, informal institutions may prevent further, market development…”
(p.179)
It is questionable whether there is a conclusion in any guide for economic
development, which giving as little insight as that one. Apart from the fact, that those
findings were common knowledge in the eighties by scholars dealing with
microfinance. (i.e. Von Pischke 1980) However, the question remains why the World
Bank, although recognising the importance of informal institutions is not able to
provide policy advises for microfinance. Further, it remains an open question if the
theory of NIE creates a theoretical barrier for applicable policies.
2.3.2 Why is the World Bank unable to provide policies for microfinance?
The World Bank was conceived in a very different context to informal
finance. The World Bank is essentially a macro lender born in an era of central
planning ideas. Therefore, the contextual distance form the informal sector in which
the World Bank operates makes it generally adverse to informal market signals. The
approach to combine microfinance and the World Bank in itself seems problematic
since the organisation has only operated in the formal lending context until now.
Therefore, its immense size and centralised organisation is out of date in the highly
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dynamic world of microfinance. The largest obstacle to World Bank microlending
programs is its lack of regionalisation necessary for both market and non-market
operations. Informal lenders are an interactive part of the social and economic
community in which they are lending and exactly that is the reason why they are
successful. Informal lenders have access to non-formal credit histories and risk
assessment information hence, their provision of credit is as dynamic as the market
demand from the community. The World Bank has none of these resources available
to them, so any microlending programme will be simply educated guesswork.
2.3.3 Lending for women
A very good example of the World Banks shortcoming is provided by
“lending to women”. By now it is recognised that women have less access to credit
than men in some developing countries (Valentine 1995). Often, investing in women
will bring about a higher return in both the enhancement of human and physical
capital than investing in men. Women are active in the markets of developing
countries often by carrying out several micro-businesses and/or agricultural
activities. Women are especially adverse to formal credit in some countries because
of social and economic inequities. In some places where the society is highly
patriarchal, women are required to have her husband or some other male relative co-
sign for a loan. Therefore, the World Bank could lend to only women and try to rid
LDCs of gender bias in credit allocation. Conceivably, such a policy is possible.
Non-governmental organisations such as Women’s World Banking are lending
primarily to women. Women do present a chance for economic development and are
the victims of market failure, but the question of which women to lend at what
interest rate remains unanswered.
2.3.4 Interest rates
Interest rates are another policy issue the World Bank would have to
determine. Commercial banks will often not lend to micro enterprises because their
inability to determine the risk involved with lending to any particular micro
PART III – CRITICISM ON NIEOIE 136
enterprise. However, the World Bank is has no more information than commercial
banks. Because the informal sector is heterogeneous and has varying levels of risk
attached to different micro-entrepreneurial activities, setting the correct interest rate
for an agency such as the World Bank is nearly impossible. Agencies like the World
Bank operate outside of the market and do not have the intimate knowledge of the
informal market as do informal lenders. Though, they can collect some market
information and set rates accordingly, the centralised and detached nature of the
World Bank prevents it from becoming an interactive part of the informal credit
market. (Puglielli) Setting the incorrect interest rate can range from having no affect
on the informal credit market to having perverse and malignant consequences. An
artificially high interest rate has no effect on credit access by micro entrepreneurs
because the demand for credit will be satisfied by other microlending firms in the
informal credit market. However, when the rate is set too low, the demand for credit
exceeds supply – at least at a sustainable level hence, crowding out private
investment. By crowding out the private investment, the World Bank destroys the
only self-sustained form of domestic investment in the informal sector.59 Similarly,
crowding out will also occur even if the interest rate is set correctly. 
The problem of information does not end with the setting of interest rates.
Micro enterprises are highly dispersed in both economic activity and location.
Lending models such as the credit cooperatives have recognised the regionalised and
heterogenic properties of micro enterprise, and thus, have adjusted accordingly.
Credit cooperatives, like the Grameen Bank are successful because they are
regionalised to the extent of informal credit agencies, and thus, take advantage of the
informal market information available to them. The Grameen Bank is able to
evaluate risk, through its highly regionalised structure, and is able to disperse credit
allowing it to find its greatest return. This is the reason why the Grameen Bank has
such a high repayment rate of above 90%. (Stiglitz 1998, Otero and Rhyne 1992,
Morduch 1997) However, the World Bank has no regional interaction. The
administration costs of lending to every potential borrower would be enormous.
                                                
59 The topic about aid and crowding out is itself immense. Private sustainable investment is an
important factor in LDC development. Aid that crowds out private market activity in both
production and investment is detrimental to macroeconomic growth. This micro-macro paradox
explains why of 245 projects evaluated by the World Bank, 85% of the World Banks projects faired
well, but the countries in which the projects were implemented, the macro economy was not proven
to be better off. (White 1992)
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Therefore, the World Bank’s lending practices would be highly biased both in region
and in the activity of the potential borrower.
2.3.5 Social context
Another obstacle of the World Bank engaging in microlending activities is its
lack of social context. Informal credit agencies work, because they can hedge against
default through the use of social pressures. The World Banks is a large centralised
foreign agency, and its ability to monitor the cultural nuances that allow for
successful microlending is limited. The lender in the informal market has intimate
knowledge of their borrowers. The World Bank has no ability to gain such intimate
knowledge. Therefore, the only way for the World Bank to hedge against default is
to employ the methods of commercial banks – credit ratings, collateral, lengthy
application processes. Coupled with a need to interact with both region and culture,
is the need to react quickly to changing credit demands. Again the World Banks
separation from the market hinders its ability to change and respond with the need of
borrowers. In contrast, to the formal sector where the needs of borrowers do not
change very rapidly, the requirements of informal borrowers change quickly. While
assuming that the World Bank will always have difficulties by directly influencing
micro credit, one could argue that they should serve as intermediary for the informal
credit markets that already exist. On the outset, such a plan not only sounds feasible,
but economically sounds. The reality is that neither is true for the same reason as
with lending directly to micro entrepreneurs; detachment from market operations.
The World Bank has no way to differentiate between good and bad existing informal
credit arrangements hence, they do not know how to fight against corruption, set
interest rates, allocate credit resources and have any impact in doing so without
destroying the very economic context it wishes to enhance. All of these context
problems have no solution.
2.3.6 Summary applicability of NIE
Informal lenders are successful because they are able to assess and respond to
the information transmitted by informal market mechanisms. The small size of
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informal lenders coupled with social and economic ties provides the advantage of
informal financial arrangements. The advantage is not only an ‘information’
advantage which can, according to NIE, be captured and materialised in building
linkages. The information advantage is based on individual social structures and
therefore, a universalistic concept of how to formalise those is not possible to gain.
Further, the heterogeneous structure of informality is decisive for its viability, but it
is impossible to create a universal theory for a universal policy advice of how to
proceed with informal institutions.
⇒ It is not possible to derive an applicable policy conclusion on NIE
theorising
2.4 Is NIE appropriate?
It has been suggested that ISA is an extension of NIE theorising towards
financial markets. Therefore, NIE, in contrast, to common financial market theories,
is able to explain the existence of informal financial markets and able to justify the
finding that linkages between informal and formal institutions promote growth. The
task of this chapter was to investigate if the NIE approach towards financial markets
is sufficient. Hence, the sufficiency in relation to reality, consistency and
applicability was examined. The findings suggest that NIE is insufficient concerning
reality, since transaction and information costs and are not enough to justify
differences in interest rates and to explain the various constructions of institutional
arrangements. NIE is also inadequate to derive policy advises since neither the
heterogeneous structure of the institutional sphere nor power relations are
considered. Thus NIE theory does not capture the financial reality of LDCs. Further,
the theory of NIE itself demonstrates severe inconsistency by explaining economic
growth with upgrading formalisation. By assuming an institutional hierarchy the
content and meaning of an institution is confused. Although NIE is able to explain
the existence of informal institutions they do so by limiting their function to
decreasing information constraints for the formal sector. In this sense, informal
institutions are only a means to overcome formal constraints. NIE neglects the fact
that informal institutions are to an equal extent the driving force behind growth.
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Therefore, NIE theory would be only sufficient when the reasoning that explains
efficiency increases in the formal sector is also able to explain efficiency
enhancement in the informal sector. As shown above, this is not the case. Further, the
informal institution is not differentiated from the formal institution. Either informal
or formal, institutions are just a means to optimise an objective function, with the
former being the least and the latter being the most efficient solution. Institutional
purposes, institutional outcomes and institutional forces are not differentiated. This
becomes particularly problematic when NIE is used as policy advise as done by the
World Bank. A universal theory can not be applicable for heterogeneous
mechanisms. The great potential of NIE lies in its attempt to advance neoclassical
reasoning. Using the World Bank as an example, it has been shown that NIE by
recognising informal forces, allows mainstream theory and orthodox institutions to
ask questions previously outside their sphere. This recognition is relevant because it
underlines the importance of informality for economics.
However, one should not confuse the theory which acknowledges the
informal sector with a theory which can answer the questions of how to built formal
institution with informal forces or how to link formal and informal institutions or if
an informal institutions is a good or a bad one. NIE cannot answer those questions on
the foundation of ‘information theory’ and the World Bank due to its formalised and
centralised feature cannot either, but maybe, this is not their job. It might be that
those questions, due to their heterogeneity, can only be answered by a theory dealing
with heterogeneous features, namely OIE. In this context, I argue that financial
advises built on NIE theory can not be useful without OIE consideration. It seems
that NIE and OIE are two sides of the same coin. NIE is able to identify the
economic question, but only under consideration of OIE aspects it is possible to
voice political advice.
⇒ NIE is not sufficient in explaining the advantage of the informal sector
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3 Criticism on ISA reflects OIE
After examining that NIE is not sufficient in explaining the unregulated
market existence, the question is to what extent these shortcomings reflect OIE
reasoning. The criticism on the NIE approach in relation to informal financial
markets was voiced by praxis oriented development economists and not by economic
theorists. In this sense, the NIE approach was considered as insufficient on practical
grounds. The question is whether problems arising from reality are similar to the
criticism of OIE on NIE on a pure theoretical base. Thus the intention is to explore if
development economists who criticise the NIE approach on practical grounds use the
same arguments as OIE scholars when criticising NIE on theoretical grounds. Only if
the weakness, as demonstrated by reality, appears to be identical to the shortcomings
of the NIE theory as criticised by OIE, NIEOIE finds justification in relation to
informal financial markets. Section (3.1) will consider the differences between NIE2
and OIE in relation to institutional change as these are not very clear identified in
contemporary literature and otherwise may lead to confusion. Following, section
(3.2) will proceed by investigating if the criticisms coming from the practical sphere
reflect the criticism stemming from OIE on a theoretical foundation. In section (3.3)
the findings will be summarised, suggesting that NIEOIE is relevant.
3.1 Borderline between NIE and OIE
It is commonly assumed that the sophisticated version of NIE (NIE2) is able
to deal with the informal sphere of economics while working as a bridge between
OIE and NIE. The following section will investigate if this is the case. I will proceed
by examining if the criticism announced from OIE on NIE is justified (3.1.1).
Further, it will be explored if North works as a bridge between NIE and OIE (3.1.2)
and if the differences between Williamson (intra-firm issues) and North (institutional
change) are as decisive as often stated (3.1.3). Following, the central role of
information in NIE will be investigated and the implication of information focus for
institutional change and economic growth will be explored (3.1.4). These points are
of particular importance since the ambiguity between NIE and OIE is not due to
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NIE’s neglect of social embeddedness. Rather, the disagreement exists in the
conclusion NIE derives in relation to institutional evolution.
3.1.1 Wrong criticism on NIE
Before the dissertation continues, some justice has to be done concerning
NIE, namely that most of its criticism found in the literature is wrong and relates if
anything to the early version of NIE. For example, Zafirovski (2003:812) argues that
NIE ignores institutional embeddedness. Similar Carlson (1997:754) argues that
NIEs analysis is ahistorical with individuals who are resistant to any institutional,
historical and other social influences. (See also Zafirovski 2003, Frank 1996, Piore
1996, Granovetter and Swedberg 1992)60 As should be apparent from the previous
analysis, NIE theory is neither ahistorical nor neglects the influence or the
importance of existing institutions. NIE explicitly does recognise and even
differentiates between cultural embeddedness in form of religion, history etc. and
institutional endowment in form of technological and institutional path dependency.
While North is commonly cited as an exception with respect to ‘shared mental
models’, he is by no way the only one.61 Other NIE scholars include Aoki (2000),
Azfar (2002), and Williamson (2000). NIE scholars do not argue that all institutions
are efficient and rational as claimed by i.e. Zavirovski 2003, Davidson and Ekelung
1994, Sjöstrang 1993 and many others. Rather NIE argues that institutions are
inefficient because they are socially constrained. Hence, the criticism of Zafirovski
(2003:816) that NIE does not consider institutions as constraints is just wrong even
in relation to the early version of NIE.
3.1.2 Wrong conception of North
                                                
60 This is a very common critique. If interested see: (Nee 1998:88) (Stein 1997:735) (Yeager
1997:154) (Greif 1998:82). (Carlson 1997:754) (Dore 1992:162), (Dugger and Sherman 1997:991)
(Piore 1996) (Granovetter and Swedberg 1992:117)
61 Zafirovski (2003:803)” Thenegative attitude towards history indicates an a-historical approach to
institution within NUIE with some notable exceptions (e.g. North 1994).” See also Granovetter,
Vanderbuilt, Zavirovski,
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Another mistake often found in the literature is to compare North with NIE.
(Zafirovski 2003, Vandenberg 2002, Granovetter 1996) It seems to be a very
common mistake to consider North as the bridge between NIE and OIE, while
contrasting him with the ‘conservative’ Williamson. However, the point is that the
use of shared mental models does not make North more an OIE than Williamson
when using bounded rationality. The two of them focus on different information
properties in distinct institutional spheres within a society, while coming to similar
conclusion concerning institutional evolution. Both of them conclude that the most
efficient solution is constrained by either bounded rationality (Williamson 1998) or
by shared mental models (North 1994) and hence, both conclude that an attempt
should be made to decrease those constraints. In relation to Williamson who implies
that complete contracts increase efficiency while decreasing bounded rationality. In
relation to North it implies that implies that new institution building alters existing
shared mental models towards more efficient ones. Hence, the content of the terms
bounded rationality and shared mental models the way they are used by North and
Williamson is very similar. Both conclude that a more efficient solution exists, is
known and can be formalised. It is this conclusion that makes them NIE.
3.1.3 Information focus
On the micro level Williamson focuses on exchange between two actors, or
acting groups (i.e. firms, employees etc.) Consequently, he argues that efficiency is
limited due to uncertainty caused by bounded rationality either in form of incomplete
contracts or impossible calculations. (Dequeche 2003, see section 2.2.1) In his
argument institution building acts as ‘efficiency device’ for the bounded rational
individual. North in contrast, is not interested in the relationship between two acting
parties, his ‘limited efficiency’ is not caused by the exchange between individuals,
instead, he focuses on shared mental models which cause individuals to act
inefficient. (See Graph below) Focusing on tradition, history, geography,
infrastructure etc. and its respective influence on communities he partly explains the
bounded rational individual. Similarly ISAs explain the existence of diverse
inefficient/efficient informal arrangements with distinct world views and different
institutional endowments. The unregulated arrangement equals the bounded rational
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individual in the sense that due to incomplete information either the community or
the individual act according to its best knowledge. Both act as efficient as possible,
whereby the most efficient solution is limited either by bounded rationality or by
shared mental models. While Williamson’s smallest entity is the individual actor,
North operates with the smallest institutional arrangement, the unregulated
institution. However, North’s use of shared mental models on the level of institution
building is conceptually not different to Williamson’s use of bounded rationality
within a firm. Or in other words, as long as ISA uses North version of shared mental
models they will be open for exact the same criticism and inconsistency as OIE
announces in relation to NIE
Graph 2: Differences in information focus
Graph 2: NIE1 focuses on information problems between two actors arising from the fact that the
possible action of the other are not known illustrated in the graph as ‘focus of interest A’, NIE2
focuses on the institutional environment which cause information problems illustrated in the graph as
‘focus of interest B’. Important is that the focus points are not connected.
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3.1.4 Transplant effect
On the first glance, it appears as if the focus on institutional endowment and
its influence on information properties as apparent in ‘transplant approaches’ has
similarities with OIE because the individual is embedded in a social context. The
attempt is surely OIE, while the theoretical execution is not. Underlying the NIE
approach is the assumption that the efficient market is similar to a natural law
(spontaneous order). Financial markets in LDCs suffer from market failure causing
credit shortages for SMEs. Unregulated financial institutions are then the best known
community solution towards this problem, restricted by shared mental models. The
most efficient institution cannot be built as long as it is not connected to the
institutional endowment because the bounded rational individual would not
understand how to use it. The ‘most efficient institution’ is outside the mental ability
of individuals. For example, in NIE perspective Islamic banks are not the most
efficient banking institution, but the shared mental model of religion which forbids
Muslims to take interest, makes it impossible to construct the most efficient
institution. Accordingly, the task of politicians is to build institutions which are in the
mental scope of the nation inhabitants. In case the mental scope is extremely limited
due to excessive traditions and other shared mental models, politicians should aim to
build institutions that alter existing shared mental models. See Graph:
Graph 3: Upgrading formalisation62
Graph 3 illustrates the NIE assumption that shared mental models like traditions are the least efficient
while simultaneously the most efficient institution cannot be built as long as it is not connected to
existing shared mental models. Therefore an effort should be made by building semi-regulated
institutions to alter existing shared mental models. Important is that an upgrading intention is pre-
assumed without backward linkages.
                                                
62 Graph by Alexandra Bernstorff 2004
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This model is a great advancement towards the neoclassical approach.
Nevertheless, it is oversimplified in three points. (1): it only assumes upward
linkages and it does so because of (2) the rational homogenous community, which is
(3) not adversely influenced by new power relations and other new societal
influences. (Hodgson 1998) These three points mirror the criticism of ISA as
demonstrated by chapter 2. To recall, critiques argued that humans are engaged in
many different even contradicting community solutions at the same time, hence, the
question of which institutional arrangement should be formalised in which manner is
not as easy as ISA describes. Further, critiques on ISA pointed out that new formal
institution alter shared mental models, but not necessarily in a positive way, new
power structures can cause new inequalities etc. hence, the aim to build a more
efficient institution without consideration of backward linkages is dangerous with an
outcome which may contradict the original purpose.
3.15 Summary borderline NIE and OIE
NIE does deal with the influence of social embeddedness on economic
institutional viability. Nevertheless, differences between the early and sophisticated
version of NIE is not as important as often pronounced. While NIE1 focuses on
information problems between actors NIE2 focuses on social factors that cause poor
information properties on a national level. However, both strands derive the similar
conclusion of formalisation and regulation while neglecting forward and backward
linkages or power relations.
3.2 Criticism on ISA equals OIE
The intention of this chapter is to explore if development economists
criticising ISA application towards financial markets on practical grounds, use the
same arguments as OIE scholars when criticising NIE on theoretical grounds. The
aim is to extend the theory, as outlined in Part I, towards reality and Hence, to give
the theory value and justification. The dissertation will proceed by considering power
PART III – CRITICISM ON NIEOIE 146
(section 3.2.1), cumulative causation (3.2.2), spontaneous order (3.2.3) and
rationality (3.2.4). The findings will be summarised in section (3.2.5)
3.2.1 Power
In NIE, power is mentioned and treated, but only in form of monopoly power,
which gets full attention as the outcome of a special market form. In general, NIE
does not deal with power as motive force, economic position and extra-market
actions for achieving power. NIE overlooks the fact that the emergence and operation
of institutions is not only economically determinate, but also by factors like power
struggles and class conflicts. (Dugger and Sherman 1997) It is rather as Perrow
(1986:219) argues that “many institution look the way they do because some actors
have power over others – and not because one type of organisation is more ‘efficient’
than another” (Perrow 1986:219) In light of such tendencies, one can depict
economic institutions, including firms and markets, just as power systems (Brinkman
1997:1035) Power is one of the main objects of OIE see for example, Galbraith
(1967) who describes the evolution from agriculture based society to large scale
manufacturing as a shift in market power from the owner of land to the owners of
capital. Or Lukes (1974) and Bartlett (1989) who conclude that power does not just
affect what people do, but also what they are. It is important to note that power can
go beyond an ability to define the terms or conditions of trade. It may even be the
ability of a moneylender to shape the preferences of his customers. (Galbreith 1967,
Bartlett 1989) The point mostly overlooked by NIE is that power does not just affect
what people do, but also what they are. (Lukes 1974, Bartlett 1989) In general,
power is one of the cornerstones of the political economy of Schumpeter, Veblen,
Dugger, Galbraith (1967). This point is important for economic development because
institutions and power “determine the structure of the market, even the whole
economic system can be changed if those interested in change have enough political
power”. (Myrdal 1953:198)
3.2.2 Causal cumulation
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While the NIE conceives all social institutions as joint outcomes of rational
individual activities, OIE defines the former as societal phenomenon with an
autonomous structure (Weber 1968:341) and moulding capacities vis-à-vis the latter.
This can be considered the most general discontinuity between NIE and OIE.
(Zavirovski 2003) The picture NIE sketches is rather simple, by considering only
how individual incentives and actions generate and perpetuate institutions, and
ignoring the reverse impact. (Piore 1996:743-4). On the one hand, NIE considers
institutions as efficiency constraint in the sense that shared mental model constraint
the spontaneous order of efficient markets (i.e. North) on the other, hand institutions
are considered as efficiency device which improve exchange between bounded
rational individuals. (i.e. Williamson) NIE misses that the efficiency constraint
influences the efficiency device and vice versa. Hence, neither of them is static
which implies cumulative causation.63 NIE regards institutions as exclusively
functions or outcomes of rational activities. By contrast, OIE entails the duality of
institutions as both explanatory and dependent variables of individual economic
activities. (Zafirovski 2003:804) OIE implies changes in one or another direction
through the whole system. This is captured in Hirschmann’s (1958) idea of ‘vicious’
and ‘virtuous’ circles where forces move as well in positive as in negative direction.
The misconception, that institutional influences on individual action are just
upgrading stems from the idea that individuals act as rational as possible following a
spontaneous order of market efficiency. Since the more efficient institution is the one
more natural according to spontaneous order, the institution would not influence
individual action. In this circumstances, the individual finds himself in a ‘more
natural environment’ than before and institutions are no more than aggregate effects.
(Zafirovski 2003:800) NIE neglects the fact that social institutions do not emerge and
persist in an automatic manner in response to efficiency imperatives, but are ‘socially
constructed, reconstructed and sometimes deconstructed’ (Granovetter 1990:98)
There are uncounted individual choices, decisions and action within an economy, but
they occur within or between either regulated or unregulated institution while
reinforcing or weakening the bonds that keep institutions together. Hence, choice,
action, bond and context go together. (Bunge 2000:151) Contrary, NIE insists on
                                                
63 (see on this criticism Pirker and Rauchenschwanndter 1998, Bowles 1998, Grafstein 1992,
Hodgson 1998)
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studying “the components of social systems, that is, individuals, while overlooking
their structure or set of connections (internal and external).” (Bunge 2000:149)
3.2.3 Rationality
OIE criticises methodological individualism (see Part I) in the sense that
human motivation are reduced to efficiency maximising outside sociological
influences emanating from group and political action. This equates  DEs criticism of
NIEs focus on community in which each community’s unregulated institution is an
efficient solution limited by existing shared mental models. NIE sees communities as
utility functions, while OIE sees persons as relational. (Myrdall, Marx, Hodgson)
NIE would argue that not only markets, firms and other economic institutions are
caused by private optimisation, but also non-economic institutions and rules,
including governments, legal systems, democracy, families, morals, conventions,
ideologies, education, science, religion.64 (Bunge 2000:806) On the one hand, the
individual is assumed to act rational under bounded rationality on the other it is
supposed that the community act rational under existing shared mental models. In
relation to unregulated credit arrangements implying that each arrangement is the
most efficient. However, OIE does not argue that rational maximising behaviour is
not legitimate in some types of analyses, but it should be called ‘situational logic’.
(Giddens 1984, Hodgson 1988, Lawson 1985)
3.2.4 Spontaneous order
Hayek and Menger conncluded that language, money, markets, morals and
law are invoked by spontaneous order, meaning, that they are the inevitable outcome
of human life. Similarly, NIE sees the efficient money market as the end of
institutional evolution. The task of national politicians is to remove obstacles to this
natural order, by altering existing shared mental models with new institutions which
                                                
64 NIE does not deny that the importance of the social context for institutions, but they leave the latter
unanalysed. NIE assumes that individuals organise themselves into small communities such as
families, tribes, villages, business firms, armies, schools, religious congregations, informal
networks, or political parties.
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work accordingly as efficiency device. Assuming that financial markets have a
natural existence implies that removing obstacles is one-directional in archiving
efficiency. In contrast, OIEs like Thorstein Veblen see evolution as an unending
process of cumulative causation, in which habits and institutions are both causes and
effects. (Hodgson 1996) In relation to unregulated credit markets DEs demonstrate
that building one semi-regulated institution shifts as well the un-regulated as well the
regulated institution in content and meaning. However, each new institution will
develop its own individual failure or lack of components which will be sooner or
later replaced with a new institutional component or arrangement. In this sense, the
‘perfect institution’ is not attainable because each new institution develops new
properties with new shortcomings. The NIE approach overlooks that every human is
born into a pre-existing tradition which he either follows or rebels against., but with
tradition, he also inherits problems to which he may invents or discovers a solution
towards. (Bunge 2000:150) Accordingly, NIE misses one of the most important
events in economic development: the emergence of novelty. (Bunge 2000:150) In
contrast, an OIE evolutionary perspective claims that micro diversities do not only
work as an aggregate, but also are a necessary condition for the unknown innovative
opportunities. (Hodgson 1996:72) OIE analyses the processes through which
diversity emerges via innovative activities while it is simultaneously checked and
selected. (Nelson Winter 1982, Eliasson 1986, Chiaromonte and Dosi 1992, Metcalfe
1992, Dosi 1988)
3.2.5 Summary criticism on ISA equals OIE
Chapter 2 demonstrated that NIE is not sufficient in the context of informal
financial markets in LDCs. The criticism summarised was not voiced by economic
theorists, but by praxis oriented development economists. In this sense, the NIE
approach was considered as insufficient on practical grounds. The intention of this
chapter is to examine if problems arising from reality are similar to the criticisms of
OIE on NIE on a pure theoretical base. The neglect of power and cumulative
causation make the upgrading intention of institution building extremely difficult.
The idea of formalising informal arrangements according to an institutional hierarchy
is for the same reason unrealistic for which OIE criticises spontaneous order.
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Rationality, transaction and information costs are not sufficient to explain interest
rate composition in developing countries, while OIE highlights on a theoretical based
why this is the case.
⇒ OIE criticism on NIE reflects DE criticism on ISA.
3.3 Conclusion Part III
It has been explored in Part I that as well, NIE as OIE apply an institutional
individual as economic actor and that on this foundation NIE and OIE form rather a
theoretical continuum, called NIEOIE, than contradicting schools. Part II
investigated whether reality reflects theoretical arguments of NIEOIE and in turn,
whether today’s economic situation requires the theory of NIEOIE. It was suggested
that because the informal sector inhibits an advantage through its individual structure
it is necessary for economic growth to link informal and formal institutions to a
financial market continuum. As the informal sector reflects those institutional
mechanisms central to OIE, while the formal one mirrors NIE, it suggests that
NIEOIE finds applicability and justification. The argumentation was built on the
assumption that the informal sector has an ‘advantage’ built on its individual
institutional forces, which differ from those in formal institutions. However, scholars
could argue that the advantage processed by informal arrangements is purely an
information advantage and hence, informal institutional forces follow the same
efficiency reasoning like formal ones. Accordingly, a differentiation between the
informal and formal institution does not exist. If this would be the case NIE and not
NIEOIE would be relevant. Therefore, it was investigated if explanations using
information as the main reasoning behind informal institutional change are in line
with NIE. The findings suggest that all approaches built on information constraints
either within the institutions or within the institutional environments reflect NIE
theory. Furthermore, it was investigated if NIE theory is sufficient in relation to
reality, theoretical consistency and applicability. Apparently, this is not the case
since NIE rejects the influence of power and class relations, forward and backward
linkages and the social content. By doing so, NIE neglects the possibility and
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advantage of informality in creating innovation and dynamism, while simultaneously
being unable to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ informal institutions. Further,
the conclusions based on NIE are mostly inappropriate since they pre-assume upward
formalisation as always positive. These criticisms announced by DE’s equal the
criticisms of OIE on NIE as stated on a theoretical base. Therefore, NIE requires to
be extended with OIE to NIEOIE
Conclusion: NIEOIE is relevant in relation to informal financial markets.
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PART IV – RELEVANCE OF NIEOIE
1 Relevance and Applicability of NIEOIE
Does it make sense to suggest, on a pure theoretical foundation, that NIEOIE
is relevant? Is it a ‘theoretical game’ with no implications? It could be that NIEOIE
has no value, particularly since all the interesting questions remain unanswered. It
has not been explored why the theoretical continuum of NIEOIE provides advantages
or of what kind these advantages are. Neither has it been explicitly mentioned what
exactly the advantage of the informal sector is nor how to capture these. Although it
was said that the informal sector is more flexible and dynamic it has not been
investigated why. Neither has it been mentioned what the advantage of using the
theoretical continuum of NIEOIE as foundation for financial market theories is or
how such a theory should look like. This has been done intentionally.
The purpose of my investigation is to show that NIEOIE is relevant and that
financial market theories are insufficient in their application to LDCs if they do not
consider non-economic variables. Therefore, I examined two questions:
(1) Is it possible that the institutional theories of NIE and OIE be
complements and not contradicting schools?
(2) Are existing financial market theories sufficient while neglecting
NIEOIE?
The findings suggest that NIEOIE form a theoretical continuum and that
existing financial market theories are insufficient because they neglect non-economic
variables decisive for viable financial system functioning - at least in LDCs.
Although the findings appear to be very simple, they are not in their theoretical
implication. The findings suggest that it is necessary for financial market theories to
implement an understanding of the unregulated sector and therefore, of non-
economic variables. Such a finding is particularly interesting since financial market
fragmentation is not only occurring in LDCs, but also recently in DCs. The relevance
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of NIEOIE in this context will be subject for the next chapter. The intention is to
explore whether a financial system, in general, neglecting the continuum of informal
and formal mechanisms can be viable at all. Therefore, chapter (1.1) examines if
financial market fragmentation is a topic for DCs, chapter (1.2) will explore the
reasons why efficient financial systems can cause financial fragmentation and
chapter (1.3) investigates the relationship between German politics and NIEOIE. In
Chapter (1.4) the findings will be summarised suggesting that NIEOIE, has political
and economic relevance only by acknowledging the importance of informal and
formal mechanisms.
1.1 Community banking
It could be argued that the argumentation about the relevance of NIEOIE is
limited to LDCs as only these countries exhibit the feature of financial dualism and
hence, the importance of heterogeneous local banking arrangements. Therefore, the
following section will investigate if developed countries show similar problems of
fragmentation. Fragmentation in developed countries usually does not stem from
non-formalised credit arrangements as in LDCs, rather local bank branch closure
excludes population segments from the formal sector. Thus, section (1.1.1) examines
the extent and characteristics of bank branch closure in DCs. Section (1.1.2)
considers the implication of bank branch closure and section (1.1.3) investigates if
bank branch closure causes financial fragmentation in the developed world.
Following section (1.1.4) summarises the findings.
1.1.1 Bank branch closure
Hitherto in the dissertation the concepts of microfinance and the importance
of informality have been applied towards less developed countries. What is lacking
and what is interesting is that microfinance is also apparent in DCs. Although in DCs
it is (for no obvious reason) called ‘community banking’. The term ‘community
banking’ is used here to cover a range of models: commercial development banks;
community development credit unions; community development loan funds; micro
loan funds and community exchange systems (Mayo1996). Similar to microfinance
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in LDCs, community banking in DCs focuses on the failure of the formal banking
sector to serve the needs of low income groups. (Johnson 1997) This failure arises
from the need for the banking sector to increasingly respond to deregulation, new
technology and the globalisation of international capital markets (Mayo 1996) and
has resulted in the closure of bank branches world wide. Bank branch closure is not
just a small problem affecting very few parts in the Western world. Instead, bank
branch closure is a global trend, occurring from Australia to Europe to Asia. For
example, almost one bank per day has closed in Australia over the past five years,
with the total number of branches has been decreased by more than 33% since 1993.
(University of NSW 2002) Simultaneously in New Zealand since the 1990s 40%
percent of New Zealand’s bank branches closed with bank charges increasing 30%.
As a remedy, New Zealand has established the Peoples Bank in 2001 which is used
by approximately 42% of the population. (Newsweekly 7th April 2001)65:
1.1.2 Implication bank branch closure
Bank branch closure has many negative side effects. The government study
“Regional Banking Services – Money too far away” was released by the
Commonwealth Government in 1999 and concludes that bank branch closures affect
people in a number of ways: (a) Loss of investment income; (b) Difficulties in
cashing cheques; (c) Difficulty in obtaining credit from banks; (d) Lack of access to
financial advise (e) Increased need for credit from local businesses in lieu of cash; (f)
individuals suffer the inconvenience of having to travel to do their banking. This also
adds to the cost of banking though fuel costs, wear on motor vehicles, and time
required to travel; (g) specific groups may suffer i.e. the elderly, people with
disabilities and physical restrictions, low-income earners who lack the means of
transport. (House of Representatives Standing Committee on financial Institutions
and Public Administration 1999:27) Nevertheless, the major impact of downgrading
banking services is on local businesses through (a) the loss of cash sales due to
consumers shopping in larger towns which have banking facilities; (b) an increase in
bad debts due to the need to extend credit to local customers who do not have regular
                                                
65 If one is interested in bank branch closures see the CCBS (Campaign for Community Banking
Service) which works as a platform and provides different ‘bank branch closure action guides’.
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access to cash; (c) delays in the depositing of cheques which then delays the
honouring of cheques; (d) increased security concerns due to the lack of secure
facilities to deposit takings and the need to transport large amounts of cash to and
from the nearest bank branch in an unsuitable vehicle such as a private car; (e)
difficulties in obtaining small change; and (f) farming businesses are particularly
disadvantaged by the loss of bank staff with intimate knowledge and experience in
rural banking. (House of Representatives Standing Committee on financial
Institutions and Public Administration 1999:27)
1.1.3 Fragmentation and bank branch closure
The problem with local bank branch closure is that branch locations, despite
the rise in electronic banking, are still the primary means of financial services,
particularly to low-income households and in rural areas. In rural areas, branch
closings result in reduced local spending, a decline in financial investment and a loss
of community confidence. (Skillern 2002) In economical terms, it seems that
communities that lose their financial services tend to lose the race for economic
development. (CAFI 1997:1) Dangerous is the fact that poorer areas have
significantly higher rate of decline of branches per resident. For example, a CRA-NC
(Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina) study found that the
number of branches decreases in the low-income neighbourhoods of Los Angeles
despite population growth while the number of bank branches remained steady in the
higher-income neighbourhood.66 The decline of banks and the rise of alternative
services in low-income and rural areas mean that the communities most in need of
economic development have less access to capital. Based on the recognition that
poverty and fragmentation is not an exclusively southern phenomenon, some
scholars already talk about the “South in the North”.67 (Johnson 1997, O’Brien et al.
1997)
                                                
66 See also Kaur et al. who conclude that bank branch closure is the fastest in the more deprived
wards of London, while exacerbating existing inequities.
67 It is very interesting that scholars talk about poverty in relation to less developed countries and
about social exclusion in the context of the developed world while the same is meant. Similar
microfinance institution in DCs are called “community banking” and not as in LDCs microfinance.
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1.1.4 Summary community banking
Financial market fragmentation is not only a phenomenon restricted to LDCs,
but also to DCs. Increased bank branch closure in poor and rural areas increases
economic stagnation in those regions through limiting access to credit, cash and
investment. In this context, particular the poor regions which are mostly in need of
investment opportunities becomes excluded, thus causing scholars to speak about a
“South in the North”.
1.2 The ‘inefficiency’ of ‘efficient’ banking
The contemporary trend in DCs for bank branch closure in rural and poor
areas caused similar features of fragmentation as in LDCs. The surprising finding is
that while it is argued in contrary that inefficiency of formal institution causes
fragmentation in LDCs, it is contrary argued that increased efficiency of formal
institutions causes fragmentation in DCs. Hence, the approach of efficiency for the
banking sector itself becomes questionable. In this context, the following section will
investigate the reason why local bank branch closure increases local stagnation by
focusing on the local money multiplier in section (1.2.1) and Further, explores why
local bank branches close by focusing on banking consolidation in section (1.2.2).
Further, the effects of an efficient banking sector on the macro level in relation to the
micro level will be examined in (1.2.3). Section (1.2.4) summarises the findings.
1.2.1 Money multiplier effect
Slowly scholars are recognising the importance of the role of financial
intermediation in maintaining the health of local economies in DCs. (Douthwaite
1997, Johnson 1997, Mayo 1996) Significant is the fact that money has a local
multiplier effect. The more money circulates locally before exiting, the more it will
create jobs and wealth within the area. Hence, each community should object the
possibility of money floating out of their area. Douthwaite (1997) illustrates the
point, by the way in which banks literally truck money out of communities in the US.
(See examples North Carolina) Another illustration is in relation to South Wales
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miners whose past savings in the form of pension contributions invested through
conventional financial systems might be currently enabling investments and
employment for people in other parts of the UK or the world, while they themselves
languish with little investment and few employment opportunities. (Johnson 1997)
Douthwaite highlights the need for locally owned and controlled banking facilities as
“investor’s interests are rarely compatible with those of a community”. (1997:58)
However, local ownership and control are only possible if resources are locally
generated. That is, the system must be able to mobilise sufficient savings and local
equity rather than external capital in order for local control to be retained. (Johnson
1997) If the focus is on community growth it suggests an aversion to scale in
financial intermediation which would tend to move surpluses of investible funds to
areas of deficit to equalise rates of financial return across space. In this context,
NIEOIE demand a different relationship between social and financial priorities.
1.2.2 Access to credit
One of the reasons for local bank branch closure is the increasing trend of
bank consolidation. In other words, ‘big banks’ that are world players, buy ‘small
banks’ that are local players. Interesting from a political economy perspective is the
general finding that larger banks hold less small business loans than small
institutions. (Berger et al. 1995, Levonian and Soller 1995, Berger and Udell 1996,
Peek and Rosengreen 1996, Strahan and Weston 1996, 1998) According to NIEOIE
this is caused by the cost advantage of small banks in supplying small business loans,
which would not be profitable for larger banks. Hence, Di Patti and Gobbi (2001)
point out that if this is true “the reduction in the number of small banks may lead to a
permanent decrease in small business credit, because loans that had positive net
present value for small banks are not longer profitable for larger ones” (2001:2213)
In generalised terms, in an age of increasing banking consolidation an equal trend in
reduction of small business lending occurs. Since SMEs are not only decisive for
growth in LDCs, but equally important for growth in DCs it is a dangerous tendency.
It is important to note that similar to the relevance of the regulated and unregulated
market in developing countries, the answer is not to leave everything global or local.
Rather the focus should be on the positive effects of unregulated or community
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institutions, while recognising the negative effects. This focus should be extended by
the attempt to complement the international financial sector with the local financial
segments. Hence, Douthwaite (1997) advocates the development of local financial
systems with an effort to complement and not to replace national and international
finance. Application of NIEOIE as a theory gives this procedure value and a
theoretical framework.
1.2.3 Macro level
Unfortunately, banking merger is not only problematic in relation to local
economies, but also on the macro level towards the entire national financial systems.
During the crisis in the 1990s, many emerging economies have sold their financial
institutions to foreign banks. Concerning commercial banks the move has been
particular strong in Hungary, Czech Republic and Tanzania. For example, The Czech
Republic has sold off 95% of the banking sector to international financial
institutions. (Arestis et al. 2003) However, instead, of fostering domestic finance,
foreign banks in many countries are exporting national savings to safer havens
thereby increasing financial instability. Moreover, the focus of international banks is
on serving richer clients and multinational investors. Hence, they only provide less
funds for domestic investors. That is dangerous since small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) employ nearly 60% of the Czech workforce and generate about 40% of the
GDP. However, it is estimated that only 2% of SMEs were able to obtain a loan in
2000. (Financial Times December 12, 2001, November 21 2002). Therefore, Arestis
et al. (2003:14) point out that during transformation in many countries the banking
system has simply moved from state ownership to foreign ownership. Although one
can argue that selling the banking system has avoided the enormously costly exercise
in financial liberalisation experienced by other emerging countries, the problem is
not only restricted to less developed countries. New Zealand, for example, just
recently noticed that the central bank lost its control over the banking system with
over 90% of banks are sold to foreign banks, causing just lately the IMF to express a
warning. (New Zealand Bankers Association 2003, IMF 2003) In other words, New
Zealand lost its control over interest and exchange rates and hence, over its political
governance because it followed the ‘financial efficiency approach’.
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1.2.4 Summary of the ‘inefficiency’ of ‘efficient’ banking
The findings suggest that financial fragmentation is not only a subject for
LDCs, but also for DCs because local bank branch closure in poor areas increases
stagnation and therefore, fragmentation between rich and poor areas. Further,
increased bank consolidation, with bigger banks buying smaller banks, decreases
investment in small medium enterprises (SME). While according to mainstream
financial market theories, the efficiency of the banking system increases, the growth
potential of poorer areas decreases. Similar for poorer countries selling their entire
national banking system global efficiency is increased, but national growth potential
is decreased. In this sense, the efficiency approach on a global level causes
inefficiency on the national level. In this context, NIEOIE has relevance in
demonstrating the importance of local dynamic for national growth potential and
allowing for efficiency aspects at the same time. The approach does not argue in
favour of a closed or open financial system as in the Keynesian/Monetarist debate,
rather it emphasises the view on the individual condition of one country under
particular circumstances. NIEOIE highlights that not ‘one theory’ has to be followed;
rather a careful consideration of the current political and economic situation is
necessary. In this context, efficiency aspects have to be replaced with a system
analysis.
1.3 Germany
Throughout the dissertation, the focus was on financial market theories and
financial market practices with the intention to examine whether they can be growth
enhancing while rejecting informal mechanisms. As the findings suggest that this is
not the case the question is if the political practice in some countries looks different
from the theory. Apparently, Germany is such a case, as will be shown at the
example the ‘Sparkasse’ (1.3.1) and the political attitude towards the international
interests of the ‘Deutsche Bank’ (1.3.2). In this context, NIEOIE is applied by a
developed country as will be shown in section (1.3.3).
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1.3.1 The ‘Sparkasse’
It is very interesting that the arguments above and the theory of NIEOIE are
indeed a fact in relation to Germany.68 Just recently, the European Union expressed
criticism on Germanys Sparkasse. (EU September 2003) The interesting feature of
the Sparkasse, apart from the fact that Germany acts as lender of last resort, is that
25% of each bank branch is locally owned, or in other words, owned by the
community. Additionally, each community has the right to sell its ownership to other
banks although this is currently very seldom happening. (see contemporary
discussion on Sparkasse Strahlsund) The European Union criticises that the
involvement of local politics with local finance contradicts the assumption of free
markets and efficiency. According to orthodox economic theory the arguments are
right. However, very often and particular from poorer regions Sparkasse manager
pronounce that if they would not get involved with local politics, regional investment
and growth would be negligible or even absent. There is not doubt that the major of
‘Strahlsund’ is also deeply involved with the activities of the local Sparkasse.
Nevertheless this involvement can have negative impact as well positive influences
and the decision to abandon the ‘Sparkasse system’ has to be considered carefully
and may be even on a case to case basis. On a theoretical base, the concept of the
‘Sparkasse’ gains theoretical validity from NIEOIE aspects The German Sparkasse is
particularly interesting in the background of regulated-unregulated institution,
because it acts like a semi-regulated institution. The bank is linked to the national
banking system, but particular credit arrangements are subject to ‘informal’ forces.69
In this context, the ‘Sparkasse’ reflects NIEOIE theorising that efficiency is
sometimes, but not always, the only growth enhancing variable and that informal
social network conditions are equally important.
                                                
68 It is important to note, that Germany belongs to the few countries world wide which does not suffer
from bank branch closure due to the existence of Sparkassen and Raifeisen Banken.
69 Under this perspective it would be very interesting to investigate the relevance and appropriateness
of Basel II. Basel II constructed categories of credit supply according to business, i.e. independent
how successful a construction company or a bakery is, credit supply is fixed according to the world
wide agreement of how much credit would be healthy to supply towards construction companies or
bakeries.
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1.3.2 The ‘Deutsche Bank’
Another subject for NIEOIE is that German banks operating on an
international level, such as Deutsche Bank, Commerz Bank, Dresdner Bank etc., are
temporarily very ‘cheap’ to buy for other international banks like The Royal Bank of
Scotland, HSBC, City Bank etc. Since the German banks are not only cheap, but also
in very good shape foreign banks just recently expressed a request to the German
government if they would be ‘allowed’ to overtake them. (Spiegel, September 2003)
So far, the German government has not answered these requests, but they will have
to. I believe in questions like these, it would be a great mistake to use orthodox
economic theory as a foundation for action. The effort of a national government
should not be on fulfilling a ‘global efficiency’ goal, instead, they should attempt to
improve ‘national efficiency’ under social, political and economic aspects. This is
exactly the area of relevance of NIE.
1.3.3 Summary Germany
Apparently, Germany applies NIEOIE and not mainstream economics in
many different areas. For example, the ‘Sparkasse’ combines local dynamics with the
national system. Similarly, just recently, the German government intervened in the
international activities of the Deutsche Bank by offering the Post Bank cheaply with
the attempt to gain greater national involvement. The political process was supported
by Germans large and medium enterprises which were afraid that the national
banking system would provide too little national investment opportunities. These
arguments are difficult to find in economic textbooks, but still reflect the theory of
NIEOIE. Additionally the concept of NIEOIE with its greater focus on informal
forces can be found in the unanticipated success of Ich-Ag’s and the increased
involvement of the KfW in microlending. It seems that the political application of
NIEOIE is three steps ahead than the theoretical development – at least in Germany.
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1.4 Conclusion Part IV
The findings suggest that bank branch closure in rural and poor areas in DCs
cause the exclusion of a population segment causing situation demonstrating
similarities with financial fragmentation in LDCs. Although the exploration of
similarities and differences of community banking and microfinance institutions is
still at an early stage the reality of financial exclusion for each affected group mirrors
the inability of the formal banking system to meet the requirements of the poor. Why
is this interesting? The point is while the concept of efficiency caused rapid
development in some areas of LDCs, and hence, causing a “North in the South”, the
equivalent forces are decisive for financial exclusion in DCs and the creation of a
“South in the North”. In contrast to LDCs in DCs, financial exclusion is born from
the excess of market forces rather than their underdevelopment. New technology has
led to the ability of financial service providers to segment their markets effectively in
the context of competition. Hence, banks are being forced to ensure that returns in
any market segment are being maximised and cross-subsidy between different parts
of the business is being kept to minimums. While the problem of financial market
fragmentation, due to imperfect information and high transactions costs exists in the
South, the volume of information and low transaction costs in the North are creating
new levels of segmentation. (Johnson 1997) Hence, the question comes up to what
extent the concept of efficiency in its orthodox form is useful in relation to the
banking system from a political economy perspective. This is exactly this is the point
highlighted by NIEOIE. By overemphasising efficiency, mainstream economics
neglects the importance of informal mechanisms for growth. In this context, it is not
important of what kind informality is, rather it is important to acknowledge the
impact of informal mechanism for as well, growth as stagnation, and NIEOIE does
so. Hence, NIEOIE is not a new financial market theory, but the findings suggest that
a new financial market approach can only be built on the foundation of NIEOIE.
GENERAL CONCLUSION 163
GENERAL CONCLUSION
The dissertation started by citing Goodfellow’s view about the ‘two economic
systems’, one for the ‘primitive people’, the other for ‘modern people’. While
reading his view today, most probably a smile will come to the face. It seems
ridiculous, inappropriate and, in a funny, way extremely political incorrect. An old
fashioned comment announced by an antique scholar a long time ago. However, after
examining the situation of financial dualism in less developed countries it became
apparent that this view is not forgotten, rather it is well alive, although hidden under
the political correct ‘curtain of financial liberalisation. While today nobody would
dare to talk about ‘primitive people’ and two economic systems it is still the
underlying assumption of contemporary financial market theories.
Goodfellow wrote: “When it is asked indeed, whether modern economic
theory can be taken as applying to primitive life, we can only answer that if it does
not apply to the whole of humanity then it is meaningless”. (1939:3) Applying the
same argument, scholars today explain informal institutional functions with ‘modern
economic theory’. This becomes particular obvious through the neglect of
differentiating between the ‘informal’ and the ‘formal’ financial institution.
According to economic theory an institution either way, is always an efficient
solution towards a collective action problem, constrained by shared mental models
and bounded rationality. However, as apparent from many case studies informality
has individual characteristics and mechanisms which are not captured by modern
economic theory focusing solely on information constraints. By neglecting the
differences between informal and formal financial institutions, economic theory
neglects the existence of informality. Apparently, this wouldn’t be of any
consequences, if it was limited to a few ‘primitive people’, but with over 80 percent
of the world’s population being reliant on those informal institutions the connection
of economic theory and reality becomes questionable. Furthermore, macroeconomic
policy making becomes difficult while economic theory turns out to be inconsistent.
In this context, the intention of the dissertation was to bring together insights
from economic theory and development economics. Within the field of development
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economics the consideration of non-economic variables for policy making is
commonly pursued although not captured in economic theory. On the other hand, the
institutional thought is well alive and could provide the theoretical foundation for
future financial market theories if the theoretical discourse of NIE and OIE is left
beside. The requirement for such a new theory is continuously rising not only in less
developed countries. Increased segmentation within developed countries accelerates
the need for a new understanding of financial market mechanisms while highlighting
the inefficiency of efficient banking. Scholar’s today talk about a ‘South in the
North’ implying social and economic exclusion, while they simultaneously talk about
a ‘North in the South’, meaning prosperous spots of growth within developing
countries. In this sense Goodfellows (1939:5) two economic systems are still alive
and it is time to acknowledge the importance of both for sustainable economic
development. While Goodfellow argued that a ‘correlation between the two systems
of economic would then be so vast’ that he chooses not to consider it, I believe that
after 65 years at least the attempt should be made to create such a correlation
furthermore I suggest that this is possible within the framework of NIEOIE.
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